spotfxtrader

I wrote this in response to a friend complaining about Greek irresponsibility.

The other angle is the corruption of the banking system as it’s currently structured and the complicity of the EU so called creditors i.e. Merkel, (where Germany is the main beneficiary of the Euro) in conjunction with the ECB’s Draghi and Lagarde of the IMF.

There is no tangible value backing ‘money’ in the current fiat banking system. Banks create money when they make loans; all money is loaned into existence. This is confirmed in the BofE Quarterly bulletin from just over a year ago here.

This is done at no material cost to the bank, and yet the payment of the interest requires the investment of intellectual or physical labour of the borrower, which is a material cost. Furthermore, the charging of interest (for risk ?) where the bank can suffer no loss and is not being temporarily deprived of the funds extended as credit (since they didn’t exist prior to the inception of the ‘loan’) means that in reality the entire transaction is utterly inequitable. Fraudulent even, notwithstanding its being legally sanctioned.

At the time the ‘money’ is created, they don’t also create the ‘money’ required to pay the interest, so bankruptcies are an absolute inevitability. It’s musical chairs.

Most of the bailout money ‘given to Greece’ has actually gone to the banks because these loans count as assets on the bank balance sheets and if they get wiped out, bank capital will get reduced, which would cause a deflationary spiral and collapse the entire Eurozone banking system. When you consider that the derivatives exposure of Deutsche Bank is $75 trillion, a 20x multiple of German GDP, this will probably happen anyway, eventually. It’s just a bubble in search of a pin.

Bank balance sheet write downs will be the result of any hard default, whereas QE on the other hand is the way to conduct a silent default and is avidly being pursued by the ECB. So default is not a moral issue for them. But basically the EU has attempted to sacrifice the Greek people in order to keep the banking system afloat and allow them to conduct their own soft default while continuing to extract the output of Greek labour to pay the banker’s salaries. OK, I know that’s a bit of a crude characterisation of the situation.

This entire situation is entirely of the making of the collusion of a large number of players, not least the ECB. By preventing a Greek currency devaluation, the Euro itself is ultimately responsible.

Here’s some more light reading.

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-06-29/good-you-alexis-tsipras-part-1

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-06-29/french-economy-dire-straits-worse-anyone-can-imagine-leaked-nsa-cable-reveals

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-06-25/forget-grexit-madame-frexit-says-france-next-french-presidential-frontrunner-wants-o

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-06-12/deutsche-bank-next-lehman

From Zero hedge – Originally published by Michael Snyder via The Economic Collapse blog,

Get ready for another major worldwide credit crunch. Today, the entire global financial system resembles a colossal spiral of debt. Just about all economic activity involves the flow of credit in some way, and so the only way to have “economic growth” is to introduce even more debt into the system. When the system started to fail back in 2008, global authorities responded by pumping this debt spiral back up and getting it to spin even faster than ever. If you can believe it, the total amount of global debt has risen by $35 trillion since the last crisis. Unfortunately, any system based on debt is going to break down eventually, and there are signs that it is starting to happen once again.

For example, just a few days ago the IMF warned regulators to prepare for a global “liquidity shock“. And on Friday, Chinese authorities announced a ban on certain types of financing for margin trades on over-the-counter stocks, and we learned that preparations are being made behind the scenes in Europe for a Greek debt default and a Greek exit from the eurozone. On top of everything else, we just witnessed the biggest spike in credit application rejections ever recorded in the United States. All of these are signs that credit conditions are tightening, and once a “liquidity squeeze” begins, it can create a lot of fear.

Over the past six months, the Chinese stock market has exploded upward even as the overall Chinese economy has started to slow down. Investors have been using something called “umbrella trusts” to finance a lot of these stock purchases, and these umbrella trusts have given them the ability to have much more leverage than normal brokerage financing would allow. This works great as long as stocks go up. Once they start going down, the losses can be absolutely staggering.

That is why Chinese authorities are stepping in before this bubble gets even worse. Here is more about what has been going on in China from Bloomberg…

China’s trusts boosted their investments in equities by 28 percent to 552 billion yuan ($89.1 billion) in the fourth quarter. The higher leverage allowed by the products exposes individuals to larger losses in the event of stock-market drops, which can be exaggerated as investors scramble to repay debt during a selloff.

In umbrella trusts, private investors take up the junior tranche, while cash from trusts and banks’ wealth-management products form the senior tranches. The latter receive fixed returns while the former take the rest, so private investors are effectively borrowing from trusts and banks.

Margin debt on the Shanghai Stock Exchange climbed to a record 1.16 trillion yuan on Thursday. In a margin trade, investors use their own money for just a portion of their stock purchase, borrowing the rest. The loans are backed by the investors’ equity holdings, meaning that they may be compelled to sell when prices fall to repay their debt.
Overall, China has seen more debt growth than any other major industrialized nation since the last recession. This debt growth has been so dramatic that it has gotten the attention of authorities all over the planet…

Wolfgang Schaeuble, Germany’s finance minister says that “debt levels in the global economy continue to give cause for concern.”

Singling out China in particular, Schaeuble noted that “debt has nearly quadrupled since 2007″, adding that it’s “growth appears to be built on debt, driven by a real estate boom and shadow banks.”

According to McKinsey’s research, total outstanding debt in China increased from $US7.4 trillion in 2007 to $US28.2 trillion in 2014. That figure, expressed as a percentage of GDP, equates to 282% of total output, higher than the likes of other G20 nations such as the US, Canada, Germany, South Korea and Australia.
This credit boom in China has been one of the primary engines for “global growth” in recent years, but now conditions are changing. Eventually, the impact of what is going on in China right now is going to be felt all over the planet.

Over in Europe, the Greek debt crisis is finally coming to a breaking point. For years, authorities have continued to kick the can down the road and have continued to lend Greece even more money.

