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From Porter Stansberry in the S&A Digest

Porter Stansberry: The next stage of the crisis is starting now
Monday, June 20, 2011

We’re about to see a return to crisis-like conditions in the world’s credit markets. This will devastate financial stocks. It should also hit commodity prices and commodity-related stocks hard. In today’s Digest, I’ll show you why I believe this will happen.

As longtime readers know, I write Friday’s Digest personally. In general, I try my best to teach our subscribers something useful. I’ve always run my research company with a few simple principles in mind. Among them, I strive to provide you with the information I would expect if our roles were reversed. You should know… abiding by this principle often requires me to share information with you before I can be 100% certain it’s correct.

That’s the case with today’s Digest. I want to show you the warning signs as I see them, right now. I want to guide you through my thinking process. And while I’ll give you my predictions about what these things mean, I hope you’ll realize that, as Yogi Berra famously said, predictions are tough – especially about the future.

The next stage in the ongoing global financial crisis will feature the collapse of both the Spanish and the Italian economies. This should occur within the next six months. Concurrently, I believe the “Chinese miracle” will be unmasked as mostly a fraud powered by a huge increase in bad lending from state-controlled banks.

Ironically, the coming wave of financial trouble will probably force people back into U.S. dollars. Gold will also do well. In the currency markets, I believe the euro will collapse in the second half of this year, as will the Australian dollar, which serves as a proxy for the Chinese economy.

I expect this next “down leg” in the world’s markets to be more severe than the crisis of 2008, because the balance sheets of the Western democracies are now less prepared to manage the losses.

Finally, I believe the euro will simply cease to exist.

The first thing I want to show you is the share price of UniCredit. You have probably never heard of UniCredit, but it is a major European bank, with significant operations in eastern and southern Europe. UniCredit is based in Italy. I’ve been keeping my eye on UniCredit for years, for reasons I’ll explain below. UniCredit is the ultimate “canary in the coal mine” of the world’s global currency system.

Most people don’t know that UniCredit is the direct descendent of Oesterreichische Credit-Anstalt, the largest bank in Eastern Europe before World War II. Translated the name means: Imperial Royal Privileged Austrian Credit-Institute for Commerce and Industry. It was a Rothschild bank. The family founded it 1855, and it became one of the most important banks in Europe.

Credit-Anstalt held assets and took deposits from all over Europe. In 1931, the bank failed as a direct result of the U.S.’s Smoot-Hawley tariff. The act crippled Germany’s economy and led French investors to redeem all the capital they’d lent to the bank. The failure of Credit-Anstalt caused Austria to abandon the gold standard, which set off a series of economic dominoes. Germany left gold… then Great Britain… and finally, in 1933, so did America.

The failure of Credit-Anstalt is what really kicked off the Great Depression. I have long been convinced the failure of its successor bank – now called UniCredit – would presage the next global monetary collapse.

I first began warning investors about UniCredit’s likely collapse and its historic role in the world’s monetary history back in March 2010. Since then, the bank’s shares have grown weaker and weaker. And since March, the shares have fallen off a cliff, hitting lows not seen since March 2009.

The sudden weakness in UniCredit’s shares (down 21% in the last several weeks) indicates to me that big trouble is brewing in Europe. I don’t believe efforts to stop the crisis in Greece will work. The austerity measures undertaken in Ireland, Spain, Italy, and Greece have severely weakened these economies, causing loan losses to banks like UniCredit.

And if there’s a run on UniCredit (and I believe there will be), the losses will be too large for Italy to manage without a huge international bailout. UniCredit has borrowed $300 billion from other European banks. And Italy’s government already owes creditors more than 120% of GDP. There aren’t any easy solutions to this problem.

Another warning comes from a friend who is a senior executive at a major Wall Street bank. He sees more high-yield bond deals than just about anyone else in the world. He told our Atlas 400 group last weekend that credit markets around the world were suddenly shutting down. Yields were moving up. Spreads (the cost to borrow above the sovereign rate) were getting wider for the first time since March 2009.

Why? Because the market knows that the U.S. Federal Reserve is going to stop buying $85 billion-plus per month of U.S. Treasury debt. But the Treasury is going to continue to issue more debt. In total, 61% of the entire federal debt will mature within four years. That means roughly $10 trillion in U.S. Treasury bonds will have to be sold, plus whatever the total deficit adds up to over the next four years – maybe another $6 trillion.

