Category: General


Dollar Pegs

February 19th, 2015 — 6:56am

The Dollar Pegs are Next
Posted on January 18, 2015 by Martin Armstrong
Dollar-Peg

The next crisis will be the currency pegs against the dollar. Here we have pegs from Hong Kong to the Middle East. We will have the same problem for as the dollar is driven higher, thanks to the implosion in the Euroland, these nations will import DEFLATION from a rising dollar. This will break their backs and force pegs to collapse around the world. Keep in mind that this will unfold probably after September 2015 and help to spiral the world economy into the worst depression in centuries. Start preparing for a rainy day.

These idiots are raising taxes when they should be lowering them as even Keynes suggested. Unfortunately, we are in a major crisis because of their insane mismanagement of the economy. There is nothing they will not steal. They are the type of people who are pocketing soap on the cart of the maid as they leave the hotel room. This level of corruption is turning into a feeding frenzy, which is our doom.

The rise in the dollar, will be the key to breaking the post-war economy. It was the flight of capital from Euroland into the Swiss that broke that peg. We will see in the months ahead the same crisis unfold in the Middle East and in Asia. This will be accelerated by the emerging economies who have issued $6 trillion in dollar debt since 2007. As the dollar rises, they will be forced into the same position as Greece – unable to pay their debts because the debt keeps rising in cost.

Comment » | Asia, Deflation, General, Geo Politics, Macro, US denouement, USD

Jim Grant Sums It All Up In 2 Stunning Paragraphs

December 8th, 2014 — 3:21pm

What will futurity make of the [so-called] Ph.D. standard [that runs our world]?

Likely it will be even more baffled than we are. Imagine trying to explain the present-day arrangements to your 20-something grandchild a couple of decades hence – after the crash of, say, 2016, that wiped out the youngster’s inheritance and provoked a cenral bank response so heavy-handed as to shatter the confidence even of Wall Street in the Federal reserve’s methods…

I expect you’ll wind up saying something like this:

“My generation gave former tenured economics professors discretionary authority to fabricate money and to fix interest rates.

We put the cart of asset prices before the horse of enterprise.

We entertained the fantasy that high asset prices made for prosperity, rather than the other way around.

We actually worked to foster inflation, which we called ‘price stability’ (this was on the eve of the hyperinflation of 2017).

We seem to have miscalculated.”

Comment » | Fed Policy, General, Geo Politics, Macro Structure

Even The BIS Is Shocked At How Broken Markets Have Become

December 8th, 2014 — 3:02pm

Originally posted here

Not a quarter passes without the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) aka central banks’ central bank (also the locus of some of the most aggressive manipulation of gold and FX in human history) reiterating a dire warning about the fire and brimstone that is about to be unleashed upon the global economy.

It started in June of 2013, when Jaime Caruana, certainly the most prominent doom and gloomer at the BIS (who also was Governor of the Bank of Spain from 2000 to 2007 when this happened) asked if “central banks [can] now really do “whatever it takes”? As each day goes by, it seems less and less likely… [seven] years have passed since the eruption of the global financial crisis, yet robust, self-sustaining, well balanced growth still eludes the global economy…. low-interest policies have made it easy for the private sector to postpone deleveraging, easy for the government to finance deficits, and easy for the authorities to delay needed reforms in the real economy and in the financial system. Overindebtedness is one of the major barriers on the path to growth after a financial crisis. Borrowing more year after year is not the cure…in some places it may be difficult to avoid an overall reduction in accommodation because some policies have clearly hit their limits.”

The BIS’ preaching did not end there, and hit a new crescendo in June of 2014, when in its 84th Annual Report, the BIS slammed “Market Euphoria”, and found a “Puzzling Disconnect” between the economy and the market”:

“it is hard to avoid the sense of a puzzling disconnect between the markets’ buoyancy and underlying economic developments globally”, that “despite the euphoria in financial markets, investment remains weak. Instead of adding to productive capacity, large firms prefer to buy back shares or engage in mergers and acquisitions” and that “the temptation to go for shortcuts is simply too strong, even if these shortcuts lead nowhere”… “Particularly for countries in the late stages of financial booms, the trade-off is now between the risk of bringing forward the downward leg of the cycle and that of suffering a bigger bust later on.”

“The global economy continues to face serious challenges. Despite a pickup in growth, it has not shaken off its dependence on monetary stimulus. Monetary policy is still struggling to normalise after so many years of extraordinary accommodation. Despite the euphoria in financial markets, investment remains weak. Instead of adding to productive capacity, large firms prefer to buy back shares or engage in mergers and acquisitions. And despite lacklustre long-term growth prospects, debt continues to rise. There is even talk of secular stagnation.

Financial markets are euphoric, but progress in strengthening banks’ balance sheets has been uneven and private debt keeps growing.

It did not end there either. In September of 2014, the warnings continued:

… the search for yield – a dominant theme in financial markets since mid-2012 – returned in full force. Volatility fell back to exceptional lows across virtually all asset classes, and risk premia remained compressed. By fostering risk-taking and the search for yield, accommodative monetary policies thus continued to support elevated asset price valuations and exceptionally subdued volatility.

The spell of market volatility proved to be short-lived and financial markets resumed their rally soon afterwards. By early September, global equity markets had recouped their losses and credit risk spreads once again consolidated at close to historical lows. While geopolitical worries kept weighing on financial market developments, these were ultimately superseded by the anticipation of further monetary policy accommodation in the euro area, providing support for asset prices.

The warnings continued. Earlier today, the BIS released its latest Quarterly Review report, where the most prominent warning this time revolves around the inverse Plaza Accord surge in the US Dollar whose dramatic, concentrated surge in recent months is unparalleled in history. In a nutshell, in “Currency movements drive reserve composition”, BIS’ McCauley and Chan warn that, in Ambrose Evans-Pritchard’s words, “off-shore lending in US dollars has soared to $9 trillion and poses a growing risk to both emerging markets and the world’s financial stability.”

From the full report:

The appreciation of the dollar against the backdrop of divergent monetary policies may, if persistent, have a profound impact on the global economy, in particular on EMEs. For example, it may expose financial vulnerabilities as many firms in emerging markets have large US dollar-denominated liabilities. A continued depreciation of the domestic currency against the dollar could reduce the creditworthiness of many firms, potentially inducing a tightening of financial conditions.

Or it may not: because this is essentially a carbon copy of the warnings that were issued after Bernanke first hinted at tapering in May of 2013, leading to the Taper TantrumTM, which led to some short-term volatility which were promptly soothed by even more central bank liquidity flooding what’s left of the capital “markets.”

AEP has more:

A chunk of China’s borrowing is disguised as intra-firm financing. This replicates practices by German industrial companies in the 1920s, which hid their real level of exposure as the 1929 debt trauma was building up. “To the extent that these flows are driven by financial operations rather than real activities, they could give rise to financial stability concerns,” said the BIS in its quarterly report.

“More than a quantum of fragility underlies the current elevated mood in financial markets,” it warned. Officials are disturbed by the “risk-on, risk-off, flip-flopping” by investors. Some of the violent moves lately go beyond stress seen in earlier crises, a sign that markets may be dangerously stretched and that many fund managers do not really believe their own Goldilocks narrative.

“Mid-October’s extreme intraday price movements underscore how sensitive markets have become to even small surprises. On 15 October, the yield on 10-year US Treasury bonds fell almost 37 basis points, more than the drop on 15 September 2008 when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy.”

“These fluctuations were large relative to actual economic and policy surprises, as the only notable negative piece of news that day was the release of somewhat weaker than expected retail sales data for the US one hour before the event,” it said.

The BIS said 55pc of collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) now being issued are based on leveraged loans, an “unprecedented level”. This raises eyebrows because CDOs were pivotal in the 2008 crash.

“Activity in the leveraged loan markets even surpassed the levels recorded before the crisis: average quarterly announcements during the year to end-September 2014 were $250bn,” it said.

BIS officials are worried that tightening by the US Federal Reserve will transmit a credit shock through East Asia and the emerging world, both by raising the cost of borrowing and by pushing up the dollar.

But it’s best to leave it to the BIS itself, where this time Claudio Borio picks up the torch left by Jaime Caruana. What is notable is that none other than the BIS slams the infamous, and now legendary intervention by James “QE4″ Bullard to assure the S&P’s levitation continues without a hitch!

To my mind, these events underline the fragility – dare I say growing fragility? – hidden beneath the markets’ buoyancy. Small pieces of news can generate outsize effects. This, in turn, can amplify mood swings. And it would be imprudent to ignore that markets did not fully stabilise by themselves. Once again, on the heels of the turbulence, major central banks made soothing statements, suggesting that they might delay normalisation in light of evolving macroeconomic conditions. Recent events, if anything, have highlighted once more the degree to which markets are relying on central banks: the markets’ buoyancy hinges on central banks’ every word and deed.

Wait, so the central banks’ central bank is openly chastising one of its own now and for what: for stabilizing the market and preserving the unstable euphoria that the BIS has been warning about for so long?