But now it appears that patience with Greece has run out.

For instance, the head of the IMF says that no delay will be allowed on the repayment of IMF loans that are due next month…

IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde roiled currency and bond markets on Thursday as reports came out of her opening press conference saying that she had denied any payment delay to Greece on IMF loans falling due next month.
Unless Greece concludes its negotiations for a further round of bailout money from the European Union, however, it is not likely to have the money to repay the IMF.
And we are getting reports that things are happening behind the scenes in Europe to prepare for the inevitable moment when Greece will finally leave the euro and go back to their own currency.

For example, consider what Art Cashin told CNBC on Friday…

First, “there were reports in the media [saying] that the ECB and/or banking authorities suggested to banks to get rid of any sovereign Greek debt they had, which suggests that maybe the next step will be Greece exiting,” Cashin told CNBC.
Also, one of Greece’s largest newspapers is reporting that neighboring countries are forcing subsidiaries of Greek banks that operate inside their borders to reduce their risk to a Greek debt default to zero…

According to a report from Kathimerini, one of Greece’s largest newspapers, central banks in Albania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Romania, Serbia, Turkey and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have all forced the subsidiaries of Greek banks operating in those countries to bring their exposure to Greek risk — including bonds, treasury bills, deposits to Greek banks, and loans — down to zero.
Once Greece leaves the euro, that is going to create a tremendous credit crunch in Europe as fear begins to spread like wildfire. Everyone will be wondering which nation will be “the next Greece”, and investors will want to pull their money out of perceived danger zones before they get hammered.

In the past, other European nations have been willing to bend over backwards to accommodate Greece and avoid this kind of mess, but those days appear to be finished. In fact, the finance minister of France openly admits that the French “are not sympathetic to Greece”…

Greece isn’t winning much sympathy from its debt-wracked European counterparts as the country draws closer to default for failing to make bailout repayments.
“We are not sympathetic to Greece,” French Finance Minister Michael Sapin said in an interview at the International Monetary Fund-World Bank spring meetings here.
“We are demanding because Greece must comply with the European (rules) that apply to all countries,” Sapin said.
Yes, it is possible that another short-term deal could be reached which could kick the can down the road for a few more months.

But either way, things in Europe are going to continue to get worse.

Meanwhile, very disappointing earnings reports in the U.S. are starting to really rattle investors.

For example, we just learned that GE lost 13.6 billion dollars in the first quarter…

One week following the announcement that it would dismantle most of its GE Capital financing operations to instead focus on its industrial roots, General Electric reported a first quarter loss of $13.6 billion.

The results were impacted by charges relating to the conglomerate’s strategic shift. A year ago GE reported a first quarter profit of $3 billion.
That is a lot of money.

How in the world does a company lose 13.6 billion dollars in a single quarter during an “economic recovery”?

Other big firms are reporting disappointing earnings numbers too…

In earnings news, American Express Co. late Thursday said its results were hurt by the strong U.S. dollar, which reduced revenue booked in other countries. Chief Executive Kenneth Chenault reiterated the company’s forecast that 2015 earnings will be flat to modestly down year over year. Shares fell 4.6%.

Advanced Micro Devices Inc. said its first-quarter loss widened as revenue slumped. The company said it was exiting its dense server systems business, effective immediately. Revenue and the loss excluding items missed expectations, pushing shares down 13%.
And just like we saw just before the financial crisis of 2008, Americans are increasingly having difficulty meeting their financial obligations.

For instance, the delinquency rate on student loans has reached a very frightening level…

More borrowers are failing to make payments on their student loans five years after leaving college, painting a grim picture for borrowers, according to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Student debt continues to increase, especially for people who took out loans years ago. Those who left school in the Great Recession, which ended in 2009, had particular difficulty with repayment, with many defaulting, becoming seriously delinquent or not being able to reduce their balances, the New York Fed said today.

Only 37 percent of borrowers are current on their loans and are actively paying them down, and 17 percent are in default or in delinquency.
At this point, the American consumer is pretty well tapped out. If you can believe it, 56 percent of all Americans have subprime credit today, and as I mentioned above, we just witnessed the biggest spike in credit application rejections ever recorded.

We have reached a point of debt saturation, and the credit crunch that is going to follow is going to be extremely painful.

Of course the biggest provider of global liquidity in recent years has been the Federal Reserve. But with the Fed pulling back on QE, this is creating some tremendous challenges all over the globe. The following is an excerpt from a recent article in the Telegraph…

The big worry is what will happen to Russia, Brazil and developing economies in Asia that borrowed most heavily in dollars when the Fed was still flooding the world with cheap liquidity. Emerging markets account to roughly half of the $9 trillion of offshore dollar debt outside US jurisdiction.

The IMF warned that a big chunk of the debt owed by companies is in the non-tradeable sector. These firms lack “natural revenue hedges” that can shield them against a double blow from rising borrowing costs and a further surge in the dollar.
So what is the bottom line to all of this?

The bottom line is that we are starting to see the early phases of a liquidity squeeze.

The flow of credit is going to begin to get tighter, and that means that global economic activity is going to slow down.

This happened during the last financial crisis, and during this next financial crisis the credit crunch is going to be even worse.

This is why it is so important to have an emergency fund. During this type of crisis, you may have to be the source of your own liquidity. At a time when it seems like nobody has any cash, those that do have some will be way ahead of the game.

http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/11/07/EZ_BNKEXP0711_SB.html

We are going to keep throwing good money after bad and work as hard as we can to transfer the debt that is on the banks to the ECB and European taxpayers as long as the voters will let us. This first tranche will be another €109 billion. That will last a few years, and Greece will only have to pay about 3.5% on that debt and the rollover debt, and people who expected to be repaid in that period will see payment extended to either 15 or 30 years.

hahahaha….

you mugs….