It’s difficult to imagine this amount of Treasury issuance won’t have a big impact on the world’s credit markets because these bonds always sell first and at the lowest yields. As these yields “back up” because of the large issuance, they should drain liquidity away from other issues, causing other bond prices to fall. This will reduce liquidity and make issuing debt more expensive across the credit spectrum.

China’s boom since 2009 was fueled by massive domestic debt issuance, which was unsustainable and is reversing. In addition, one Chinese company after another is being revealed as a fraud – and then crashing. These are not isolated events. I have studied Chinese companies for more than a decade. Out of all the stocks I’ve analyzed closely, I’ve only seen a handful I didn’t believe were fraudulent.

So far, none of the major Chinese banks have come under serious scrutiny. But I believe they will… and I believe major fraud will be discovered. Take the recent weakness in the shares of China Life Insurance (LFC), for example. This isn’t a minor company. It’s a $90 billion life insurance company. As fraud allegations spread into major Chinese financials, the entire underpinning of the Chinese boom will fall apart. It has all been fueled by debt and fixed-asset investments (land, buildings, equipment, and machinery). Consider just a few of these facts…

Fixed-asset investment remains greater than 50% of GDP in China, for the 12th year in a row. No other country has ever had more than nine years of this kind of sustained fixed-asset investment.

In the first five months of 2011, fixed-asset investment grew by 25.8% according to China’s National Bureau of Statistics. That’s $1.39 trillion worth of investment.

Jim Chanos, the famed short seller, says China is currently building 30 billion square feet of commercial real estate. That is enough to provide every person in China with a five-square-foot cubicle.

Jeremy Grantham, one of the world’s most astute investors, points out that China has been purchasing gigantic quantities of raw materials. The scale of these purchases makes them impossible to sustain. China makes up 9.4% of the world’s economy, but it is currently consuming 53% of the world’s cement, 47% of the world’s iron ore, and 46.9% of its coal.

A massive increase in China’s domestic debt fueled this investment. In 2010, for example, Chinese banks extended $55 billion in loans – up 95% from the year before. Now, banking regulators are increasing reserve requirements, greatly reducing the amount of available credit. In May, lending was down 25% versus last year.

With Europe’s crisis heating back up, with credit tightening in the U.S. (thanks to the end of quantitative easing), and with China’s boom unraveling… it’s time to be extremely cautious. I don’t know when it will start… but we’re entering another period of soaring volatility, increasing interest rate spreads, and falling stock and bond prices. How the authorities deal with these problems will set the stage for what happens next. If they try to paper over these continuing crises again – with new money-printing programs from the Federal Reserve – you can expect a massive inflation and what I call The End of America.

Our best hope for more stability and a return to prosperity is for people to realize that bailing out banks doesn’t solve these problems. It only makes them worse. But… I’m not optimistic. In the June issue of my newsletter, Stansberry’s Investment Advisory, I detail my best two new ideas to profit from the next stage of this crisis.

IMF warns US, eurozone deficits a threat to stability

The International Monetary Fund warned that Washington and debt-ridden European countries are “playing with fire” unless they take drastic steps to reduce their budget deficits.

The warning came as the IMF cut its growth forecast for the US and said the risks facing the global economy have increased since April.

It said the euro area’s worsening crisis, signs of economic weakening in the US and overheating in the developing world all pose fresh threats to global stability.

“The global economy has turned the corner from the Great Recession. However, securing the transition from recovery to expansion will require a concerted effort at addressing diverse challenges,” the IMF said in its World Economic Outlook update.

World growth this year is expected to be 4.3pc, a downgrade from 4.4pc in April, prompted predominantly by a sharp reduction in America. US GDP is now forecast to grow at 2.5pc this year and 2.7pc in 2012, compared with its prediction in April of 2.8pc and 2.9pc respectively.

“For the US, it is critical to immediately address the debt ceiling and launch a deficit reduction plan that includes entitlement reform and revenue-raising tax reform,” it said.

Jose Vinals, director of the IMF’s monetary and capital markets department, added: “If you make a list of the countries in the world that have the biggest homework in restoring their public finances to a reasonable situation in terms of debt levels, you find four countries: Greece, Ireland, Japan and the United States.