Does this mean that the BIS is now openly calling for a crash? Perhaps, what is clear is that even the BIS, or the “good cop” (if only for the middle-class, certainly bad cop for the 0.01%-ers) is now shocked by just how broken the markets have become as summarized in the following line:

The highly abnormal is becoming uncomfortably normal. Central banks and markets have been pushing benchmark sovereign yields to extraordinary lows – unimaginable just a few years back. Three-year government bond yields are well below zero in Germany, around zero in Japan and below 1 per cent in the United States. Moreover, estimates of term premia are pointing south again, with some evolving firmly in negative territory. And as all this is happening, global growth – in inflation-adjusted terms – is close to historical averages. There is something vaguely troubling when the unthinkable becomes routine.

So yes, thank you for confirming – years after most who still follow the farce that is the “market” with an open mind – just how absolutely broken it is thanks to central bankers.

And here is the rub, because for the BIS to be complaining about broken markets is nothing short of peak hypocrisy.

Why? Exhibit A: the BIS board of directors.

So, dear BIS thinkers, philosophers, and commentators: the next time you wish to warn the general public about how fucked up everything has become, maybe you can throw some of these “rational” ideas around your next Board meeting first and ask the economist sociopaths who are sitting on the CTRL-P buttons at printing presses around the globe to maybe take it a little easier with the wholesale, worldwide destruction of not only fiat currency but every single “market”.

Oh, and while you are at it, please tell Benoit Gilson to slam paper gold to triple (and, if possible, double) digits ASAP: unlike the world’s chasers of momentum who only buy an asset if it becomes more expensive on hopes greater fools will buy it back from them, there are those who actually know a good deal that won’t last when they see it.

Comment » | Deflation, General, Macro, QE

Bear Capitulation

December 7th, 2013 — 9:03am

Via Hugh Hendry’s Eclectica Fund December 2013 Letter to investors,

What if I were to tell you I was turning more bullish? Is that something you might be interested in?

We are macro investors. That means that we are constantly exposed to the shifting sands that the world’s increasingly powerful gaggle of central bankers – and the capital flows they encourage – impose on global financial markets. However we tend to stick to our big (and often bearish) views, something that means our performance comes with hot and cold spells. The most recent one – and it doesn’t take a genius to see this – has been cold. It hasn’t been as bad as it could have been for the simple reason that we make big bets when we are doing well and small bets when we aren’t. We allocate increasing amounts of capital to winning trades and cut losing trades rapidly. We’ve been cutting a lot recently. The good news is that this has minimised our drawdown. The even better news is that our returns have improved lately; it looks as if we are entering a hot spell, and we have begun to re-allocate significantly more risk capital to our endeavours.

So what makes me think we are heading hot at the moment? Let me tell you about the character of Bob Ryan, from the US cable TV show Entourage. The show chronicles the workings of Hollywood and Ryan is a legendary movie producer credited with a string of box office winners. His problem is that his success was rather a long time ago. So no one is certain of his skills anymore. His reaction is to make seemingly absurd promises – think along the lines of “…what if I were to tell you that this movie will cost peanuts to make, will earn you four Oscars and will gross $100m… is that something you might be interested in?” In some walks of life (well, mine anyway) such is the popularity of the show that the expression has entered the modern lexicon as a catchphrase for offering up fantastical, if not actually impossible, ideas. With that in mind, what if I were to tell you that I have adopted a tactically bullish outlook? Is that something you might be interested in?

Last bear standing? Not any more…

I know what you are thinking. You are thinking that the last bear is capitulating. It isn’t a good sign. Maybe it is that simple. But I think it is a little more complicated. We, and I accept we aren’t the first here, sense that US monetary officials may now be willing to subordinate the demands of their own economy to the perils confronting emerging market economies. If that is the case, the great peril is not that the Fed finally tightens monetary policy and US stock prices suddenly tumble from what are very obviously overpriced levels. Would that it were – our curmudgeonly portfolio structure (think dynamic volatility targeting and stop losses) works well with big stock market reversals. Instead the greater peril is that the current backdrop will turn out to mark a rapid acceleration in the ongoing move to the upside. A hint that this might be the case comes from looking back through the 113 years of price data for the Dow Jones Industrial Average. We have done this (so you don’t have to), searching along the way for the comparable periods that fit most tightly to the last 500 trading days. What is clear is that periods of trading similar to the one we have seen over the last two years don’t often seem to end quietly: they boom big time or they crash. Which is it to be this time? Looking at the markets of 1928, 1982 or even 1998, all of which have scarily similar looking historical charts to today’s, we wonder if it won’t be both. Starting with the boom bit.

Let’s look at what happened in 1998. All sorts of market moving events were shifting the sands. There was the fall out from the Asian Tiger crisis. There was Russia’s local currency default. And there were the event risks of the collapse of LTCM and the Y2K scare. Together these things ensured that US monetary policy was set far too loose for the US economy itself. And the result? A parabolic trend to the upside in equities that destroyed anyone who chose to stand in its way. This is what I fear most today: being bearish and so continuing to not make any money even as the monetary authorities shower us with the ill thought-out generosity of their stance and markets melt up. Our resistance of Fed generosity has been pretty costly for all of us so far. To keep resisting could end up being unforgivably costly.

Made a mistake once? Why not make it again…

You will wonder what makes the Fed so concerned that it is willing to risk another bubble and another crash?

The answer rests in the dominance of neo-mercantilism as the most successful economic orthodoxy of our time. For those new to this, the text book definition will suffice. Neo-mercantilism is a policy regime borrowed from 19th century Kaiser Germany. It encourages exports, discourages imports, controls capital movement, and centralises currency decisions in the hands of a central government (to reduce reliance on flighty foreign capital). The point is to increase the level of foreign reserves held by the sovereign government, allowing for an accommodating domestic monetary policy. It also looks like it works — you can make a good case for it being responsible for the superior growth rates seen across Asia since the 1980s. However it comes with what I think is about to be a major problem. It has made domestic monetary policy in most Asian countries very pro-cyclical and we haven’t really yet tested this pro-cyclicality to the downside. What happens when the rest of the world becomes unwilling to raise its indebtedness further in order to buy Asian-produced products and facilitate Asian growth? And what if that is about where we are right now?

To date, the experiment with economic growth in Asia has succeeded as an almost direct result of the re-leveraging of the American economy since interest rates began to fall in the early 1980s.

The Japanese authorities blazed a trail on this for everyone to follow. It kicked off with (yet) another credit cycle gone wrong. In the 1970s there was a bubble in lending to Latin American governments. That was popped by Paul Volker’s tightening of US monetary policy. Latin American currencies tumbled and sound currencies soared. Except the yen. Japan had a central plan for economic self-sufficiency – one that required a positive current account and endless rounds of domestically funded investment. They did not want a strong currency, low cost imported goods and a consumer boom or anything else that might have risked future trade deficits. So they worked to keep the yen from appreciating too fast, too soon. How? The Bank of Japan created yen and bought Treasuries. This money found its way into the local banking system (as new money does) where it was soon turbo-boosted by foreign capital inflows: overseas investors were attracted by the corporate profits produced from the loose policy and pretty pleased with the way in which a persistently undervalued exchange rate made asset prices cheap to foreign investors. Chuck in fractional reserve banking, and risk-seeking bankers and it was inevitable that asset prices would surge. The rest is history. Equity prices, ignoring all qualitative objections to bubble valuations, quadrupled. Then they crashed.

First Japan. Now China.

To understand today’s story we have to leave Japan (reluctantly — we’ll come back to it), and travel 20 years later to China, where the same pattern has been repeating itself. Back in 2004. China’s cheap land, cheap labour, cheap money, cheap everything, produced high returns on capital and trade surpluses with the rest of the world which encouraged investment inflows into the country. That, as Charles Kindleberger, the intellectual godfather of macro investing and author of the unsurpassed classic Manias, Panics & Crashes, noted, is the kind of combination that “almost always” leads to an increase in the country’s currency and domestic asset prices.

However Kindleberger was writing pre-neo-mercantilism. He would have expected the follow-on from this to be higher consumption as a result of the wealth effect of higher asset prices (people who feel rich spend more) and of the boost to spending from a rising currency giving falling import prices. He’d have looked at 2004 China and expected every member of the middle class to be driving a cheap BMW by 2006. That didn’t happen. Instead currency interventions held down the yuan and, at the same time, the planners’ need for cheap credit to finance their investment projects meant the real returns from bank deposits were forced to stay firmly negative (if you are going to invest in worse than useless investment projects it mitigates matters somewhat if you insist on the debt being cheap…). Negative deposit rates might make residents of countries with developed welfare states more likely to spend. They appear to make the Chinese more likely to save. You will hear much about the rise of a consumer boom in China in no end of bullish papers. But the truth is different. It is that China is unique in the extent to which it has prevented ordinary people being exposed to cheap BMWs; despite the massive growth in the economy consumption has persistently fallen as a share of GDP. The Kaiser would have approved.