Call my chauffeur and get me back to my taxpayer funded penthouse…

From Jeremy Warner in the Telegraph

Like a slow-motion car crash, all eyes are fixed in horror on the political chaos into which Greece is descending.

So desperate has the nation’s plight become that even economic suicide seems preferable to the austerity European neighbours seem minded, brutally, to impose upon it.

For the birthplace of European civilisation and modern democracy to boot, there could hardly be a more ignominious descent.

If the tax rises, spending cuts and state sell-offs of the ruling government’s medium term financial strategy (MTFS) aren’t approved, then assuming international policymakers are as good as their word, all future IMF/eurozone loans will cease.

In such circumstances, sovereign debt default would follow within days, and government, unable to pay its bills, would grind to a halt.

Given Greece’s comparatively recent history of junta rule, it would surely only be a matter of time before the military stepped into the ensuing political vacuum.

Unthinkable for an apparently advanced economy? Well, perhaps, but the unthinkable has had a nasty habit of becoming true these past four years.

Whatever the eventual outcome, we are now well past the point where matters are capable of happy resolution. What’s happening is plainly a tragedy for Greece, but just how serious is it for the rest of the eurozone?

In terms of the big numbers, it might scarcely seem to matter. Greece accounts for under 3pc of eurozone output.

If Greece were to vanish into a black hole tomorrow, the European economy as a whole would hardly notice. The same goes for the other peripheral eurozone nations that have availed themselves of the bail-out funds – Ireland and Portugal. The three countries combined account for less than 7pc of eurozone GDP.

Their troubles would be nobody’s but their own if these nations had sovereign currencies and monetary policies. As everyone knows, sadly that’s not the case.

That all three are joined at the hip through the single currency to the rest of the eurozone makes the tragedy of the periphery very much everyone else’s, too. The periphery has come to threaten the core.

Against this wider, existential threat to the single currency, the “will they, won’t they?” see-saw over giving Greece more bail-out money, and the interminable debate over whether private creditors might be required to take haircuts in return, make up something of a sideshow.

You’d have thought that Athens has virtually no cards left to play, yet the threat its travails pose to the eurozone as a whole gives Greece something of a whip hand. In the game of brinkmanship currently being played out in Athens and Brussels, Greece is not entirely without negotiating power.

Give us the money, the Greeks can say, or we’ll pull the whole house down with us. As Europe’s policy elite is only too painfully aware, the cost of refusing is likely to be infinitely greater than that of coughing up, however politically unpalatable it might seem to the solvent north. Neither the IMF nor the eurozone can afford to let Greece go.

Yet disingenuously, the pretence is maintained that the crisis is no more than a bit of fiscal ill-discipline in the profligate fringe that corrective austerity can easily eradicate.

Unfortunately, it’s much more serious than that, for the fiscal crisis now manifesting itself in sky-high sovereign bond yields is just part of an ongoing and European-wide banking crisis.

Let’s for the moment forget the bit of the crisis that grabs all the headlines right now – the meltdown in the periphery’s public finances – and instead focus on what’s happening in the banking system. Here we are seeing a continued “run” on the banks of vulnerable countries not unlike that which befell the UK at the height of the credit crunch.

This is an entirely rational response by depositors. Any country condemned to years of austerity and economic contraction is likely to experience a massive bad debt problem in its domestic lending, rendering much of the banking system insolvent.

On top of that, there’s the risk of sovereign debt default and/or enforced departure from the euro and consequent steep currency depreciation. No one in their right mind would keep their money in a Greek or Irish bank right now.

Fear of capital controls and/or the re-establishment of national currencies to stem the outflow and restore competitiveness has naturally served to exaggerate the phenomenon. The mentality is fast becoming one of get out now while you still can. It scarcely needs saying that the moment capital controls are imposed, it’s game over. The country that does so is effectively out of the euro.

With high dependence on foreign funding, the Irish banking system is particularly vulnerable to this capital flight. As deposits flee the country, the banks are forced back on to the lender-of-last-resort facilities operated by their central banks.

These central banks will in turn use the collateral to borrow from other eurozone central banks, the chief lender being the Bundesbank.

The whole system has become hopelessly enmeshed. It’s almost impossible to disentangle it in a cost-free way. Greece, Ireland and Portugal are one thing, but if they are joined by Spain, then that’s a different story.

At that point, the proportion of GDP accounted for by the troubled periphery rises to 26pc, and you might want to think seriously about getting your money out of the German banking system, too.

In so far as it is possible to discern a rationale behind repeated sovereign debt bail-outs, it seems to be that of buying time.

This time can be used by the banking system to rebuild solvency through earnings retention and, where necessary, recapitalisation. Yet so far, it’s failed to correct the underlying problem in the European periphery, which is one of excessive external indebtedness, both public as well as private.

Unfortunately, the current account imbalances that feed this indebtedness remain as large as ever. Without the natural stabiliser of currency adjustment, there’s nothing to relieve them other than years of grinding deflation.

There are only two ways this can end. Either the surplus core has to accept that it must continue to bail out the periphery on a virtually permanent basis – a transfer union – or the single currency must lose its outer fringe.

Both solutions carry significant cost to the core, the first through gift aid, the second through the crystalisation of bad debt.

It’s a stark choice, but markets seem determined to bring matters to a head.

I am reminded of Ambrose Evans-Pritchard’s comment :

That is what the euro always meant, and why I have always viewed the Project as the malign – chiefly, but not only, because any such European government created to back up EMU would lack a democratic counterweight rooted in legitimacy, and would be inherently authoritarian.

With Greek two year paper ‘yielding’ 27%, the question of a Greek default is no longer a matter of ‘if’, but ‘when and in what form’. Minds are being focussed on what happens to the Euro area, and the Euro itself. Now that we know that the French banks (as signalled by Moody’s downgrade of Crédit Agricole, BNP Paribas and Société Générale) are on the hook for large chunks of Greek debt, the idea of wider contagion must be scaring the shit out of the imbecile euro politicians who have foisted this doomed experiment on the European people.