“You cannot afford to have a world economy where these important decisions are postponed because you’re really playing with fire.”

The IMF had already downgraded its forecasts for UK growth to 1.5pc from 1.7pc in April, which was itself a downgrade from 2pc in November.

It added: “Downside risks due to heightened potential for spillovers from further deterioration in market confidence in the euro area periphery have risen since April. Market concerns about possible setbacks to the US recovery have also surfaced.

If these risks materialize, they will reverberate across the rest of the world–possibly seriously impairing funding conditions for banks and corporations in advanced economies and undercutting capital flows to emerging economies.”

From Jeremy Warner in the Telegraph

Like a slow-motion car crash, all eyes are fixed in horror on the political chaos into which Greece is descending.

So desperate has the nation’s plight become that even economic suicide seems preferable to the austerity European neighbours seem minded, brutally, to impose upon it.

For the birthplace of European civilisation and modern democracy to boot, there could hardly be a more ignominious descent.

If the tax rises, spending cuts and state sell-offs of the ruling government’s medium term financial strategy (MTFS) aren’t approved, then assuming international policymakers are as good as their word, all future IMF/eurozone loans will cease.

In such circumstances, sovereign debt default would follow within days, and government, unable to pay its bills, would grind to a halt.

Given Greece’s comparatively recent history of junta rule, it would surely only be a matter of time before the military stepped into the ensuing political vacuum.

Unthinkable for an apparently advanced economy? Well, perhaps, but the unthinkable has had a nasty habit of becoming true these past four years.

Whatever the eventual outcome, we are now well past the point where matters are capable of happy resolution. What’s happening is plainly a tragedy for Greece, but just how serious is it for the rest of the eurozone?

In terms of the big numbers, it might scarcely seem to matter. Greece accounts for under 3pc of eurozone output.

If Greece were to vanish into a black hole tomorrow, the European economy as a whole would hardly notice. The same goes for the other peripheral eurozone nations that have availed themselves of the bail-out funds – Ireland and Portugal. The three countries combined account for less than 7pc of eurozone GDP.

Their troubles would be nobody’s but their own if these nations had sovereign currencies and monetary policies. As everyone knows, sadly that’s not the case.

That all three are joined at the hip through the single currency to the rest of the eurozone makes the tragedy of the periphery very much everyone else’s, too. The periphery has come to threaten the core.

Against this wider, existential threat to the single currency, the “will they, won’t they?” see-saw over giving Greece more bail-out money, and the interminable debate over whether private creditors might be required to take haircuts in return, make up something of a sideshow.

You’d have thought that Athens has virtually no cards left to play, yet the threat its travails pose to the eurozone as a whole gives Greece something of a whip hand. In the game of brinkmanship currently being played out in Athens and Brussels, Greece is not entirely without negotiating power.

Give us the money, the Greeks can say, or we’ll pull the whole house down with us. As Europe’s policy elite is only too painfully aware, the cost of refusing is likely to be infinitely greater than that of coughing up, however politically unpalatable it might seem to the solvent north. Neither the IMF nor the eurozone can afford to let Greece go.

Yet disingenuously, the pretence is maintained that the crisis is no more than a bit of fiscal ill-discipline in the profligate fringe that corrective austerity can easily eradicate.

Unfortunately, it’s much more serious than that, for the fiscal crisis now manifesting itself in sky-high sovereign bond yields is just part of an ongoing and European-wide banking crisis.

Let’s for the moment forget the bit of the crisis that grabs all the headlines right now – the meltdown in the periphery’s public finances – and instead focus on what’s happening in the banking system. Here we are seeing a continued “run” on the banks of vulnerable countries not unlike that which befell the UK at the height of the credit crunch.

This is an entirely rational response by depositors. Any country condemned to years of austerity and economic contraction is likely to experience a massive bad debt problem in its domestic lending, rendering much of the banking system insolvent.

On top of that, there’s the risk of sovereign debt default and/or enforced departure from the euro and consequent steep currency depreciation. No one in their right mind would keep their money in a Greek or Irish bank right now.

Fear of capital controls and/or the re-establishment of national currencies to stem the outflow and restore competitiveness has naturally served to exaggerate the phenomenon. The mentality is fast becoming one of get out now while you still can. It scarcely needs saying that the moment capital controls are imposed, it’s game over. The country that does so is effectively out of the euro.