Mercantilism needs a donor. That donor has heen you.

The key point about Japanese and now Chinese mercantilism is that the creation of domestic growth in this way has always required a donor country — the one hosting the consumption boom needed to finance the investment spending back home. In the latest round, cash is injected into Treasuries by China (this is what Bernanke referred to as the “glut of savings”). It is then captured by the US banking system (someone has to sell the Treasuries to the Chinese and manage the proceeds). Then the loop repeats. Chuck in (again!) the fractional reserve banking and your usual bullish community of loan officers in the US and you soon see a rise in economic activity and of course in leverage. Then stock and property prices boom. But it doesn’t end there. Oh no. The boom boosts wealth in the US. They borrow more and spend more — bringing what should be tomorrow’s consumption forward into today. That in turn boosts demand for imports and shovels more dollars into China, something that forces it to print more yuan to keep its currency down and to buy more Treasuries. This cash enters the banking sector… and so on.

All this needs more and more Chinese productive capacity (more steel plants, more concrete, more factories, more ships, more roads, more property, more, more, MORE) to meet the additional foreign demand. China is the host. The US is the donor. The host effectively offers vendor financing to help the donor consume. In return the host gets high domestic investment rates and full employment — both things that help when you are after social obedience and international influence (it’s easy to have a strong foreign policy when your would-be enemy owes you money). And everyone gets rising asset prices. Which is nice. In theory this is an expansion without limit. That sounds like a joke. It’s more an observation.

Limitless prosperity or limitless instability?

This has been our world for some time now. That’s a problem for the likes of us. Why? Because when the psychology of the price discovery mechanism becomes more dependent on money creation than economic growth, as in Japan during the 1980s and in China for the last decade, asset prices become an abstraction. They separate from our qualitative perception of reality; they are more susceptible to wild price trends that in theory have no limit; and they display a two-way causality.

This isn’t how it is supposed to work. In a more normal world you can think of finding value in terms of the one-way causality of a thermometer and room temperature. If we doubt the veracity of the thermometer we can always produce an independent, second, thermometer to determine the proper temperature. The temperature is what it is. Just as in investing, the fundamentals are what they are. But what if it wasn’t like that? What if by warming the mercury in the thermometer, we could also raise the room temperature? This is what happens in the wacky world of neo-mercantilism. Here “fundamental” investing has little or no merit. There is one reason for being long and one alone: sovereign nations are printing money and you can see that prices are trending. That’s it. Nothing else matters. Think of a neo-mercantilist market as if it were a mouse with the toxoplasma virus. The virus hijacks its immune system and makes it fearless. It dies in the end. But not before it does some pretty nutty stuff. There’s no more point in yelling “watch out for the cat” at a mouse hijacked by toxoplasma than there is looking at valuation measures in a market hijacked by mercantilism.

Me and my immune system

My investing immune system has been in pretty good shape recently. But that’s the main reason why I’ve produced mediocre investment performance. I’ve been sensible. But in doing so I have imposed qualitative, one-way causality arguments onto a market that just doesn’t care. I need to be more like the mouse (just without the bit where it dies) and that means I have had to put aside qualitative analysis and be in this trending market. I had thought it would be worth staying bearish and accepting underperformance for the fun of being right in the end – becoming what the British call a vexatious litigant, someone who fights for the sake of it. But I’m not sure any of us can wait that long. Playing it safe, as my good friend Chris Cole wrote last year may be the greatest risk of all.” So the mouse it is.

America fights back

Back to our story. What happens when the donor can’t take it any more? This happened in part in March 2009 when the US rejected Asia’s neo-mercantilism. Two destructive, domestic boom/bust cycles within a decade had left gross debt almost four times GDP. The domestic economy had become unresponsive to even record fiscal expansion and almost zero overnight rates. Something had to be done to regain the initiative. Polite requests for the Chinese to allow their currency to revalue higher versus the dollar were rebuffed and in its absence expansionary American fiscal and monetary policy only served to make China richer. Not ok. So America fought back. With QE.

If the Chinese were never going to revalue their currency themselves, the US would effectively do it for them. QE would target higher prices in China, something that would revalue the renmimbi in real terms and, with a bit of luck, produce the consumer boom that its bureaucrats had so steadfastly sought to prevent. This would transform China into the donor country and also generate the prosperity America needed to recover from the clutches of its debt deflation. And so the sands shifted again. The Fed kicked off its Treasury purchase program in 2009 in the full knowledge that the lack of demand for productive investment in the moribund US economy would create a surplus of speculative flows into faster growing regions of the world. It also knew that such flows would force the foreign exchange targeting emerging market central banks to print even more of their own currencies to keep a lid on their exchange rate appreciation as the dollar debased itself. The Fed then recognised how the chain reaction we have chronicled above would go. Emerging market asset prices would be bid up, something that would in turn be met by more central bank printing of local currencies which would then be leveraged through the emerging market banking system into even higher local asset prices and so on and so on and so on.

The Fed starts winning

This works. Well it works for the Fed. We estimate that total emerging market debt now surpasses $66trn. That’s almost two and a half times emerging market GDP and double its level at the start of the Fed’s QE extravaganza. At the same time car sales in China have surpassed those of the US and property prices are on a rip. Housing transactions are up 35% year on year and new home prices are rising across the nation by between 15% and 20%. Looks like a consumer boom doesn’t it? So from the Fed’s point of view this is going well. So well that since July 2008, the renminbi has appreciated by some 30% against the euro. But while the Fed might be pleased the Chinese probably aren’t.

“When the monster stops growing. it dies. It can’t stay one size.”

The Grapes of Wrath, John Steinbeck

The mercantilist plan has always been to push overseas trade expansion via the perpetuation of an under-valued currency. It isn’t working out. Look at Europe. Europe’s nominal GDP was supposed to be much higher by now (partly on the back of China’s helpful 2009 bout of credit expansion). But it has only surpassed its previous highs by 2%. And denominated in renminbi, it’s much much worse: the European economy has nose-dived by 25% since March 2008. Try being a small labour intensive manufacturer in some coastal Chinese city renowned for its export prowess but struggling with fast rising wages selling into that!

The German philosopher and experimental psychologist scientist, Gustav Fechner, once proposed a rule that can be expressed as follows “in order that the intensity of a sensation may increase in arithmetical progression, the stimulus must increase in geometrical progression?” That seems to describe China pretty well. The huge disappointments in growth elsewhere mean that for China’s GDP to make arithmetic progression, a geometric intensity of effort – with no theoretical end – is required. The monster has to grow. Note that since the Fed turned the tables with its QE policy in 2009, China has had to consume more concrete in its roads, rail projects, bridges, factory construction and new buildings than the US did during the entire 20th century. Yet despite this Herculean effort its structural growth rate has fallen by 30%. This is all fascinating. But tell you what it isn’t. It isn’t stable. It is what China expert Michael Pettis would call a volatility machine.

Markets predicting deflation get asset inflation

Something happened in April of this year that I think may have marked a turning point. Before I go into that I want to be sure we all understand something. You want to believe that China’s growth rate over the last 30 years has been a triumph of superior state planning and the irrepressible force of urban migration, a one way causality if you like. I’d like to too. But we have to accept that it just isn’t true. Instead it is the result of a system of foreign exchange suppression – and so anchoring our expectations to it is a very bad idea. With that in mind, I’m going to ask you to consider the US Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) market. As you know, we allocate a lot of time and risk capital to equities. Their malleability allied with low transaction costs and liquidity make them an excellent way for us to invest in our macro narratives. But we find it hard to buy and sell equities based on valuations. Doing it like this is just too imprecise. So we prefer the certainty of inflation expectations: you should be long equities if inflation expectations are trending higher — or more specifically for us when the 10-year inflation expectation, derived from the TIPS market, is greater than its 200 day moving average.

Over the last decade you could have done this and nothing else and escaped most criticism. A simple trading rule where one is long S&P futures when the condition is met, and flat otherwise, has produced a return of 75% since the 1st of January 2003 (around the bottom of the TMT crash). A long-only strategy has produced better gains – almost 95% – but using the rule would have lowered your maximum drawdown from 56% to just 20%. So once you adjust for volatility you can say that you would have done better investing guided by trend inflation expectations than not. The 10-year expectation moved below its 200 day moving average in April this year. And yet we have taken a resolutely contrarian message from this signal. Don’t sell equities. China’s pledge to maintain high GDP growth rates by ploughing on with capacity enhancing supply additions to its fixed capital formation, even at a time when the still risk averse banking system in Europe and America is failing to produce a consumer boom in the West, is fast building global deflationary pressure. That’s the resounding message from the TIPS market. And in a world of two way causality, that could continue to prove immensely bullish. Why? Because the Fed uses this criteria as its principal benchmark for determining whether to taper or not.