The question is who wants to be holding Euros while they sort the whole mess out…

from zero hedge

Courtesy of the recently declassified Fed discount window documents, we now know that the biggest beneficiaries of the Fed’s generosity during the peak of the credit crisis were foreign banks, among which Belgium’s Dexia was the most troubled, and thus most lent to, bank. Having been thus exposed, many speculated that going forward the US central bank would primarily focus its “rescue” efforts on US banks, not US-based (or local branches) of foreign (read European) banks: after all that’s what the ECB is for, while the Fed’s role is to stimulate US employment and to keep US inflation modest. And furthermore, should the ECB need to bail out its banks, it could simply do what the Fed does, and monetize debt, thus boosting its assets, while concurrently expanding its excess reserves thus generating fungible capital which would go to European banks. Wrong. Below we present that not only has the Fed’s bailout of foreign banks not terminated with the drop in discount window borrowings or the unwind of the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, but that the only beneficiary of the reserves generated were US-based branches of foreign banks (which in turn turned around and funnelled the cash back to their domestic branches), a shocking finding which explains not only why US banks have been unwilling and, far more importantly, unable to lend out these reserves, but that anyone retaining hopes that with the end of QE2 the reserves that hypothetically had been accumulated at US banks would be flipped to purchase Treasurys, has been dead wrong, therefore making the case for QE3 a done deal. In summary, instead of doing everything in its power to stimulate reserve, and thus cash, accumulation at domestic (US) banks which would in turn encourage lending to US borrowers, the Fed has been conducting yet another stealthy foreign bank rescue operation, which rerouted $600 billion in capital from potential borrowers to insolvent foreign financial institutions in the past 7 months. QE2 was nothing more (or less) than another European bank rescue operation!

For those who can’t wait for the punchline, here it is. Below we chart the total cash holdings of Foreign-related banks in the US using weekly H.8 data.

Note the $630 billion increase in foreign bank cash balances since November 3, which just so happens is the date when the Fed commenced QE2 operations in the form of adding excess reserves to the liability side of its balance sheet. Here is the change in Fed reserves during QE2 (from the Fed’s H.4.1 statement, ending with the week of June 1).

Above, note that Fed reserves increased by $610 billion for the duration of QE2 through the week ending June 1 (and by another $70 billion in the week ending June 8, although since we only have bank cash data through June 1, we use the former number, although we are certain that the bulk of this incremental cash once again went to foreign financial institutions).

So how did cash held by US banks fare during QE2? Well, not good. The chart below demonstrates cash balances at small and large US domestic banks, as well as the cash at foreign banks, all of which is compared to total Fed reserves plotted on the same axis. It pretty much explains it all.

The chart above has tremendous implications for everything from US and European monetary policy, to exhange rate and trade policy, to the current account on both sides of the Atlantic, to US fiscal policy, to borrowing and lending activity in the US, and, lastly, to QE 3.

What is the first notable thing about the above chart is that while cash levels in US and US-based foreign-banks correlate almost perfectly with the Fed’s reserve balances, as they should, there is a notable divergence beginning around May of 2010, or the first Greek bailout, when Europe was in a state of turmoil, and when cash assets of foreign banks jumped by $200 billion, independent of the Fed and of cash holdings by US banks. About 6 months later, this jump in foreign bank cash balances had plunged to the lowest in years, due to repatriated fungible cash being used to plug undercapitalized local operations, with total cash just $265 billion as of November 17, just as QE2 was commencing. Incidentally, the last time foreign banks had this little cash was April 2009… Just as QE1 was beginning. As to what happens next, the first chart above says it all: cash held by foreign banks jumps from $308 billion on November 3, or the official start of QE2, to $940 billion as of June 1: an almost dollar for dollar increase with the increase in Fed reserve balances. In other words, while the Fed did nothing to rescue foreign banks in the aftermath of the first Greek crisis, aside from opening up FX swap lines, one can argue that the whole point of QE2 was not so much to spike equity markets, or the proverbial “third mandate” of Ben Bernanke, but solely to rescue European banks!

What this observation also means, is that the bulk of risk asset purchasing by dealer desks (if any), has not been performed by US-based primary dealers, as has been widely speculated, but by foreign dealers, which have the designation of “Primary” with the Federal Reserve. Below is the list of 20 Primary Dealers currently recognized by the New York Fed. The foreign ones, with US-based operations, are bolded:

BNP Paribas Securities Corp.
Barclays Capital Inc.
Cantor Fitzgerald & Co.
Citigroup Global Markets Inc.
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC
Daiwa Capital Markets America Inc.
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
Goldman, Sachs & Co.
HSBC Securities (USA) Inc.
Jefferies & Company, Inc.
J.P. Morgan Securities LLC
MF Global Inc.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated
Mizuho Securities USA Inc.
Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC
Nomura Securities International, Inc.
RBC Capital Markets, LLC
RBS Securities Inc.
SG Americas Securities, LLC
UBS Securities LLC.