With high dependence on foreign funding, the Irish banking system is particularly vulnerable to this capital flight. As deposits flee the country, the banks are forced back on to the lender-of-last-resort facilities operated by their central banks.

These central banks will in turn use the collateral to borrow from other eurozone central banks, the chief lender being the Bundesbank.

The whole system has become hopelessly enmeshed. It’s almost impossible to disentangle it in a cost-free way. Greece, Ireland and Portugal are one thing, but if they are joined by Spain, then that’s a different story.

At that point, the proportion of GDP accounted for by the troubled periphery rises to 26pc, and you might want to think seriously about getting your money out of the German banking system, too.

In so far as it is possible to discern a rationale behind repeated sovereign debt bail-outs, it seems to be that of buying time.

This time can be used by the banking system to rebuild solvency through earnings retention and, where necessary, recapitalisation. Yet so far, it’s failed to correct the underlying problem in the European periphery, which is one of excessive external indebtedness, both public as well as private.

Unfortunately, the current account imbalances that feed this indebtedness remain as large as ever. Without the natural stabiliser of currency adjustment, there’s nothing to relieve them other than years of grinding deflation.

There are only two ways this can end. Either the surplus core has to accept that it must continue to bail out the periphery on a virtually permanent basis – a transfer union – or the single currency must lose its outer fringe.

Both solutions carry significant cost to the core, the first through gift aid, the second through the crystalisation of bad debt.

It’s a stark choice, but markets seem determined to bring matters to a head.

I am reminded of Ambrose Evans-Pritchard’s comment :

That is what the euro always meant, and why I have always viewed the Project as the malign – chiefly, but not only, because any such European government created to back up EMU would lack a democratic counterweight rooted in legitimacy, and would be inherently authoritarian.

With Greek two year paper ‘yielding’ 27%, the question of a Greek default is no longer a matter of ‘if’, but ‘when and in what form’. Minds are being focussed on what happens to the Euro area, and the Euro itself. Now that we know that the French banks (as signalled by Moody’s downgrade of Crédit Agricole, BNP Paribas and Société Générale) are on the hook for large chunks of Greek debt, the idea of wider contagion must be scaring the shit out of the imbecile euro politicians who have foisted this doomed experiment on the European people.

The question is who wants to be holding Euros while they sort the whole mess out…

At long last a real post.

Looking at the weekly chart, it appears that the entire move up off the 1.18757 low from June a year ago may now be complete.

A move back to the long term channel which currently coincides with the old high around the 1.3667 area made back in 2004 would not be impossible. Other scenarios allow for one further test of the 1.5100 – 1.5150 area.

The descending highs below the 2008 all time high remain ominous.

from zero hedge

Courtesy of the recently declassified Fed discount window documents, we now know that the biggest beneficiaries of the Fed’s generosity during the peak of the credit crisis were foreign banks, among which Belgium’s Dexia was the most troubled, and thus most lent to, bank. Having been thus exposed, many speculated that going forward the US central bank would primarily focus its “rescue” efforts on US banks, not US-based (or local branches) of foreign (read European) banks: after all that’s what the ECB is for, while the Fed’s role is to stimulate US employment and to keep US inflation modest. And furthermore, should the ECB need to bail out its banks, it could simply do what the Fed does, and monetize debt, thus boosting its assets, while concurrently expanding its excess reserves thus generating fungible capital which would go to European banks. Wrong. Below we present that not only has the Fed’s bailout of foreign banks not terminated with the drop in discount window borrowings or the unwind of the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, but that the only beneficiary of the reserves generated were US-based branches of foreign banks (which in turn turned around and funnelled the cash back to their domestic branches), a shocking finding which explains not only why US banks have been unwilling and, far more importantly, unable to lend out these reserves, but that anyone retaining hopes that with the end of QE2 the reserves that hypothetically had been accumulated at US banks would be flipped to purchase Treasurys, has been dead wrong, therefore making the case for QE3 a done deal. In summary, instead of doing everything in its power to stimulate reserve, and thus cash, accumulation at domestic (US) banks which would in turn encourage lending to US borrowers, the Fed has been conducting yet another stealthy foreign bank rescue operation, which rerouted $600 billion in capital from potential borrowers to insolvent foreign financial institutions in the past 7 months. QE2 was nothing more (or less) than another European bank rescue operation!

