spotfxtrader

On the Swiss move
Bruce Krasting

I have repeatedly said in these pages [zerohedge — your homepage ?] that for currency intervention to be successful it has to be done in conjunction with other big central banks. The Go it Alone policy has not worked over the past 20 years. I have no reason to expect that it will work this time either.

I think the most important press announcement this AM is not from the SNB; it is from the ECB. There is little doubt from this that the SNB is in this all alone:

The Governing Council of the European Central Bank has been informed by the Swiss National Bank about its decision to “no longer tolerate a EUR/CHF exchange rate below the minimum rate of CHF 1.20.”

The Governing Council takes note of this decision, which has been taken by the Swiss National Bank under its own responsibility.

I think that the SNB has just committed suicide. They did the one thing they should never have done. Draw a line in the sand.

Events far outside of the control of the SNB will determine the consequences of the policy to put a floor under the CHF. While I don’t doubt their short-term resolve to defend the 1.20 level for the EURCHF I am already questioning how long this can continue. Some thoughts on where this may go.

Stay away from the CHF. There is only one trade to make as of this morning. That would be long the EURCHF. To me that is like shorting gold. Don’t do it, is my advice.

This has been tried before by the SNB way back in the late 70’s. As a currency matter the policy was a success. The Franc stabilized against the weak German Mark. But three years later the Swiss were suffering a massive hangover. Inflation went from a negligible number to over 7%. There can be no doubt but that the same results will happen again. It’s just a matter of time.

Stay away from Swiss stocks for the time being. Yes, a cheaper Franc is good for translated earnings. So if you believe that multiples are the only driver of stock prices you might conclude that the move by the SNB makes the SMI (stock index) a buy. Think again. A government that falls back on currency controls as the only measure of policy options left, is a place that you don’t want to put your money. The big jump in Swiss stocks this AM is a logical knee jerk response. But the SNB move is also the kiss of death for the equity markets in Switzerland.

Europe is falling apart. That reality has not changed as a result of the SNB action. Over the next few weeks we will get more bad news from the EU. In the past the ‘go to’ response has been to buy the Yen and CHF as a safe haven knee jerk reaction. Now that trade is dead (both of them in my opinion). So where will the hot money go the next time the headlines scare capital? There is only one choice left now. That would be gold.

I believe that the amount of intervention required to drive the EURCHF from 1.14 to 1.20 this AM was quite small. The market immediately re-priced the currency to the level the SNB said it was prepared to defend. But that is not going to be the result at some time in the near future. At some point the SNB will be tested. I have no doubt but that they will step up and intervene like mad the next time the CHF is in demand. But at what cost? How many Euros will they be forced to absorb? E100b? E300b? Could it go as high as E1 trillion? There is no number that can’t be achieved. The question of, “How much can they do?” has not been asked or answered as yet. The market is going to both ask and answer that question. I think the time frame for this is before the end of this year.

Do the Swiss have the will to take this fight to the bitter end? There is nothing in history that says that they can or will. What if this begins to backfire sometime this fall? Does the SNB just stand there and print Francs? That is what they have said they will do. I wonder what they will be thinking when the money supply first doubles, then triples then just goes vertical. Are they really so stupid to think that the floor on the Franc has no risk attached to it?

In 2010 the SNB reported a loss of CHF 21b as a result of their failed interventions against the Euro that left them holding the bag. There was political hell to pay for these losses. The annual gains of the SNB are paid back to the Cantons. There will be no gains (only losses) as a result of the new policy. The Swiss exporters, farmers, tourist industry may hail the move today, but just wait till the policy fails. Before this is over the SNB will hold an extra 500b Euros. The losses could easily exceed E50b. This will sink the SNB forever.

What will the SNB do with all the Euros they have promised to buy? That’s easy to answer. Only German and French debt will be allowed. This will just result in a widening of credit spreads between the North and the South. As this happens more capital will seek a safe haven. What the Swiss have done will add to the instability within the EU. As a result, the ECB will hate the SNB.

To some extent the strong CHF was a dollar phenomenon. The CHF got stronger and stronger against the Euro. Through the markets this acted as a support for the Euro versus the dollar. What might it mean now that this relief valve has been broken? One possible response is that the dollar gets stronger in a significant way. That has not been the reaction so far this morning, but I consider this to be a reasonable outcome. Just a question for those who are looking at this from a global perspective:

What is the number one worst thing that could happen to the US economy over the next six months?