That’s right, out of 20 Primary Dealers, 12 are…. foreign. And incidentally, the reason why we added the (if any) above, is that since this cash is fungible between on and off-shore operations, what happened is that the $600 billion in cash was promptly repatriated and used by domestic branches of foreign banks to fill undercapitalization voids left by exposure to insolvent European PIIGS and for all other bankruptcy-related capital needs. And one wonders why suddenly German banks are so willing to take haircuts on Greek bonds: it is simply because courtesy of their US based branches which have been getting the bulk of the Fed’s dollars in 1 and 0 format, they suddenly find themselves willing and ready to face the mark to market on Greek debt from par to 50 cents on the dollar. And not only Greek, but all other PIIGS, which will inevitably happen once Greece goes bankrupt, either volutnarily or otherwise. In fact, the $600 billion in cash that was repatriated to Europe will mean that European banks likely are fully covered to face the capitalization shortfall that will occur once Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain and possibly Italy are forced to face the inevitable Event of Default that will see their bonds marked down anywhere between 20% and 60%. Of course, this will also expose the ECB as an insolvent central bank, but that largely explains why Germany has been so willing to allow Mario Draghi to take the helm at an institution that will soon be left insolvent, and also explains the recent shocking animosity between Angela Merkel and Jean Claude Trichet: the German are preparing for the end of the ECB, and thanks to Ben Bernanke they are certainly capitalized well enough to handle the end of Europe’s lender of first and last resort. But don’t take our word for this: here is Stone McCarthy’s explanation of what massive reserve sequestering by foreign banks means: “Foreign banks operating in the US often lend reserves to home offices or other banks operating outside the US. These loans do not change the volume of excess reserves in the system, but do support the funding of dollar denominated assets outside the US….Foreign banks operating in the US do not present a large source of C&I, Consumer, or Real Estate Loans. These banks represent about 16% of commercial bank assets, but only about 9% of bank credit. Thus, the concern that excess reserves will quickly fuel lending activities and money growth is probably diminished by the skewing of excess reserve balances towards foreign banks.”

Which brings us to point #2: prepare for the Bernanke hearings and possible impeachment. For if it becomes popular knowledge that the Chairman of the Fed, despite explicit instructions to enforce the trickle down of “printed” dollars to US banks, was only concerned about rescuing foreign banks with the $600 billion in excess cash created out of QE2, then all political hell is about to break loose, and not even Democrats will be able to defend Bernanke’s actions to a public furious with the complete inability to procure a loan. Any loan. Furthermore the data above proves beyond a reasonable doubt why there has been no excess lending by US banks to US borrowers: none of the cash ever even made it to US banks! This also resolves the mystery of the broken money multiplier and why the velocity of money has imploded.

Implication #3 explains why the US dollar has been as week as it has since the start of QE 2. Instead of repricing the EUR to a fair value, somewhere around parity with the USD, this stealthy fund flow from the US to Europe to the tune of $600 billion has likely resulted in an artificial boost in the european currency to the tune of 2000-3000 pips, keeping it far from its fair value of about 1.1 EURUSD. If this data does not send European (read German) exporters into a blind rage, after the realization that the Fed (most certainly with the complicity of the G7) was willing to sacrifice European economic output in order to plug European bank undercapitalization, then nothing will.

But implication #4 is by far the most important. Recall that Bill Gross has long been asking where the cash to purchase bonds come the end of QE 2 would come from. Well, the punditry, in its parroting groupthink stupidity (validated by precisely zero actual research), immediately set forth the thesis that there is no problem: after all banks would simply reverse the process of reserve expansion and use the $750 billion in Cash that will be accumulated by the end of QE 2 on June 30 to purchase US Treasurys.

Wrong.

The above data destroys this thesis completely: since the bulk of the reserve induced bank cash has long since departed US shores and is now being used to ratably fill European bank balance sheet voids, and since US banks have benefited precisely not at all from any of the reserves generated by QE 2, there is exactly zero dry powder for the US Primary Dealers to purchase Treasurys starting July 1.

This observation may well be the missing link that justifies the Gross argument, as it puts to rest any speculation that there is any buyer remaining for Treasurys. Alas: the digital cash generated by the Fed’s computers has long since been spent… a few thousand miles east of the US.

Which leads us to implication #5. QE 3 is a certainty. The one thing people focus on during every episode of monetary easing is the change in Fed assets, which courtesy of LSAP means a jump in Treasurys, MBS, Agency paper, or (for the tin foil brigade) ES: the truth is all these are a distraction. The one thing people always forget is the change in Fed liabilities, all of them: currency in circulation, which has barely budged in the past 3 years, and far more importantly- excess reserves, which as this article demonstrates, is the electronic “cash” that goes to needy banks the world over in order to fund this need or that. In fact, it is the need to expand the Fed’s liabilities that is and has always been a driver of monetary stimulus, not the need to boost Fed assets. The latter is, counterintuitively, merely a mathematical aftereffect of matching an asset-for-liability expansion. This means that as banks are about to face yet another risk flaring episode in the next several months, the Fed will need to release another $500-$1000 billion in excess reserves. As to what asset will be used to match this balance sheet expansion, why take your picK; the Fed could buy MBS, Muni bonds, Treasurys, or go Japanese, and purchase ETFs, REITs, or just go ahead and outright buy up every underwater mortgage in the US. This side of the ledger is largely irrelevant, and will serve only two functions: to send the S&P surging, and to send the precious metal complex surging2 as it becomes clear that the dollar is now entirely worthless.

That said, of all of the above, the one we are most looking forward to is the impeachment of Ben Bernanke: because if there is one definitive proof of the Fed abdicating any and all of its mandates, and merely playing the role of globofunder explicitly at the expense of US consumers and borrowers, not to mention lackey for the banking syndicate, this is it.

the dots are gradually joining up

from zero hedge

Here Is What Happens After Greece Defaults

Submitted by Tyler Durden on 05/21/2011 19:49 -0400

When it comes to the topic of Greece, by now everyone is sick of prevaricating European politicians who even they admit are lying openly to the media, and tired of conflicted investment banks trying to make the situation appear more palatable if only they dress it in some verbally appropriate if totally ridiculous phrase (which just so happens contracts to SLiME). The truth is Greece will fold like a lawn chair: whether it’s tomorrow (which would be smartest for everyone involved) or in 1 years, when the bailout money runs out, is irrelevant. The question then is what will happen after the threshold of nevernever land is finally breached, and Kickthecandowntheroad world once again reverts to the ugly confines of reality. Luckily, the Telegraph’s Andrew Lilico presents what is arguably the most realistic list of the consequences of crossing the senior bondholder Styx compiled to date.