For those who can’t wait for the punchline, here it is. Below we chart the total cash holdings of Foreign-related banks in the US using weekly H.8 data.

Note the $630 billion increase in foreign bank cash balances since November 3, which just so happens is the date when the Fed commenced QE2 operations in the form of adding excess reserves to the liability side of its balance sheet. Here is the change in Fed reserves during QE2 (from the Fed’s H.4.1 statement, ending with the week of June 1).

Above, note that Fed reserves increased by $610 billion for the duration of QE2 through the week ending June 1 (and by another $70 billion in the week ending June 8, although since we only have bank cash data through June 1, we use the former number, although we are certain that the bulk of this incremental cash once again went to foreign financial institutions).

So how did cash held by US banks fare during QE2? Well, not good. The chart below demonstrates cash balances at small and large US domestic banks, as well as the cash at foreign banks, all of which is compared to total Fed reserves plotted on the same axis. It pretty much explains it all.

The chart above has tremendous implications for everything from US and European monetary policy, to exhange rate and trade policy, to the current account on both sides of the Atlantic, to US fiscal policy, to borrowing and lending activity in the US, and, lastly, to QE 3.

What is the first notable thing about the above chart is that while cash levels in US and US-based foreign-banks correlate almost perfectly with the Fed’s reserve balances, as they should, there is a notable divergence beginning around May of 2010, or the first Greek bailout, when Europe was in a state of turmoil, and when cash assets of foreign banks jumped by $200 billion, independent of the Fed and of cash holdings by US banks. About 6 months later, this jump in foreign bank cash balances had plunged to the lowest in years, due to repatriated fungible cash being used to plug undercapitalized local operations, with total cash just $265 billion as of November 17, just as QE2 was commencing. Incidentally, the last time foreign banks had this little cash was April 2009… Just as QE1 was beginning. As to what happens next, the first chart above says it all: cash held by foreign banks jumps from $308 billion on November 3, or the official start of QE2, to $940 billion as of June 1: an almost dollar for dollar increase with the increase in Fed reserve balances. In other words, while the Fed did nothing to rescue foreign banks in the aftermath of the first Greek crisis, aside from opening up FX swap lines, one can argue that the whole point of QE2 was not so much to spike equity markets, or the proverbial “third mandate” of Ben Bernanke, but solely to rescue European banks!

What this observation also means, is that the bulk of risk asset purchasing by dealer desks (if any), has not been performed by US-based primary dealers, as has been widely speculated, but by foreign dealers, which have the designation of “Primary” with the Federal Reserve. Below is the list of 20 Primary Dealers currently recognized by the New York Fed. The foreign ones, with US-based operations, are bolded:

BNP Paribas Securities Corp.
Barclays Capital Inc.
Cantor Fitzgerald & Co.
Citigroup Global Markets Inc.
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC
Daiwa Capital Markets America Inc.
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
Goldman, Sachs & Co.
HSBC Securities (USA) Inc.
Jefferies & Company, Inc.
J.P. Morgan Securities LLC
MF Global Inc.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated
Mizuho Securities USA Inc.
Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC
Nomura Securities International, Inc.
RBC Capital Markets, LLC
RBS Securities Inc.
SG Americas Securities, LLC
UBS Securities LLC.