So imagine the virtuous loop that runs through asset prices today. The Fed begins QE to thwart neo¬mercantilism and capture more of its own domestic expansion. The Chinese witness a shortfall in their GDP growth rates as their overseas expansion moderates. This robs them of the ability to loosen policy in the West. They counter by embarking on more fixed capital formation to maintain a floor on domestic GDP growth. This adds to the global supply equation that drives break-even inflation expectations lower and leads the Fed to once more embark on yet looser monetary conditions. It is a reflexive cycle that can drive mice to be madder and madder. Or braver and braver. Depends how you look at it. But either way, only a foolish investor would stand in the way of this bull market. It’ll crash of course, just not for a while.

Want to make real money? Make it in Japan

What if I were to tell you that you could buy something for $300k and it might be worth $5m in a couple of years? Is that something you might be interested in?

Japan has never been very far away from my thoughts. I’ve grown old as its economy and stock market have languished from the aftershocks of their equity price bubble in the 1980s. My first year as an investment analyst in Edinburgh was spent conducting research on Japanese stocks in the year immediately after the bubble had popped. I remember the denial on the part of my superiors that the show had ended. It’s hard to accept you have luck not talent.

Later I remember being struck by how the Dow Jones Industrial Average had broken its 1929 price high 25 years later in 1954. That really captured my imagination. I don’t know why. Perhaps even then it was the notion of an economic life cycle savings hypothesis. That people make consumption decisions based on their current stage of life. That we have roughly 23 years or so to accumulate savings and a pension to see us through our less industrious later years. It made sense to me that regardless of the stock market bubble in the 1920s, 25 years should be sufficient to take out a nominal price established so long ago. I reasoned that even low rates of inflation compound to quite a large number over so many years. And that the nature of social democracies is that they dislike prolonged hardship. If things get so bad then sooner or later they are going to vote for politicians who will address their concerns.

So I started looking around to see whether I could find other asset classes that complied with this pattern. Gold caught my attention. The price high of January 1980 struck me as being similar in magnitude to what took place on Wall Street all those years previously. Gold flew from its shackles of $35 an ounce in 1970 to sell briefly for more than $800 in January 1980; and then it crashed. But the nominal price high was taken out 27 years later on the 28th December 2007. The silver market had been cornered at the peak making its price high that much more difficult to surmount. It needed 31 years to re-establish the old price high. The oil market took just 24 years to break the $40 handle last seen in March 1980. Interesting isn’t it?

I then became fascinated by the 7th of December 1941. Yes it was the date of the attack on Pearl Harbour but it also represented an incredibly rare occurrence: the Dow Jones traded at its 50-year price moving average. John Templeton bought his “penny” stocks and the rest was history. This brings me to Japan. The TOPIX stock price index has recently traded as low as its 50-year moving average and better still, next December will mark the 25th anniversary of its great price peak.

Maybe this doesn’t mean anything. But it is our contention that Japan’s long spell in the sin bin has left its society particularly vulnerable to the charms of a radicalisation of monetary policy. We reckon that with the pro-growth shocks of neo-mercantilism essentially having run their course, Japan will struggle to produce the incremental GDP necessary to service and repay its gigantic sovereign debt load. This will provoke inflationary price targeting by a politicised central bank that should send Japanese stock prices heavenwards once more. I’m not eulogising about Abenomics and its golden arrows here. Instead I’m expressing a more negative kind of bullishness: the fear of persistent policy failure that leads to fiat money printing without limit.

Back in 2008, with world equity markets in turmoil, I purchased a one-touch 40k Nikkei call option for which we paid $300k. I could envisage the yen strengthening substantially and triggering a corporate shock as Japanese household names buckled under the duress of currency appreciation. I also bought a lot of credit protection. And sure enough, in 2011 and for the majority of 2012 the yen strengthened. Japan recorded its largest manufacturing bankruptcy and a number of prominent household names, the giant electronic businesses, saw the cost of insuring their debt sky-rocket. For instance, Sharp rose from a spread of around 100 in January 2012 to over 5,900 in October of the same year. The Japan iTraxx Index for five-year protection, however, only flared to 220 (from around 100 in 2010) and so our hypothesis that much of corporate Japan would buckle under the weight of yen strength proved unfounded.

That was a shame but nevertheless, this “crisis-lite” was sufficient to produce the political intervention that we had envisaged. The most senior policy makers at the Bank of Japan were unceremoniously removed from office and monetary policy was set, instead, very loosely, propelling yen asset prices higher. The stock market leapt by 60% on the news and the currency weakened by 20%. And, as the chart below of the Japanese five-year break-even inflation expectation reveals, one should be long their stock market. We still value the one-touch at our purchase price today, and with the market approaching 16k and trending higher, who is to say where it will trade in April 2018? If it touches 40k, get $5m.

CHART PAGE 7

Where will it all end?

Remarkably, the aftershocks of Japan’s volte-face seemed to catch American policy makers out. In May, the Fed, convinced that its QE program had succeeded in re-distributing global GDP away from China and towards the US economy, began signalling its intent to taper its easy money by autumn. However, with 10-year Treasury rates having moved from 1.75% to 3% and its fourth largest trading partner having devalued by 20% since the previous November, the anticipated vigorous domestic American growth never actually materialised; it was captured instead by the new and even looser monetary policy of Japan. Yet again the reflexive loop had worked to sustain the monetary momentum that is feeding global stock markets. And the not so all-knowing Fed? It had to shock market expectations in October by removing the immediacy of its tighter policy and stock markets rebounded higher. Where will this all end? Can it ever end?

There are multiple possible outcomes. The one markets are most vulnerable to is the re-emergence of bullish bankers. They could lend such that the consumer boom in the US and Europe finally sparks and in doing so provoke the Fed to finally tighten policy. That would spook developed market equities but not as much as you might think – they will have the palliative of the stronger GDP growth. Emerging market equities are closer to the edge of a bubble and could prove more susceptible to a greater drawdown owing to the fragilities of their debt fuelled economies. But for now, the re-emergence of risk-seeking bankers fuelling a lending boom in the West seems remote. We aren’t too worried about it. In Europe for instance the banking system has an estimated 2.6trn euros of deleveraging (circa 30% of GDP) still to complete, having shed 3.5trn euros already.

So we are happy to run a long developed market stock position with a short hedge composed of emerging market equity futures. We are running an unhedged long in Japanese equities as our wild bullish card (we have, of course, hedged the currency).

It seems then to us that the most likely outcome is that America and Europe remain resilient without booming. But with monetary policy set so much too loose it is inevitable that we will continue to witness mini-economic cycles that convince investors that economies are escaping stall speed and that policy rates are likely to rise. This will scare markets – and emerging markets in particular – but it won’t actually materialise: stronger growth in one part of the world on the back of easier policy will be countered by even looser policy elsewhere (the much fabled “currency wars”). So market expectations of tighter policy will always be rescinded and emerging markets will recover rather than crash. Developed markets just keep trending positively against this background – and might accelerate. Remember what we said about 1928 and 1998 at the beginning.

Just be long. Pretty much anything.

So here’s how I understand things now that I am no longer the last bear standing. You should buy equities if you believe many European banks and their sovereign paymasters are insolvent. You should buy shares if you put a higher probability than your peers on the odds of a European democracy rejecting the euro over the course of the next few years. You should be long risk assets if you believe China will have lowered its growth rate from 7% to nearer 5% over the course of the next two years. You should be long US equities if you are worried about the failure of Washington to address its fiscal deficits. And you should buy Japanese assets if you fear that Abenomics will fail to restore the fortunes of Japan (which it probably won’t). Hey this is easy…

And then it crashed

I have not completely lost my senses of course. Eclectica remain strong believers in the most powerful force in the universe – compounding positive returns – and avoiding large losses is crucial to achieving this.

We have built a reputation for getting the calls right in the difficult space that is macro investing, which has served us and our clients well during both trending bull markets and times of crisis. Today, of course, the market is “golden” which is to say that the 50 day price trend is above the 200 day. But remember that during those forays into the “dead-zone”, years like 2008 and 2011 when equity markets crashed, Eclectica performed handsomely. I like to think therefore that I own an alpha crisis management franchise that has rewarded our investors at limes of stock market stress.

This commitment remains as resolute as at any time over the last 11 years that I have managed the Fund. But what if I could produce a consistent alpha return profile with the in-built crisis hedge to your wealth… is that something you might be interested in?

Comment » | China, General, Japan, QE, Uncategorized

Global Economic Recovery..

April 28th, 2013 — 6:55pm

HG

bellwether verdict suggests not…

Comment » | Deflation, General, Macro

The Road to Serfdom

October 12th, 2012 — 3:43pm

originally posted here and here

Authored by Detlev Schlichter; originally posted at DetlevSchlichter.com,

We are now five years into the Great Fiat Money Endgame and our freedom is increasingly under attack from the state, liberty’s eternal enemy. It is true that by any realistic measure most states today are heading for bankruptcy. But it would be wrong to assume that ‘austerity’ policies must now lead to a diminishing of government influence and a shrinking of state power. The opposite is true: the state asserts itself more forcefully in the economy, and the political class feels licensed by the crisis to abandon whatever restraint it may have adhered to in the past. Ever more prices in financial markets are manipulated by the central banks, either directly or indirectly; and through legislation, regulation, and taxation the state takes more control of the employment of scarce means. An anti-wealth rhetoric is seeping back into political discourse everywhere and is setting the stage for more confiscation of wealth and income in the future.