What happens when Greece defaults. Here are a few things:

Every bank in Greece will instantly go insolvent.
The Greek government will nationalise every bank in Greece.
The Greek government will forbid withdrawals from Greek banks.
To prevent Greek depositors from rioting on the streets, Argentina-2002-style (when the Argentinian president had to flee by helicopter from the roof of the presidential palace to evade a mob of such depositors), the Greek government will declare a curfew, perhaps even general martial law.
Greece will redenominate all its debts into “New Drachmas” or whatever it calls the new currency (this is a classic ploy of countries defaulting)
The New Drachma will devalue by some 30-70 per cent (probably around 50 per cent, though perhaps more), effectively defaulting 0n 50 per cent or more of all Greek euro-denominated debts.
The Irish will, within a few days, walk away from the debts of its banking system.
The Portuguese government will wait to see whether there is chaos in Greece before deciding whether to default in turn.
A number of French and German banks will make sufficient losses that they no longer meet regulatory capital adequacy requirements.
The European Central Bank will become insolvent, given its very high exposure to Greek government debt, and to Greek banking sector and Irish banking sector debt.
The French and German governments will meet to decide whether (a) to recapitalise the ECB, or (b) to allow the ECB to print money to restore its solvency. (Because the ECB has relatively little foreign currency-denominated exposure, it could in principle print its way out, but this is forbidden by its founding charter. On the other hand, the EU Treaty explicitly, and in terms, forbids the form of bailouts used for Greece, Portugal and Ireland, but a little thing like their being blatantly illegal hasn’t prevented that from happening, so it’s not intrinsically obvious that its being illegal for the ECB to print its way out will prove much of a hurdle.)
They will recapitalise, and recapitalise their own banks, but declare an end to all bailouts.
There will be carnage in the market for Spanish banking sector bonds, as bondholders anticipate imposed debt-equity swaps.
This assumption will prove justified, as the Spaniards choose to over-ride the structure of current bond contracts in the Spanish banking sector, recapitalising a number of banks via debt-equity swaps.
Bondholders will take the Spanish Banking Sector to the European Court of Human Rights (and probably other courts, also), claiming violations of property rights. These cases won’t be heard for years. By the time they are finally heard, no-one will care.
Attention will turn to the British banks. Then we shall see…

Contagion.

From Simon Black

The world is now divided into essentially three categories:
(1) those nations that can effectively sidestep catastrophic meltdown;
(2) those nations that cannot avoid meltdown, but can afford to kick the can down the road
(3) those nations that must face their grim, unavoidable meltdown reality now

The United States, for better or worse, is in category 2. Politicians can keep pretending that the wheels on the bus go ’round and ’round because, at present, there are too many other countries in category 3… namely, much of Europe.

Greece is on the brink of official insolvency… yet in an exceedingly bizarre interview with German news magazine Der Spiegel published today, Jean-Claude Junker insists that (a) Greece is not broke, (b) if Greece doesn’t make its debt payments, this is not the same as ‘default,’ and (c) it’s OK for politicians to lie because people don’t understand capital markets.

(*Note, suspension of disbelief IS required to read this interview; Junker caps it off with a metaphoric riddle, “If the donkey were a cat it could climb a tree. But it is not a cat,” which has about as much insight as “Confucius say: Man who go to bed with itchy butt wake up with smelly finger….”)

As the Prime Minister of Luxembourg and president of the Euro Group, Junker is a very important figure in European finance… and in the interview, he makes it quite clear where his priorities lie: with the bankers.

As Junker states, “If Greece were to declare a national bankruptcy tomorrow, the country would have no access to the international financial market for years to come, and its most important creditors, the banks in Germany and Europe, would have an enormous problem…”

Well, certainly no one should expect Europe’s banks to suffer their own losses after making idiotic loans to corrupt governments. It’s much easier to stick the people with the bill by establishing a trillion dollar bailout fund with taxpayer money.

Problem is, people in Europe are starting to wake up and get it.

The anti-euro “True Finn” party in Finland recently surged in the polls to become the country’s third-largest political party and a major obstacle for any European bailout. This weekend, Spain’s ruling Socialist party was hammered with losses as voters voiced their utter disgust with the current government’s handling of the economy.

In Germany, this year’s state election results are showing that voters are sick and tired of shouldering the financial burden for the rest of Europe. Chancellor Angela Merkel’s ruling party is losing miserably, though in a pathetically desperate move, some local governments are changing suffrage limits and allowing 16-year olds to vote.

This is the strongest indicator yet of how bad the situation in Europe has become: German banks are so over-exposed to the PIIGS sovereign debt that, in the face of political revolt all across Europe, German politicians have resorted to recruiting the Justin Bieber crowd to maintain the status quo.

Simply put, if Greece fails, the banks will collapse, and European financial markets will tank. Politicians will stop at nothing to prevent this from happening… including sticking every man, woman, and child with the bailout bill, as well as pulling socialist-minded teenagers into the voting booths to ensure they stay in power.

Eventually, though, these efforts will prove fruitless. Greece has two months of cash left… and a default by any other name is still a default. The ‘have’ nations in Europe don’t want to foot the bailout bill any more than the ‘have not’ nations in Europe want to accept deep austerity measures.

This is going to cause a lot of turmoil in Europe in the short-term… and as the US government has successfully kicked its can down the road through late summer thanks to the Treasury Department plundering public pension money, investors are free to get their worry on in Europe.

I would suspect gold and silver in euro terms to do quite well as the market looks around, once and for all and realizes that there are truly no good major currency alternatives. This could be the start of a chain reaction.