That’s right, out of 20 Primary Dealers, 12 are…. foreign. And incidentally, the reason why we added the (if any) above, is that since this cash is fungible between on and off-shore operations, what happened is that the $600 billion in cash was promptly repatriated and used by domestic branches of foreign banks to fill undercapitalization voids left by exposure to insolvent European PIIGS and for all other bankruptcy-related capital needs. And one wonders why suddenly German banks are so willing to take haircuts on Greek bonds: it is simply because courtesy of their US based branches which have been getting the bulk of the Fed’s dollars in 1 and 0 format, they suddenly find themselves willing and ready to face the mark to market on Greek debt from par to 50 cents on the dollar. And not only Greek, but all other PIIGS, which will inevitably happen once Greece goes bankrupt, either volutnarily or otherwise. In fact, the $600 billion in cash that was repatriated to Europe will mean that European banks likely are fully covered to face the capitalization shortfall that will occur once Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain and possibly Italy are forced to face the inevitable Event of Default that will see their bonds marked down anywhere between 20% and 60%. Of course, this will also expose the ECB as an insolvent central bank, but that largely explains why Germany has been so willing to allow Mario Draghi to take the helm at an institution that will soon be left insolvent, and also explains the recent shocking animosity between Angela Merkel and Jean Claude Trichet: the German are preparing for the end of the ECB, and thanks to Ben Bernanke they are certainly capitalized well enough to handle the end of Europe’s lender of first and last resort. But don’t take our word for this: here is Stone McCarthy’s explanation of what massive reserve sequestering by foreign banks means: “Foreign banks operating in the US often lend reserves to home offices or other banks operating outside the US. These loans do not change the volume of excess reserves in the system, but do support the funding of dollar denominated assets outside the US….Foreign banks operating in the US do not present a large source of C&I, Consumer, or Real Estate Loans. These banks represent about 16% of commercial bank assets, but only about 9% of bank credit. Thus, the concern that excess reserves will quickly fuel lending activities and money growth is probably diminished by the skewing of excess reserve balances towards foreign banks.”

Which brings us to point #2: prepare for the Bernanke hearings and possible impeachment. For if it becomes popular knowledge that the Chairman of the Fed, despite explicit instructions to enforce the trickle down of “printed” dollars to US banks, was only concerned about rescuing foreign banks with the $600 billion in excess cash created out of QE2, then all political hell is about to break loose, and not even Democrats will be able to defend Bernanke’s actions to a public furious with the complete inability to procure a loan. Any loan. Furthermore the data above proves beyond a reasonable doubt why there has been no excess lending by US banks to US borrowers: none of the cash ever even made it to US banks! This also resolves the mystery of the broken money multiplier and why the velocity of money has imploded.

Implication #3 explains why the US dollar has been as week as it has since the start of QE 2. Instead of repricing the EUR to a fair value, somewhere around parity with the USD, this stealthy fund flow from the US to Europe to the tune of $600 billion has likely resulted in an artificial boost in the european currency to the tune of 2000-3000 pips, keeping it far from its fair value of about 1.1 EURUSD. If this data does not send European (read German) exporters into a blind rage, after the realization that the Fed (most certainly with the complicity of the G7) was willing to sacrifice European economic output in order to plug European bank undercapitalization, then nothing will.

But implication #4 is by far the most important. Recall that Bill Gross has long been asking where the cash to purchase bonds come the end of QE 2 would come from. Well, the punditry, in its parroting groupthink stupidity (validated by precisely zero actual research), immediately set forth the thesis that there is no problem: after all banks would simply reverse the process of reserve expansion and use the $750 billion in Cash that will be accumulated by the end of QE 2 on June 30 to purchase US Treasurys.

Wrong.

The above data destroys this thesis completely: since the bulk of the reserve induced bank cash has long since departed US shores and is now being used to ratably fill European bank balance sheet voids, and since US banks have benefited precisely not at all from any of the reserves generated by QE 2, there is exactly zero dry powder for the US Primary Dealers to purchase Treasurys starting July 1.

This observation may well be the missing link that justifies the Gross argument, as it puts to rest any speculation that there is any buyer remaining for Treasurys. Alas: the digital cash generated by the Fed’s computers has long since been spent… a few thousand miles east of the US.

Which leads us to implication #5. QE 3 is a certainty. The one thing people focus on during every episode of monetary easing is the change in Fed assets, which courtesy of LSAP means a jump in Treasurys, MBS, Agency paper, or (for the tin foil brigade) ES: the truth is all these are a distraction. The one thing people always forget is the change in Fed liabilities, all of them: currency in circulation, which has barely budged in the past 3 years, and far more importantly- excess reserves, which as this article demonstrates, is the electronic “cash” that goes to needy banks the world over in order to fund this need or that. In fact, it is the need to expand the Fed’s liabilities that is and has always been a driver of monetary stimulus, not the need to boost Fed assets. The latter is, counterintuitively, merely a mathematical aftereffect of matching an asset-for-liability expansion. This means that as banks are about to face yet another risk flaring episode in the next several months, the Fed will need to release another $500-$1000 billion in excess reserves. As to what asset will be used to match this balance sheet expansion, why take your picK; the Fed could buy MBS, Muni bonds, Treasurys, or go Japanese, and purchase ETFs, REITs, or just go ahead and outright buy up every underwater mortgage in the US. This side of the ledger is largely irrelevant, and will serve only two functions: to send the S&P surging, and to send the precious metal complex surging2 as it becomes clear that the dollar is now entirely worthless.