I would put a “too strong” dollar at the top of my list. Should the result of the SNB action be a 10-15% up move in the dollar versus Euro it will be the kiss of death for US GDP. I think there is a very good case for this to occur. Bernanke must be very upset this AM. What the Swiss have done runs very counter to his plan to “export” US deflation. The Swiss are now going to be the exporters of deflation. The bulk of this will stay in the EU, but some of it surely will come to our shores. If your odds for a USA double dip were 50-50 on Friday, they just went to 70-30.

How much intervention can the world absorb? Japan is doing it big time in both the currency and debt markets. China is manipulating its FX and interest rates. The USA is manipulating interest rates in an unprecedented way. Brazil, Russia, Korea are all doing the same. It won’t work folks. It will fail. The Central Banks are not omnipotent. The markets are.

I suppose there is a soft landing scenario to the steps taken today by the SNB. The liquidity problems in the credit markets of Europe could somehow magically stabilize. It’s possible that the debt woes of the PIIGS could also disappear from the market’s radar. It’s conceivable that US growth could perk up and a crisis is avoided.

I don’t see any of those things happening any time soon. I say the SNB move will fail at some point. If/when that happens it will be an important point in history. If we see the headline, “Swiss cave to market – Franc soars” that will be the day that marks the end game of “extend and pretend” policies and market manipulation. That will be the day that the Great Depression of the new millennium begins. What we went through in 2008 will be a walk in the park compared to that turning point.

I wrote about the prospects of a CHF Peg a few times in the past month or two. I think the steps taken today represent a huge gamble by the SNB. I said of the prospects for this to happen:
The Swiss like to “Double Down”

The SNB has, in fact, doubled down as of this morning. This is the biggest financial bet in the country’s long history. They are “All In” on this bet. Not only are they betting Switzerland’s economic future, they have also placed a bet for the other 7 billion people living on the planet. I would give a “zero’ possibility for this to work. Get your seat belts on. Volatility is about to take another monstrous leap.

just to realise how toxic the whole environment is…

Europe is falling apart. That reality has not changed as a result of the SNB action. Over the next few weeks we will get more bad news from the EU. In the past the ‘go to’ response has been to buy the Yen and CHF as a safe haven knee jerk reaction. Now that trade is dead (both of them in my opinion). So where will the hot money go the next time the headlines scare capital?

There is only one choice left now.

That would be gold.

Predictions are hard to make, especially about the future, but following the latest piece from AEP in the telegraph, where he states :

“The Chinese central bank’s reserve manager SAFE is clearly buying euros on a large scale to hold down the yuan and safeguard export advantage in Europe, but it appears to be purchasing short-term debt of a one-year maturity or less and other liquid assets.”

also..

“The three-month euribor/OIS spread, the fear gauge of credit markets, reached the highest level in two years today, jumping 7 basis points to 40 in wild trading.

“Europe’s money markets are undoubtedly starting to freeze up,” said Marc Ostwald from Monument Securities.

“It’s not as dramatic as pre-Lehman but it is alarming and shows the pervasive degree of fear in the markets. People are again refusing to lend except on a secured basis.”

If those with demand for Euros can’t borrow any, short term rates will go up, even if the market is non functioning. This will put upward pressure on the currency…. Given that we’re sitting in the middle of the range formed since the low in May, and given the violence of the rejection of each new low seen during the last couple of days’ trading, a break to the upside of this range is now not inconceivable. The “negative” outlook for the eurozone probably means that the market is short, which to me warns of the possibility of a significant move higher.

1.51 is back in the frame.

Negated by a break back below 1.40.

We are going to keep throwing good money after bad and work as hard as we can to transfer the debt that is on the banks to the ECB and European taxpayers as long as the voters will let us. This first tranche will be another €109 billion. That will last a few years, and Greece will only have to pay about 3.5% on that debt and the rollover debt, and people who expected to be repaid in that period will see payment extended to either 15 or 30 years.

hahahaha….

you mugs….

Call my chauffeur and get me back to my taxpayer funded penthouse…

From Porter Stansberry in the S&A Digest

Porter Stansberry: The next stage of the crisis is starting now
Monday, June 20, 2011

We’re about to see a return to crisis-like conditions in the world’s credit markets. This will devastate financial stocks. It should also hit commodity prices and commodity-related stocks hard. In today’s Digest, I’ll show you why I believe this will happen.