War is the health of the state, and so is financial crisis, ironically even a crisis in government finances. As the democratic masses sense that their living standards are threatened, they authorize their governments to do “whatever it takes” to arrest the collapse, prop up asset prices, and to enforce some form of stability. The state is a gigantic hammer, and at times of uncertainty the public wants nothing more than seeing everything nailed to the floor. Saving the status quo and spreading the pain are the dominant political postulates today, and they will shape policy for years to come.
Unlimited fiat money is a political tool

A free society requires hard and apolitical money. But the reality today is that money is merely a political tool. Central banks around the world are getting ever bolder in using it to rig markets and manipulate asset prices. The results are evident: equities are trading not far from historic highs, the bonds of reckless and clueless governments are trading at record low interest rates, and corporate debt is priced for perfection. While in the real economy the risks remain palpable and the financial sector on life support from the central banks, my friends in money management tell me that the biggest risk they have faced of late was the risk of not being bullish enough and missing the rallies. Welcome to Planet QE.

I wish my friends luck but I am concerned about the consequences. With free and unlimited fiat money at the core of the financial industry, mis-allocations of capital will not diminish but increase. The damage done to the economy will be spectacular in the final assessment. There is no natural end to QE. Once it has propped up markets it has to be continued ad infinitum to keep ‘prices’ where the authorities want them. None of this is a one-off or temporary. It is a new form of finance socialism. It will not end through the political process but via complete currency collapse.

Not the buying and selling by the public on free and uninhibited markets, but monetary authorities – central bank bureaucrats – now determine where asset prices should be, which banks survive, how fast they grow and who they lend to, and what the shape of the yield curve should be. We are witnessing the destruction of financial markets and indeed of capitalism itself.

While in the monetary sphere the role of the state is increasing rapidly it is certainly not diminishing in the sphere of fiscal policy. Under the misleading banner of ‘austerity’ states are not rolling back government but simply changing the sources of state funding. Seeing what has happened in Ireland and Portugal, and what is now happening in Spain and in particular Greece, many governments want to reduce their dependence on the bond market. They realize that once the bond market loses confidence in the solvency of any state the game is up and insolvency quickly becomes a reality. But the states that attempt to reduce deficits do not usually reduce spending but raise revenues through higher taxes.
Sources of state funding

When states fund high degrees of spending by borrowing they tap into the pool of society’s savings, crowd out private competitors, and thus deprive the private sector of resources. In the private sector, savings would have to be employed as productive capital to be able repay the savers who provided these resources in the first place at some point in the future. By contrast, governments mainly consume the resources they obtain through borrowing in the present period. They do not invest them in productive activities that generate new income streams for society. Via deficit-spending, governments channel savings mainly back into consumption. Government bonds are not backed by productive capital but simply by the state’s future expropriation of wealth-holders and income-earners. Government deficits and government debt are always highly destructive for a society. They are truly anti-social. Those who invest in government debt are not funding future-oriented investment but present-day state consumption. They expect to get repaid from future taxes on productive enterprise without ever having invested in productive enterprise themselves. They do not support capitalist production but simply acquire shares in the state’s privilege of taxation.

Reducing deficits is thus to be encouraged at all times, and the Keynesian nonsense that deficit-spending enhances society’s productiveness is to be rejected entirely. However, most states are not aiming to reduce deficits by cutting back on spending, and those that do, do so only marginally. They mainly replace borrowing with taxes. This means the state no longer takes the detour via the bond market but confiscates directly and instantly what it needs to sustain its outsized spending. In any case, the states’ heavy control over a large chunk of society’s scarce means is not reduced. It is evident that this strategy too obstructs the efficient and productive use of resources. It is a disincentive for investment and the build-up of a productive capital stock. It is a killer of growth and prosperity.
47 percent, then 52 percent, then 90 percent…

Why do states not cut spending? – I would suggest three answers: first, it is not in the interest of politicians and bureaucrats to reduce spending as spending is the prime source of their power and prestige. Second, there is still a pathetic belief in the Keynesian myth that government spending ‘reboots’ the economy. But the third is maybe the most important one: in all advanced welfare democracies large sections of the public have come to rely on the state, and in our mass democracies it now means political suicide to try and roll back the state.

Mitt Romney’s comment that 47% of Americans would not appreciate his message of cutting taxes and vote for him because they do not pay taxes and instead rely on government handouts, may not have been politically astute and tactically clever but there was a lot of truth in it.

In Britain, more than 50 percent of households are now net receivers of state transfers, up 10 percent from a decade ago. In Scotland it is allegedly a staggering 90 percent of households. Large sections of British society have become wards of the state.

Against this backdrop state spending is more likely to grow than shrink. This will mean higher taxes, more central bank intervention (debt monetization, ‘quantitative easing’), more regulatory intervention to force institutional investors into the government bond market, and ultimately capital controls.
Eat the Rich!

In order to legitimize the further confiscation of private income and private wealth to fund ongoing state expenditure, the need for a new political narrative arose. This narrative claims that the problem with government finances is not out-of-control spending but the lack of solidarity by the rich, wealthy and most productive, who do not contribute ‘their fair share’.

An Eat-the-Rich rhetoric is discernible everywhere, and it is getting louder. In Britain, Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg wants to introduce a special ‘mansion tax’ on high-end private property. This is being rejected by the Tories but, according to opinion polls, supported by a majority of Brits. (I wager a guess that it is popular in Scotland.) In Germany, Angela Merkel’s challenger for the chancellorship, Peer Steinbrueck, wants to raise capital gains taxes if elected. In Switzerland of all places, a conservative (!) politician recently proposed that extra taxes should be levied on wealthy pensioners so that they make their ‘fair’ contribution to the public weal.
France on an economic suicide mission

The above trends are all nicely epitomized by developments in France. In 2012, President Hollande has not reduced state spending at all but raised taxes. For 2013 he proposed an ‘austerity’ budget that would cut the deficit by €30 billion, of which €10 billion would come from spending cuts and €20 billion would be generated in extra income through higher taxes on corporations and on high income earners. The top tax rate will rise from 41% to 45%, and those that earn more than €1 million a year will be subject to a new 75% marginal tax rate. With all these market-crippling measures France will still run a budget deficit and will have to borrow more from the bond market to fund its outsized state spending programs, which still account for 56% of registered GDP.

If you ask me, the market is not bearish enough on France. This version of socialism will not work, just as no other version of socialism has ever worked. But when it fails, it will be blamed on ‘austerity’ and the euro, not on socialism.

As usual, the international commentariat does not ‘get it’. Political analysts are profoundly uninterested in the difference between reducing spending and increasing taxes, it is all just ‘austerity’ to them, and, to make it worse, allegedly enforced by the Germans. The Daily Telegraph’s Ambrose Evans-Pritchard labels ‘austerity’ ‘1930s policies imposed by Germany’, which is of dubious historical and economic accuracy but suitable, I guess, to make a political point.

Most commentators are all too happy to cite the alleged negative effect of ‘austerity’ on GDP, ignoring that in a heavily state-run economy like France’s, official GDP says as little about the public’s material wellbeing as does a rallying equity market in an economy fuelled by unlimited QE. If the government spent money on hiring people to sweep the streets with toothbrushes this, too, would boost GDP and could thus be labelled economic progress.

At this point it may be worth adding that despite all the talk of ‘austerity’ many governments are still spending and borrowing like never before, first and foremost, the United States, which is running the largest civil government mankind has ever seen. For 5 consecutive years annual deficits have been way in excess of $1,000 billion, which means the US government borrows an additional $4 billion on every day the markets are open. The US is running budget deficits to the tune of 8-10% per annum to allegedly boost growth by a meagre 2% at best.
Regulation and more regulation

Fiscal and monetary actions by states will increasingly be flanked by aggressive regulatory and legislative intervention in markets. Governments are controlling the big pools of savings via their regulatory powers over banks, insurance companies and pension funds. Existing regulations already force all these entities into heavy allocations of government bonds. This will continue going forward and intensify. The states must ensure that they continue to have access to cheap funding.

Not only do I expect regulation that ties institutional investors to the government bond market to continue, I think it will be made ever more difficult for the individual to ‘opt out’ of these schemes, i.e. to arrange his financial affairs outside the heavily state-regulated banking, insurance, and pension fund industry. The astutely spread myth that the financial crisis resulted from ‘unregulated markets’ rather than constant expansion of state fiat money and artificially cheap credit from state central banks, has opened the door for more aggressive regulatory interference in markets.
The War on Offshore

Part and parcel of this trend is the War on Offshore, epitomized by new and tough double-taxation treaties between the UK and Switzerland and Germany and Switzerland. You are naïve if you think that attacks on Swiss banking and on other ‘offshore’ banking destinations are only aimed at tax-dodgers. An important side effect of these campaigns is this: it gets ever more cumbersome for citizens from these countries to conduct their private banking business in Switzerland and other countries, and ever more expensive and risky for Swiss and other banks to service these clients. For those of us who are tax-honest but prefer to have our assets diversified politically, and who are attracted to certain banking and legal traditions and a deeper commitment to private property rights in places such as Switzerland, banking away from our home country gets more difficult. This is intentional I believe.