That said, of all of the above, the one we are most looking forward to is the impeachment of Ben Bernanke: because if there is one definitive proof of the Fed abdicating any and all of its mandates, and merely playing the role of globofunder explicitly at the expense of US consumers and borrowers, not to mention lackey for the banking syndicate, this is it.

from zero hedge

As if insolvent European private banks were not enough to worry about (and with banking assets of 461 percent of GDP in the UK, 178 percent in Germany, and 820 percent in Switzerland, there is more than enough to worry about), a new study by Open Europe has found that at the heart of the insolvency argument is none other than the only hedge fund that is even worse capitalized than the US Federal Reserve: the European Central Bank. “With Greece forced to seek a second bail-out to avoid bankruptcy, Open Europe has today published a briefing cataloguing how the eurozone crisis could drive the European Central Bank itself into insolvency, with taxpayers likely to pick up a big chunk of the bill. The role of the ECB in the ongoing eurozone and banking crisis has been significantly understated. By propping up struggling eurozone governments and providing cheap credit to ailing banks, the ECB has put billions worth of risky assets on its books. We estimate that the ECB has exposure to struggling eurozone economies (the so-called PIIGS) of around €444bn – an amount roughly equivalent to the GDP of Finland and Austria combined. Of this, around €190bn is exposure to the Greek state and Greek banks. Should the ECB see the value of its assets fall by just 4.25%, which is no longer a remote risk, its entire capital base would be wiped out.” It seems that in crafting “prudent” capitalization ratios courtesy of Basel 1 through infinity, the global NWO regulators totally let the ECB slip through the cracks. The finding also confirms what we have been saying all along: there is no way that any form of voluntary or involuntary phase transition that will require the ECB to mark down assets that it has on its books at par (yet are worth 50 cents on the dollar) can ever occur: such an event would result in the immediate insolvency of the European lender of first and last resort, and, in turn, the unravelling of the Eurozone.

From Open Europe:

“The ECB’s attempts to paper over the cracks in the eurozone may have temporarily softened the impact of the crisis, but have exacerbated the situation in the long-term. The ECB has dug itself into a hole and now we are seeing that there is no easy way out.”

“Huge risks have been transferred from struggling governments and banks onto the ECB’s books, with taxpayers as the ultimate guarantor. There’s a real risk that these assets will face radical write-downs in future with eurozone governments and banks teetering on the edge of bankruptcy. This amounts to a hidden – and potentially huge – bill to taxpayers to save the euro.”

“The ECB’s wobbly finances and operations to finance states have landed a serious blow to its credibility. It must now seek to become the strong, independent bank that electorates were promised when the Single Currency was forged.”

Key points from the report:

– In parallel with the IMF’s and EU’s multi-billion euro interventions, the ECB has engaged in its own bail-out operation, providing cheap credit to insolvent banks and propping up struggling eurozone governments, despite this being against its own rules. The ECB is ultimately underwritten by taxpayers, which means that there is a hidden – and potentially huge – cost of the eurozone crisis to taxpayers buried in the ECB’s books.

– As a result, the ECB’s balance sheet is now looking increasingly vulnerable. We estimate that the ECB has exposure to struggling eurozone economies (the so-called PIIGS) of around €444bn – an amount roughly equivalent to the GDP of Finland and Austria combined. Although not all these assets and loans are ‘bad’, many of them could result in serious losses for the ECB should the eurozone crisis continue to deteriorate. Critically, struggling banks in insolvent countries have been allowed to shift risky assets away from their own balance sheets and onto the ECB’s (all the while receiving ECB loans in return). Many of these assets are extremely difficult to value.

– Overall, the ECB is now leveraged around 23 to 24 times, with only €82bn in capital and reserves. In contrast, the Swedish central bank is leveraged just under five times, while the average hedge fund is leveraged four to five times. This means that should the ECB see its assets fall by just 4.25% in value, from booking losses on its loans or purchases of government debt, its entire capital base would be wiped out.