As longtime readers know, I write Friday’s Digest personally. In general, I try my best to teach our subscribers something useful. I’ve always run my research company with a few simple principles in mind. Among them, I strive to provide you with the information I would expect if our roles were reversed. You should know… abiding by this principle often requires me to share information with you before I can be 100% certain it’s correct.

That’s the case with today’s Digest. I want to show you the warning signs as I see them, right now. I want to guide you through my thinking process. And while I’ll give you my predictions about what these things mean, I hope you’ll realize that, as Yogi Berra famously said, predictions are tough – especially about the future.

The next stage in the ongoing global financial crisis will feature the collapse of both the Spanish and the Italian economies. This should occur within the next six months. Concurrently, I believe the “Chinese miracle” will be unmasked as mostly a fraud powered by a huge increase in bad lending from state-controlled banks.

Ironically, the coming wave of financial trouble will probably force people back into U.S. dollars. Gold will also do well. In the currency markets, I believe the euro will collapse in the second half of this year, as will the Australian dollar, which serves as a proxy for the Chinese economy.

I expect this next “down leg” in the world’s markets to be more severe than the crisis of 2008, because the balance sheets of the Western democracies are now less prepared to manage the losses.

Finally, I believe the euro will simply cease to exist.

The first thing I want to show you is the share price of UniCredit. You have probably never heard of UniCredit, but it is a major European bank, with significant operations in eastern and southern Europe. UniCredit is based in Italy. I’ve been keeping my eye on UniCredit for years, for reasons I’ll explain below. UniCredit is the ultimate “canary in the coal mine” of the world’s global currency system.

Most people don’t know that UniCredit is the direct descendent of Oesterreichische Credit-Anstalt, the largest bank in Eastern Europe before World War II. Translated the name means: Imperial Royal Privileged Austrian Credit-Institute for Commerce and Industry. It was a Rothschild bank. The family founded it 1855, and it became one of the most important banks in Europe.

Credit-Anstalt held assets and took deposits from all over Europe. In 1931, the bank failed as a direct result of the U.S.’s Smoot-Hawley tariff. The act crippled Germany’s economy and led French investors to redeem all the capital they’d lent to the bank. The failure of Credit-Anstalt caused Austria to abandon the gold standard, which set off a series of economic dominoes. Germany left gold… then Great Britain… and finally, in 1933, so did America.

The failure of Credit-Anstalt is what really kicked off the Great Depression. I have long been convinced the failure of its successor bank – now called UniCredit – would presage the next global monetary collapse.

I first began warning investors about UniCredit’s likely collapse and its historic role in the world’s monetary history back in March 2010. Since then, the bank’s shares have grown weaker and weaker. And since March, the shares have fallen off a cliff, hitting lows not seen since March 2009.

The sudden weakness in UniCredit’s shares (down 21% in the last several weeks) indicates to me that big trouble is brewing in Europe. I don’t believe efforts to stop the crisis in Greece will work. The austerity measures undertaken in Ireland, Spain, Italy, and Greece have severely weakened these economies, causing loan losses to banks like UniCredit.

And if there’s a run on UniCredit (and I believe there will be), the losses will be too large for Italy to manage without a huge international bailout. UniCredit has borrowed $300 billion from other European banks. And Italy’s government already owes creditors more than 120% of GDP. There aren’t any easy solutions to this problem.

Another warning comes from a friend who is a senior executive at a major Wall Street bank. He sees more high-yield bond deals than just about anyone else in the world. He told our Atlas 400 group last weekend that credit markets around the world were suddenly shutting down. Yields were moving up. Spreads (the cost to borrow above the sovereign rate) were getting wider for the first time since March 2009.

Why? Because the market knows that the U.S. Federal Reserve is going to stop buying $85 billion-plus per month of U.S. Treasury debt. But the Treasury is going to continue to issue more debt. In total, 61% of the entire federal debt will mature within four years. That means roughly $10 trillion in U.S. Treasury bonds will have to be sold, plus whatever the total deficit adds up to over the next four years – maybe another $6 trillion.