The United States of America have taken this strategy to its logical extreme. The concept of global taxation for all Americans, regardless where they live, coupled with aggressive litigation and threat of reprisal against foreign financial institutions that may – deliberately or inadvertently – assist Americans in lowering their tax burden, have made it very expensive and even risky for many banks to deal with American citizens, or even with holders of US green cards or holders of US social security numbers. Americans will find it difficult to open bank accounts in certain countries. This is certainly the case for Switzerland but a friend of mine even struggled obtaining full banking services in Singapore. I know of private banks in the UK that have terminated banking relationships with US citizens, even when they were longstanding clients. All of this is going to get worse next year when FATCA becomes effective – the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, by which the entire global financial system will become the extended arm of the US Internal Revenue System. US citizens are subject to de facto capital controls. I believe this is only a precursor to real capital controls being implemented in the not too distant future.

When Johann Wolfgang von Goethe wrote that “none are more hopelessly enslaved than those who falsely believe they are free” he anticipated the modern USA.

And to round it all off, there is the War on Cash. In many European countries there are now legal limits for cash transactions, and Italy is considering restrictions for daily cash withdrawals. Again, the official explanation is to fight tax evasion but surely these restrictions will come in handy when the state-sponsored and highly geared banking sector in Europe wobbles again, and depositors try to pull out their money.
“I’ve seen the future, and it will be…”

So here is the future as I see it: central banks are now committed to printing unlimited amounts of fiat money to artificially prop up various asset prices forever and maintain illusions of stability. Governments will use their legislative and regulatory power to make sure that your bank, your insurance company and your pension fund keep funding the state, and will make it difficult for you to disengage from these institutions. Taxes will rise on trend, and it will be more and more difficult to keep your savings in cash or move them abroad.

Now you may not consider yourself to be rich. You may not own or live in a house that Nick Clegg would consider a ‘mansion’. You may not want to ever bank in Switzerland or hold assets abroad. You may only have a small pension fund and not care much how many government bonds it holds. You may even be one those people who regularly stand in front of me in the line at Starbucks and pay for their semi-skinned, decaf latte with their credit or debit card, so you may not care about restrictions on using cash. But if you care about living in a free society you should be concerned. And I sure believe you should care about living in a functioning market economy.

This will end badly.

Comment » | Deflation, Fed Policy, General, Geo Politics, Gold, Macro Structure, QE

Anti fragility

May 3rd, 2012 — 2:59pm

“There’s something called action bias. People think that doing something is necessary. Like in medicine and a lot of places. Like every time I have an MBA—except those from Wharton, because they know what’s going on!—they tell me, “Give me something actionable.” And when I was telling them, “Don’t sell out-of-the-money options,” when I give them negative advice, they don’t think it’s actionable. So they say, “Tell me what to do.” All these guys are bust. They don’t understand: you live long by not dying, you win in chess by not losing—by letting the other person lose. So negative investment is not a sissy strategy. It is an active one”.

“The average doesn’t matter when you’re fragile.”

Nassim Taleb at Wharton.

Comment » | General

The Existential Financial Problem Of Our Time

February 29th, 2012 — 8:12am

Sovereign Man
Notes from the Field

Originally posted here

Date: February 28, 2012
Reporting From: London, England

[Editor’s note: Tim Price, a frequent Sovereign Man contributor and Director of Investment at PFP Wealth Management in London, is filling in for Simon today.]

In December last year, the poet Alice Oswald withdrew from the TS Eliot poetry prize on the grounds that the prize was being sponsored by an investment company (Aurum, a fund of hedge funds manager).

How you feel about this principled stance may depend on whether you are a UK taxpayer. If you are a UK taxpayer, you will probably feel relieved that your tax pounds are no longer being squandered on the Arts Council’s sponsorship of the prize in question “a tiny victory” but a victory nevertheless against the arrogant dissipations of the state.

Ms Oswald seems to believe that poetry prizes should be funded with everybody else’s money, rather than by a private patron grown-up enough to be responsible for its discretionary expenditure (private patronage being what you might call “traditional” in the arts).

As a graduate in English Language and Literature, this commentator has no animus against poets. But I am not sure we want them in charge of the economy. They are notorious for starving in garrets for a reason.

Ms Oswald’s “protest” is part of a wider intellectual malaise that lazily conflates government spending with the real economy and which conveniently ignores the fact that without a flourishing private sector, there would be no government and certainly no government spending to speak of.

It is part of that lazy thinking that inspires journalists to keep speaking of “the government” spending money on this or that, as if “the government” were somehow sitting on an infinitely large pile of “government money” that most of the time it was unreasonably withholding from worthy causes.

The reason our economy is knackered is because successive governments have indeed pandered to subjective worthy causes with money that those governments did not possess.

Tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow, taxpayers will be paying the bill. It is not government money because the government doesn’t have any. It has liabilities only. It is taxpayers’ money.

The finest achievement to date of the UK’s coalition government has been a triumph of PR’ as one might expect, given that PR appears to comprise the only work experience our current Prime Minister has ever had outside politics.

A myth has arisen, polished frequently by an ignorant media, that the British government has started to deal with the grotesque debt inherited from the previous government. But as Prosperity Capital’s chief economist Liam Halligan points out, government spending was actually higher for the fiscal year 2010/11 than under the last year of the last government.

The UK debt figures are also much worse than conventionally believed because 2011 debt including “interventions” stood at ~£2,270 billion as at September 2011, or 150% of UK GDP. To this we should add public sector pensions (~£1,100bn+), PFI (~£400bn+) and sundry other off-balance-sheet obligations of the state.

Liam Halligan’s bleak summary is that after five years of supposed austerity, UK government spending will be back to 2005 levels… but with twice as much debt.

Just as there has been no real austerity in the UK, yet’ there has been no real deleveraging in the global economy at an aggregate level. Paul Marson of Lombard Odier points out that global credit market debt stands at $220 trillion, having grown by 11% annually since 2002, versus 8% nominal GDP growth:

[Credit Market & Debt to GDP]

In debt markets we are seeing a catastrophic example of the law of diminishing returns. As Marson makes clear, it takes greater amounts of debt to have the same marginal impact on GDP. The marginal effectiveness of debt has collapsed during the period since the end of the Second World War.

For the USA, for example, 1 unit of debt generated 0.63 units of GDP between 1953 and 1984; that same 1 unit of debt generated 0.24 units of GDP between 1985 and 2000; since 2000, 1 unit of debt has generated just 0.08 units of GDP.

The problem is insuperable. More debt has been created in the past forty years than will ever realistically be paid back… which leads us to the existential financial problem of our time:

The modern, debt-based economy requires constant economic expansion if only to service all that debt. So what happens when the modern economy goes ex-growth and stops expanding?

Iceland already found out. Greece is in the process of discovering. But we will all get a chance to participate in this lesson.

Runaway fiscal and monetary stimulus throughout the western economies is in the process of destroying the concept of creditworthiness at the centre of the modern monetary system. Private investors, we suspect, have little or no conception of the extent to which the state is now the predominant player in the financial markets.

Central banks control the money supply and interest rates. Central banking and commercial banking interests have essentially become fused.

The ECB’s long-term refinancing operations are banking bailouts by the back door. Central banks are now also the swing players in government bond markets which directly influences the price for corporate credit. Central bank monetary stimulus also directly influences equity market direction and confidence.

Be careful, be very careful about the sort of government debt you hold. You may well end up being paid in whole- but in such depreciated terms that being “kept whole” will be meaningless in real terms.

In all other respects, our investment choices remain what they have always been: high quality, high yielding defensive equities; uncorrelated systematic trend-following funds; gold, silver, and gold and silver mining companies.

There will come a point, and it may admittedly be some time in coming, when a major government bond market goes bang. Perhaps Japan, some peripheral market in the euro zone, some core market in the euro zone, the UK, or even the US.

You will hear the echo throughout the world. We intend to be a very long way away when that time comes.

Comment » | Deflation, General, Geo Politics, Gold, US denouement

The Doom Loop

February 25th, 2012 — 5:38am

Andrew Haldane writes about equity and the banking system.

published in London review of Books here

In 1989, the CEOs of the seven largest banks in the US earned an average of $2.8 million, almost a hundred times the annual income of the average US household. In the same year, the CEOs of the largest four UK banks earned £453,000, fifty times average UK household income. These are striking inequalities. Yet by 2007, at the height of the financial sector boom, CEO pay at the largest US banks had risen nearly tenfold to $26 million, more than five hundred times US household income, while among the UK’s largest banks it had risen by an almost identical factor to reach £4.3 million, 230 times UK household income in that year.