– Hefty losses for the ECB are no longer a remote risk, with Greece likely to default within the next few years – even if it gets a fresh bail-out package from the EU and IMF – which would also bring down the country’s banks. We estimate that the ECB has taken on around €190bn in Greek assets by propping up the Greek state and banks. Should Greece restructure half of its debt – which is needed to bring down the country’s debt to sustainable levels – the ECB is set to face losses of between €44.5bn and €65.8bn on the government bonds it has purchased and the collateral it is holding from Greek banks. This is equal to between 2.35% and 3.47% of assets, meaning it comes close to wiping out the ECB’s capital base.

– A loss of this magnitude would effectively leave the ECB insolvent and in need of recapitalisation. It would then have to either start printing money to cover the losses or ask eurozone governments to send it more cash (via a capital call to national central banks). The first option would lead to inflation, which is unacceptable in Germany, while the second option amounts to another fully fledged bail-out, with taxpayers facing upfront costs (rather than loan guarantees as in the government eurozone bail-outs).

– The ECB’s actions during the financial crisis have not only weighed heavily on its balance sheet, but also its credibility. First, as a paper published by the ECB last year noted, “The perceptions of a central bank’s financial strength have an impact on the credibility of the central bank and its policy”. Secondly, by financing states, the ECB has effectively engaged in fiscal policy – and therefore politics – something which electorates were told would never happen.

– Worried about the risk of these potential losses being realised, the ECB is vehemently opposed to debt restructuring for Greece and other weaker economies. However, continuing the ECB’s existing policy of propping up insolvent banks – and intermittently governments – would be even worse for the eurozone as a whole.

– The ECB’s cheap credit has served as a disincentive to struggling banks to recapitalise and limit their exposure to toxic assets in weak eurozone economies. This creates moral hazard for banks and governments alike, at times even fuelling the sovereign debt crisis, while transferring more of the ultimate risk to taxpayers across Europe. Therefore, in its attempt to soften the immediate impact of the financial crisis, the ECB may in fact have exacerbated the situation in the long-term, increasing the cost of keeping the eurozone together for taxpayers and governments.

– Moving forward, the ECB must return to its original mission of promoting price stability and a way has to be found to get ailing banks off the ECB’s life support. This should include a winding-down mechanism for insolvent banks.

from John Mauldin’s letter

Deflation first…

Velocity Rolls Over

The following came to my inbox from my friends at GaveKal. They chart their own private calculation of the velocity of money. Notice in the chart below that the velocity of money was screaming “Problem!” during the recent crisis, began to improve with the recovery in 2009, rolled over with the end of QE1, and started to improve again (more or less) with QE2. Now, with QE2 ending, velocity is already down and falling, which is worrisome, as this comment shows. (Understand, the guys at GaveKal are typically looking for reasons to be bullish.)

“As we have highlighted in recent Dailies, our Velocity Indicator has been heading south rather rapidly. At first glance, this might appear surprising as there are few signs of stress in the financial system today: corporate spreads are decently tight, IPOs continue to roll out, and the VIX remains low. Sure, Greek debt has now been downgraded below Montenegro’s and stands at the same ratings as Cuba’s, but even acknowledging this, the recent depths reached by our Velocity Indicator is still somewhat surprising. Why, in the face of fairly benign markets, is our indicator so weak?

“The answer is very simple and it is linked to the recent underperformance of banks almost everywhere. Indeed, with short rates still low everywhere, and yield curves positively sloped, we are in the phase of the cycle when banks should be outperforming. The fact that they are not has to be seen as a concern. So does the underperformance come from the fact that the market senses that losses have yet to be booked (Europe?)? Is it a reflection of a lack of demand for loans (US?) or that more losses and write-offs are just around the corner (Japan?)? Is the bank underperformance signaling that we are on the verge of a new banking crisis, most likely linked to the possibility of European debt restructurings? Or perhaps it is linked to the coming end of QE2 and consequential tightening in the liquidity environment ?

“In our view, any of the above could potentially explain the recent bank underperformance. But whatever the reasons may be, it has to be seen as a worrying sign. One of our ‘rules of thumb’ is that if banks do not manage to outperform when yield curves are steep, the market must be worried about the financial sectors’ balance sheets (given that, with a steep yield curve, there are few reasons to worry about the bank’s income statement).”