The “Game Over” Redux
Submitted by Tyler Durden on 05/19/2011 21:01 -0400

Back in November, we posted a piece by Knight Research titled “The Game Is Over” in which the firm’s strategist Mark Lapolla presented his thesis why he believes that “the structural and cyclical terms of global trade have finally reached their tipping point. This will catalyze a wholesale change in sentiment and a historic repositioning of risk assets. The emerging market global growth story is over.” And while the article came out just as the barrage of $750 billion in daily POMOs courtesy of QE2 was starting and hence masked the true state of reality, now that QE2 is finishing, it is only appropriate to bring Mark back up front, as the imminent and very violent convergence of the rosy myth that is the stock market, and of the underlying miserable reality, is about to wake up all those who have been dozing under the Printer Piper of Eccleslin’s soothing tune, and Lapolla’s thesis is about to see its first validation. In essence, while we have heard much from those who claim that the end game will come as a result of hyperinflation, Lapolla is convinced in the opposite: namely that the end will be not a bang but a hyperdeflationary whimper. In order to refresh readers with his thoughts, recently Lapolla conducted an interview with the master questioner Kate Welling in which the Knight strategist laid out his uber-bearish case in more gruesome detail than most can stomach. Below we present the key points from his interview, as well as the full thing subsequently.

In a nutshell, and this won’t come as a surprise to anyone, Lapolla believes that “the game is over because there is no collateral… When consumer debt is rooted 75%-plus in residential real estate and residential real estate is impaired, easy Federal Reserve monetary policy simply cannot make it to Main Street. The transmission mechanism is broken. There is no conduit. ”

Lapolla’s observations on the secular shift in the employment structure:

What’s going on here is very simple. John Maynard Keynes wrote a letter entitled, “Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren “in 1930, in which he coined the term “technological unemployment.” He said it’s a term nobody has heard of, but you are going to be hearing a lot about it. Of course, he was writing about the use of technology to supplant labor in the factory… Any way you slice it, nominal wages, real wages, hourly wages, the duration of unemployment — all of these measures imply that we have a growing structural fracture in the labor markets.

On the irrelevance of week to week and month to month micro fluctuations in the jobs numbers:

Right now, the full employment gap is running about 11 million jobs. That’s a shocking gap and, although this is very difficult to quantify, we have a sinking suspicion that — while a number of the jobs that are being created right now might in fact be “good jobs” – they’re being filled by over-qualified labor no longer able to wait for jobs at compensation levels similar to what they had before. Now, in the very long run, this might work itself out, but in the short run it doesn’t do anything to change the outlook for the consumer. What it does is suggest that people are going to have to shift down the way they live and the way they expect to live — perhaps even further than they already have. Thus, the propensity to save in this country has to continue to rise — which (although not in the short term) is very bullish long term — whether that’s captured in the aggregate data or not. So as you’ve gathered, we are very different from consensus, first and foremost, when it comes to the secular structure of labor and credit in the U.S.

On the previously discussed topic of Squatter’s Rent (discussed extensively here):

There are roughly six to seven million folks who are no longer paying on the mortgages on their homes, so if we do some really simple arithmetic, it suggests in the aggregate as much as $100 billion of annualized consumer income is being freed up to find its way into consumer spending elsewhere in the economy, instead of going towards the satisfaction of housing debt…, the real question is if, or when, does the foreclosure mechanism begin to kick back into gear and then accelerate? At this juncture, there really isn’t a tremendous amount of evidence that it’s going to accelerate. Let me give you a tangible example. We know someone who has lost his job and is in a home with a $1.45 million mortgage. The house is on the market at $1.3 million, which we guess is the degree to which the home has been written down on the books of the mortgage holder. The property taxes on the home are about $20,000 a year, so he has been expecting an eviction notice or a foreclosure proceeding for almost 18 months. Yet his property taxes have been mysteriously paid every year. What is going on is clear: If the bank or whomever holds that mortgage note were to foreclose, the house’s liquidation value is prob¬ably about $900,000. So they would have to take a further $400,000 writedown on that mortgage. Which makes paying $20,000 a year in property taxes, look like a relative bargain.

On Europe’s state of suspended animation:

Europe right now is still kicking the deflationary can down the street; trying to postpone and prolong the inevitable. Meanwhile, they’re trying to cover their tracks with verbiage claiming they’re pursing mandated fiscal and monetary austerity policies and monetary policy. But the ECB’s bump up in rates of 25 basis points isn’t material. And all of this is intensifying the deflationary pressures on the periphery countries. So Europe is in a state of suspended animation, where the deflationary pressures are spilling out but even the sort of modest financial restructuring the United States is trying is still being resisted. It’s clearly not a stable situation.

On the “China” question:

I think the China situation, how¬ever, is profoundly obvious and profoundly simple. The idea that the free world is placing its hope in a repressive, communist regime employing command and control economic management while violating trade protections and human rights everywhere is absolutely astounding, amazing. I would suggest that, in itself, should be a sufficient warning flag. But let’s be a lot more specific. I actually see the situation in China as very analogous to the U.S. in 1929 and Japan in the 1980s….I’ll just tick off eight similarities between China circa 2011 and the U.S. before the Depression. 1) Massive disparity of wealth, income, and education. 2) Rapid industrialization and displacement of labor. 3) Opaque and misleading economic and financial data. 4) Massive build-up of leverage across the “rising” class. 5) Bubbles in both residential real estate and fixed asset/infrastructure development. 6) Accelerating and uncontrolled growth in disintermediated credit. 7) Expected transference of economic growth to domestic demand. And, finally, an accelerating price/wage spiral. Nonetheless, to China’s credit, they have a booming economy which has drawn the attention, admiration and certainly the economic aspirations of the world. The irony is, despite its hubris, China appears to have lost control — and has done so by doing everything it could to avoid that. Essentially, in its own zeal to placate its masses with rapid growth, China has created a tide of inflation that threatens it with wide-spread social unrest. But if it crushes speculation and clamps down on credit, it risks a deflationary collapse that would also threaten social harmony. The upshot is that China no longer controls its own destiny. The free markets do. As an aside, I would suggest that in the not-too distant future, when this all unravels, there will be downside as well as upside for the U.S., particularly as it relates to what we were talking about before, the way the U.S. has benefited from the value of intellectual property versus scale.