How do we make sense of these salary increases? Easily, in fact. During the go-go years, bank profits reached spectacular highs. Bank shareholders remunerated managers for delivering these riches; CEO pay grew almost exactly in line with shareholder returns. Reality then intervened. The heart-stopping global recession of the last few years was largely induced by financial sector excess. The long-term costs of the crisis are likely comfortably to exceed a year’s global income.

The continuing backlash against banking, as evidenced in popular protests on Wall Street and in the City of London, is a response not just to the fact that the world is poorer, as pre-crisis riches have turned to rags, but to the way these riches were privatised, while the rags are being socialised. This disparity is nothing new. Neither, in the main, is it anyone’s fault. For the most part the financial crisis was not the result of individual wickedness or folly. It is not a story of pantomime villains and village idiots. Instead the crisis reflected a failure of the entire system of financial sector governance.

In the first half of the 19th century, the business of banking was simple. The UK had around five hundred banks and seven hundred building societies. Most of the former operated as unlimited liability partnerships: the owners-cum-managers backed the banks’ losses with every last penny of their own personal wealth. The building societies operated as mutually owned co-operatives, with ownership, control and liability all pooled. Financial sector assets amounted to less than 50 per cent of annual UK GDP.

Banks’ balance sheets were heavily cushioned. Shareholder funds – so-called equity capital – protected depositors from loss and often accounted for as much as half of the balance sheet. Cash, and liquid securities such as government bonds, enabled banks to meet their payment obligations to depositors. They accounted for about a third of banks’ assets. Banking systems maintained broadly similar arrangements across the US and Europe. This relationship between governance and balance sheet was mutually compatible. Owing to unlimited liability, control was exercised by investors whose personal wealth was on the line – a potent incentive to be prudent with depositors’ money. Bank directors – the major shareholders responsible for day to day management – excluded investors who didn’t have sufficiently deep pockets to bear the risk. Shareholders were firmly on the hook, and had a strong incentive, in turn, to make sure that managers didn’t step out of line. Managers monitored shareholders and shareholders managers. In this way, the 19th-century banking model kept risk-taking in check.

The global environment was changing, however. During the first half of the 19th century, rich countries were hungry for capital to finance investment in infrastructure, including railways. As long as capital in banks was restricted to a small number of unlimited liability partners, credit was constricted. But in 1826, the six‑partner restriction on UK banks was lifted, allowing them to operate with an unlimited number of shareholders as joint-stock banks. Ownership and control became legally distinct – a crucial historical shift. Nevertheless, shareholder discipline was still proving an effective brake on risky lending and there was pressure for further liberalisation. One obvious solution was to limit shareholder liability so that their losses were no greater than their initial investment. Once investors’ personal wealth was no longer in jeopardy, bank credit would free up. In the UK, the change came with the Limited Liability Act and Joint Stock Companies Acts of 1855 and 1856.

At first, limited liability status was not taken up enthusiastically by banks: they were reluctant to give up unlimited liability, which they regarded as a badge of prudence. But the collapse of the City of Glasgow bank in 1878, caused by speculative lending and false accounting practices, ended that. Eighty per cent of the bank’s shareholders were made destitute. The opinions of bankers, Parliament and public alike shifted quickly. By 1889, only two unlimited liability British banks remained.

Even then, some of the benefits of unlimited liability were preserved. UK banks moved to a regime of extended liability, whereby shareholders were liable for an additional fixed level of reserve capital in the event of stress or bankruptcy. This made for a deep pool of contingent capital, often amounting to 50 per cent of a bank’s assets. Extended liability was enough to keep bank shareholders and managers on their toes: risk monitoring incentives remained sharp and the appetite for risk blunt. But the balance started to tilt at the beginning of the 20th century. As banks grew in size, the vetting of shareholders became impractical. Then, during the Depression, the need to draw from the contingent capital pool had the effect of heightening panic among UK and US banks, rather than diminishing it. By the end of the 1930s, only six British banks still maintained reserve liability. The governance and balance sheets of banks were, by this time, unrecognisable from those a century earlier. Banks were now controlled by arms-length managers, no longer major shareholders, while ownership was held by a widely dispersed set of shareholders, unvetted and anonymous, their upside pay-offs unlimited but their downside risks now capped by limited liability.

What impact did these changes have on banks’ incentive to take risks? The answer was provided in 1974, around a hundred years after the introduction of limited liability, by the Nobel Prize-winning economist Robert Merton, who showed that the equity of a limited liability company could be valued as if it were a financial option – that is, an instrument which offers rights over the future fruits of the company’s assets. This option has value – in the jargon, it is ‘in the money’ – provided a firm’s assets cover its debts. But the most extraordinary implication of Merton’s framework is that the value of those options can be enhanced by increases in the degree of uncertainty about the value of the bank’s assets. How so? Because while uncertainty increases both upside and downside risks, downside risks are capped by limited liability. For shareholders, the sky is the limit but the floor is always just beneath their feet. To maximise shareholder value, therefore, banks need simply to seek bigger and riskier bets.

The response to these incentives has been entirely predictable. Since 1880, the ratio of UK bank assets to GDP has risen roughly tenfold, and the increase has been particularly steep over the past thirty years, peaking at well over 500 per cent of GDP. The pattern in other developed countries has been similar, if less dramatic. The bets weren’t just bigger, but also riskier. During the 20th century, an alphabet soup of exotic and complex instruments, often known by three-letter acronyms, came to displace simple loans on banks’ balance sheets. These boosted banks’ returns. But if returns are high, risks are never far behind. Returns on bank assets were two and a half times more volatile at the end of the 20th century than at the beginning.
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Finance has a further trick up its sleeve, a trick that at a stroke boosts both volatility and returns to the owners of a bank. Leverage, simply put, is borrowing against your capital stake. For example, if borrowing allows a bank to hold assets of 120 against capital of ten, then its leverage is 12. The beauty of leverage is that it effortlessly multiplies the amount shareholders receive as a return on their assets. Consider a bank that makes a 1 per cent return on its assets. By allowing leverage (assets relative to equity) of two, shareholders can double their money; with leverage of four, they can quadruple their money. And so on. Banks have been using this device for well over a century. As unlimited liability was phased out, leverage among banks rose from about three or four in the middle of the 19th century to about five or six at its close. Leverage continued its upward march when extended liability was removed, and by the end of the 20th century it was higher than twenty. In 2007, at its high-water mark, bank leverage hit thirty or more.

This strategy translated, by the arithmetical magic of leverage, into higher shareholder returns. Having begun the 20th century in modest single figures, equity returns to banks were, on average, close to 20 per cent by its end. At the height of the boom, bank equity returns touched 30 per cent. Higher leverage accounted for almost all of this. Bank managers no longer had to sweat their assets: they simply had to borrow against them.

The downside of this strategy is now only too clear. With leverage of two (UK banks in 1850), 50 per cent of your assets must go bad before your equity is wiped out and you go bust. But with leverage of twenty (UK banks in 2000), you will go bust if you lose only 5 per cent of your assets. Over the last hundred years, as returns to banking have increased so too has their volatility, rising by a factor of between six and sevenfold. In the recent financial crisis, UK banks’ shareholder returns fell from twenty-something to below zero in the space of a year.

In principle, market discipline ought to form a natural counterweight to these balance-sheet risks. Debt-holders in a bank, including depositors, ought to worry about shouldering increased risk, and should respond by raising the cost of funds or restricting their quantity, thereby restraining risk-hungry, excess-profit-seeking shareholders. During the 19th century, that theory fitted the facts. Depositor flight and bank runs followed when banks were perceived as fragile. But as the 20th century progressed, evidence of debtors exerting discipline over managers became increasingly patchy. Nowhere was the ineffectiveness of market discipline better illustrated than in the run-up to the recent financial crisis. At the same time as they were leveraging themselves up to the hilt, banks traded in debt markets as though they were riskless. Debtors should act as a brake on risk-taking, but in practice they served as an accelerator. The reason, once again, lies in incentives. When they face a crisis, it is dangerous for banks to have debtors take a hit. To do so may scare the horses, risking a stampede of deposits out of the door. Debtor discipline then has the effect of making a bad situation worse. Extended liability was abolished for just that reason. And the complex debt instruments issued by banks a hundred years later buckled under the same pressure.

In fact, making debtors shoulder the burden of risk in a crisis may have become harder over the past century. The structure of banking has been transformed during that time, in particular by the emergence of financial leviathans considered ‘too big to fail’. At the start of the 20th century, the assets of the UK’s three largest banks accounted for less than 10 per cent of GDP. By 2007, that figure had risen above 200 per cent of GDP. When these institutions hit problems, a bad situation can become catastrophic. In this crisis, as in past ones, catastrophe insurance was supplied not by private creditors but by taxpayers. Only they had pockets deep enough to refloat banks with such huge assets. This story has been repeated for the better part of a century and a half; in evolutionary terms, we have had survival not of the fittest but the fattest. I call this phenomenon the ‘doom loop’.

Consider the effects of the too-big-to-fail problem on risk-taking incentives. If banks know they will be bailed out, those holding their debt will be less likely to price the risk of failure for themselves. Debtor discipline will therefore be weakest among those institutions where society would wish it to be strongest. This encourages them to grow larger still: the leverage cycle isn’t merely repeated, but amplified. The doom loop grows larger. The biggest banks effectively benefit from a disguised, and growing, state subsidy. By my estimate, for UK banks this subsidy amounts to tens of billions of pounds per year and has often stretched to hundreds of billions. Few UK government spending departments have budgets this big. For the global banks, the subsidy can reach a trillion dollars – about eight times the annual global development budget.

We have arrived at a situation in which the ownership and control of banks is typically vested in agents representing small slivers of the balance sheet, but operating with socially sub-optimal risk-taking incentives. It is clear who the losers have been in the present crisis. But who are the beneficiaries? Short-term investors for one. More than anyone else, they benefit from a bumpy ride. If their timing is right, short-term investors can win on both the upswings (by buying) and the downswings (by short-selling) in financial prices. Bank shareholding has become increasingly short‑term over recent years. Average holding periods for US and UK banks’ shares fell from around three years in 1998 to around three months by 2008.

Bank managers have benefited too. In joint-stock banking, ownership and control are distinct. That means managers may not always do what their owners wish. They may seek to feather their own nests by making decisions that boost short-term profits and thereby justify an increase in their own pay. Such decisions may also increase banks’ vulnerability to shocks. In an attempt to avoid this problem, shareholders have sought to align managerial incentives with their own. One way of doing that, increasingly popular over the past decade, has been to remunerate managers not in cash but in equity or using equity‑based metrics. This can generate hugely powerful pecuniary incentives for managers to act in the interests of shareholders. At the peak of the boom, the wealth of the average US bank CEO increased by $24 for every $1000 created for shareholders. They earned $1 million for every 1 per cent rise in the value of their bank. But such equity-based contracts also set up some peculiar risk incentives. In the 19th century, managers monitored shareholders who monitored managers; in the 21st, managers egged on shareholders who egged on managers. The results have been entirely predictable. Before the crisis, the top five equity stakes were held by the CEOs of the following US banks: Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley and Countrywide. We know how these disaster movies ended.

The evolution of banking as I have described it has satisfied the immediate demands of shareholders and managers, but has short-changed everyone else. There is a compelling case for policy intervention. The best proposals for reform are those which aim to reshape risk-taking incentives on a durable basis. Perhaps the most obvious way to tackle shareholder-led incentive problems is to increase banks’ equity capital base. This directly reduces their leverage and therefore the scale of the risks they can take. And it increases banks’ capacity to absorb losses, reducing the need for taxpayer intervention. Over the past few years, this case has been pushed by regulatory reformers. Under the so‑called Basel III agreements struck in 2010, banks’ minimum equity capital ratios will rise fivefold over the next decade, from 2 per cent to close to 10 per cent of assets for the largest global banks. That is a significant shift. Will it be enough?

Recent academic studies suggest not. A 10 per cent capital ratio translates into bank leverage of roughly 25. So even once Basel III is in place, an unexpected loss in a bank’s assets of just 4 per cent will be enough to render it insolvent. History is full of such unexpected bad news, from wars to shocks in oil prices. Basel III is a good starting point, but may not be the finishing line.

An alternative, more radical approach would be to tackle the problem of bank governance and control. Since the crisis, a number of proposals have been made – increasing board expertise and the power of risk committees, for example. These are steps in the right direction. But one look at the star‑studded cast of non-executive directors on the boards of failed financial institutions is to realise that to wish for better is to wish upon a star.

What else might be done? As at the start of the 20th century, the prevailing ownership and control models in banking were the public limited company and the mutually owned co-operative. Under the first, ownership and control are vested in a small minority of stakeholders, with rights assigned according to weight of portfolio: it is an equity dictatorship model. Under the second, ownership and control are vested in a much wider set of stakeholders, with rights unrelated to weight of portfolio – a stakeholder democracy model. Both have their problems. For the public company, it is risk and profit-seeking by the minority. For the mutual, it is a lack of financial incentive to curb risk, as those with the majority voting rights typically have the smallest financial stakes. But it isn’t difficult to conceive of governance models that combine the best bits of both.

To give one example, voting rights could be extended across a wide group of stakeholders, but weighted by stake. Governance and control would then be distributed across the whole balance sheet, curbing the profit-seeking incentives of the equity minority, while weighting voting rights by size of portfolio to avoid the inertia of mutuality. Bank governance would then be a wealth-weighted democracy, a hybrid of the mutual and joint-stock models. This would seem like a radical departure. But in many respects it would be a return to the incentive-aligned structure of 19th-century banking. Over the past century, the imbalance between those who have garnered the profit from banking and those who have taken on the risk has increased. It isn’t only banks that have gone bankrupt during this crisis. Households, companies and even countries have borne the brunt. Putting equity, social and financial, back into banking is essential if the financial system is to be durably repaired.

Comment » | General

nearing the €uro denouement

November 23rd, 2011 — 2:40pm

This is an excellent piece posted at : http://charleshughsmith.blogspot.com/2011/11/whats-lost-with-demise-of-euro-only.html?

Buy his book here

Tuesday, November 22, 2011
What’s Lost With the Demise of the Euro? Only What Was Unsustainable

Scaremongering aside, the demise of the euro does not end European integration. It only means that which is unsustainable has been relinquished and a return to stability is finally possible.

So the euro is doomed. Toast. History. This will lead to:

1. the end of civilization

2. the end of European integration

3. the start of new Dark Ages

4. the return to a sustainable reality

The correct answer is 4. The euro was an unsustainable, self-destructing extension of the integration that has long simplified trade, travel and work throughout the EU (European Union).

At the risk of over-saturating you with more euro-related material, here are the basics we need to keep in mind as the third act plays out.

A common currency seemed like a good way to simplify trade and lower transaction costs. As I noted yesterday in Some Heretical Thoughts on the U.S. Dollar, such “folk” convictions rest on “sole-source causation”: in this case, that a single currency would only offer more benefits of integration because it lowered complexity and transaction costs.

The euro supporters forgot or ignored the primary purpose of national currencies:to account for differences in transparency, productivity, trust, money creation and risk between nations’ economies and their Central Banks/States.

If you remove this means of accounting for these fundamental differences, then you have removed a feedback loop from a dynamic system, and thus removed an absolutely essential flow of information and transparency.

What you’re left with is a system of lies, officially sanctioned opacity, misinformation, disinformation, cooked books, artifice and propaganda, i.e. exactly what Europe has become. With the euro, there was no way for the system to account for thr vast differences in debt loads, credit risks, transparency, productivity and a dozen other fundamentals that are expressed in foreign exchange rates.

By all accounts, Greece and Italy have painfully dysfunctional national finances and political Elites resistant to admitting the dysfunction is unsustainable. Once those nations revert to national currencies, then their currencies will reflect the market’s assessment of their economy and their national/Central Bank policies.

The same will hold true for all the other EU member states: the market will shift through the various metrics and feedback loops and reach an equilibrium around the value of each nation’s currency.

Profligate, over-indebted nations with dysfunctional Elites and systems plagued by political corruption and gridlock will see their currencies devalued and the interest rates they must pay to borrow money raise to the point that borrowing will no longer be an option to escape the consequences of profligacy, and the devalued currency will preclude buying imports from strong-currency nations.

These feedback loops are essential to providing the citizenry and their economy with the transparency and information they need to adapt to reality. The euro has erased all that vital information, leaving only interest rates as the sole expression of differences between economies.

Interest rates are simply not a rich enough source of information and market feedback to express the differences between national economies; the global markets need the information and feedback loop provided by currencies.

As I attempted to describe yesterday, currencies are not explicable with “sole-source causality” or “folk” understandings; they are distillations of numerous information feeds and feedback loops that only a transparent market can generate.

I have little doubt the euro is being held aloft by cloaked Central Bank intervention; the Elites are desperately attempting to cloak the system’s intrinsic dysfunction and stop the market from repricing the euro based on the inevitable return to national currencies.

Rather than fear this return to transparent feedback, we should welcome it and hurry it along. Systems which cut off feedback and choke transparency with artifice and lies are doomed to implode. If Europe ditches the failed “folk” experiment called the euro, then the process of recognizing and pricing dysfunction can begin, and the stability that only transparency and feedback can provide will soon return to the EU.

This may sound counter-intuitive, but it’s the only way forward to a sustainable, stable reality. The immense hubris of Europe’s dysfunctional Elites precludes their recognition that reality eventually trumps artifice and intervention. Their feeble, addled cries cannot turn back the tide, even if their bloated self-importance is infinite.

Comment » | EUR, General, Geo Politics, Macro, The Euro

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