On China’s Lewis Point (discussed extensively here):

If there was one thing that pushed us over the edge to publish it last November, it was our belief, now confirmed, that China and an increasing number of other emerging markets are caught in a price/wage spirals that they’re not going to be able to control through monetary, fiscal or legislative policy. These are an inevitable result, not only of the credit boom, but of the manufacturing engine they’re living by. This is the great differentiator between the U.S. and China. The reason a systemic inflation cannot happen here for a long time and why it is happening in China is simply this: When labor is in the business of manufacturing goods (as opposed intellectual property or services), labor has a call on rising finished goods prices. When commodities prices begin to increase and manufacturers attempt to raise finished goods prices, wage rates must go up or labor’s value is necessarily diminished. This is the dynamic traditional U.S. manufacturing businesses faced decades ago, and now, in China, it has reached epic proportions. We’ve seen 20% to 30% wage increases by the government on the low end and by contract manufacturers such as Foxconn (FXCNF), which does the Apple (AAPL) iPhone, on the high end. It has raised wage rates, almost 30%. China bulls believe this wage inflation is good for workers and so ultimately is going to help China accelerate consumer demand as an engine of their growth. Nonetheless, it hasn’t and won’t, for a couple of reasons. 1) Savings rates actually are rising in the major city centers. 2) China’s consumer confidence numbers and research on the ground in China both show that labor has never been less secure than they are now, which seems paradoxical. One would think that China’s new¬found international power, along with higher incomes, would make Chinese workers feel all is right with the world. The problem is that the cost of living is growing even faster. Without getting too technical, China has probably crossed over what’s called, in academic theory, the Lewis Point, where the movement of labor from agriculture into manufacturing reaches a peak and begins to taper off as manufacturing labor begins to reconsider whether life in fact wasn’t better back on the farm.

On the link between inflation and money:

Increased money supply is not a causal factor for inflation. It’s like suggesting that a bartender is a causal factor for alcoholism. In reality, reserves, whether they exist in the system’s books or not, are always available. Credit creation cannot really be controlled. If you and I want to create a loan between ourselves, we can do it. If a bank wants to create a loan, it can do it. The only thing that can mitigate that ability is regulation of the banks. However, if we consider the off-balance-sheet and shadow banking mechanisms, there really is no way to control that credit creation. The only way the Federal Reserve can influence credit creation is by raising or lowering short-term rates. With that said, we’re at the outer bound, at zero, and what we’re finding is that demand for money is not increasing as the cost of money goes to zero — which is not unlike what we saw in Japan. What is happening, however, as ever when the cost of money stays this low, is that speculators are inclined to speculate because the cost of speculation on leverage is negligible.

The reason why, in Lapolla’s opinion, the Fed has failed in generating systemic inflation (and why the Fed will keep coming back, and doing the same wrong things over and over until everything finally breaks)

The reason [we don’t have systemic inflation] is that the labor markets are fractured. So, at the end of the day, what we’re having now is an asset inflation again, an echo. We’re not seeing the seeds or leading edge of wage/price inflation, the true driver of damaging systemic inflation. Asset inflation resolves itself in one way, and one way only, and that’s through asset deflation. So we have ongoing asset deflation in the residential real estate market. We have ongoing asset deflation in the commercial real estate market and we will ultimately have asset deflation across China and Asia.

On what would happen to the global economy if the dollar were to collapse versus the euro and commodities:

Global deflation and depression are what would happen.

On what self-cannibalizing HFT algorithms means for volume and for the markets in general.

Doesn’t it necessarily imply that there must be real inefficiencies in pricing on the table, for long-term investors, if everyone is totally focused on the short term? So, suggesting that “the game is over” has implications across the board. It has implications in terms of the way asset allocators think about investing, the way their money managers think about deploying capital, and ultimately about the way corporate managers think about deploying shareholder capital. We in effect are in this very awkward “teenage” stage where we’ve just had this fracturing shock, the credit crash, the exposing of all the financial hubris and misallocation of capital. We haven’t even moved to credibly addressing those issues in Europe and we’re still holding onto the notion that the emerging markets — which are just getting their first taste of capitalism on the back of reckless credit expansion and speculation — can somehow become the engine that overwhelms the massive deleveraging of the developed world. It’s a preposterous notion. I’m not being fatalistic. This is the way history moves. In 30 years, it will be clear to people, looking back, that this is the final chapter of the old story in which finance, financiers, leverage and short-term trading ruled the world.

On what the “sequel” is:

We’re moving towards something that, by definition, is going to have to address the real structural issues — in the U.S., fractured labor markets, still-excessive credit and unsupportable levels of debt tied to homes, a rising propensity to save, bleak expectations for wages and investment returns. From our vantage point, it’s only a question of timing. But it’s entirely possible that there won’t be an asymmetrically positive outcome for the globe. “Growth” is not a fait accompli. In fact, there can and probably should be periods, lengthy periods, of virtually no growth; of consolidation and pruning. So we would reject the notion that growth necessarily has to happen. Very marginal, just population-type, growth could in fact be the order of the day, and that implies a re-pricing of risk capital across the board.

Lastly, his investment advice:

Those who are bit more speculative, we’re encouraging to pick a spot where they will buy the U.S. long bond, if not zeros on the U.S. long bond, as rates start to move closer to 5%. It’s likely to have very high, equity-type returns, in short bursts.