It’s difficult to imagine this amount of Treasury issuance won’t have a big impact on the world’s credit markets because these bonds always sell first and at the lowest yields. As these yields “back up” because of the large issuance, they should drain liquidity away from other issues, causing other bond prices to fall. This will reduce liquidity and make issuing debt more expensive across the credit spectrum.

China’s boom since 2009 was fueled by massive domestic debt issuance, which was unsustainable and is reversing. In addition, one Chinese company after another is being revealed as a fraud – and then crashing. These are not isolated events. I have studied Chinese companies for more than a decade. Out of all the stocks I’ve analyzed closely, I’ve only seen a handful I didn’t believe were fraudulent.

So far, none of the major Chinese banks have come under serious scrutiny. But I believe they will… and I believe major fraud will be discovered. Take the recent weakness in the shares of China Life Insurance (LFC), for example. This isn’t a minor company. It’s a $90 billion life insurance company. As fraud allegations spread into major Chinese financials, the entire underpinning of the Chinese boom will fall apart. It has all been fueled by debt and fixed-asset investments (land, buildings, equipment, and machinery). Consider just a few of these facts…

Fixed-asset investment remains greater than 50% of GDP in China, for the 12th year in a row. No other country has ever had more than nine years of this kind of sustained fixed-asset investment.

In the first five months of 2011, fixed-asset investment grew by 25.8% according to China’s National Bureau of Statistics. That’s $1.39 trillion worth of investment.

Jim Chanos, the famed short seller, says China is currently building 30 billion square feet of commercial real estate. That is enough to provide every person in China with a five-square-foot cubicle.

Jeremy Grantham, one of the world’s most astute investors, points out that China has been purchasing gigantic quantities of raw materials. The scale of these purchases makes them impossible to sustain. China makes up 9.4% of the world’s economy, but it is currently consuming 53% of the world’s cement, 47% of the world’s iron ore, and 46.9% of its coal.

A massive increase in China’s domestic debt fueled this investment. In 2010, for example, Chinese banks extended $55 billion in loans – up 95% from the year before. Now, banking regulators are increasing reserve requirements, greatly reducing the amount of available credit. In May, lending was down 25% versus last year.

With Europe’s crisis heating back up, with credit tightening in the U.S. (thanks to the end of quantitative easing), and with China’s boom unraveling… it’s time to be extremely cautious. I don’t know when it will start… but we’re entering another period of soaring volatility, increasing interest rate spreads, and falling stock and bond prices. How the authorities deal with these problems will set the stage for what happens next. If they try to paper over these continuing crises again – with new money-printing programs from the Federal Reserve – you can expect a massive inflation and what I call The End of America.

Our best hope for more stability and a return to prosperity is for people to realize that bailing out banks doesn’t solve these problems. It only makes them worse. But… I’m not optimistic. In the June issue of my newsletter, Stansberry’s Investment Advisory, I detail my best two new ideas to profit from the next stage of this crisis.

From Jeremy Warner in the Telegraph

Like a slow-motion car crash, all eyes are fixed in horror on the political chaos into which Greece is descending.

So desperate has the nation’s plight become that even economic suicide seems preferable to the austerity European neighbours seem minded, brutally, to impose upon it.

For the birthplace of European civilisation and modern democracy to boot, there could hardly be a more ignominious descent.

If the tax rises, spending cuts and state sell-offs of the ruling government’s medium term financial strategy (MTFS) aren’t approved, then assuming international policymakers are as good as their word, all future IMF/eurozone loans will cease.

In such circumstances, sovereign debt default would follow within days, and government, unable to pay its bills, would grind to a halt.

Given Greece’s comparatively recent history of junta rule, it would surely only be a matter of time before the military stepped into the ensuing political vacuum.

Unthinkable for an apparently advanced economy? Well, perhaps, but the unthinkable has had a nasty habit of becoming true these past four years.

Whatever the eventual outcome, we are now well past the point where matters are capable of happy resolution. What’s happening is plainly a tragedy for Greece, but just how serious is it for the rest of the eurozone?

In terms of the big numbers, it might scarcely seem to matter. Greece accounts for under 3pc of eurozone output.

If Greece were to vanish into a black hole tomorrow, the European economy as a whole would hardly notice. The same goes for the other peripheral eurozone nations that have availed themselves of the bail-out funds – Ireland and Portugal. The three countries combined account for less than 7pc of eurozone GDP.

Their troubles would be nobody’s but their own if these nations had sovereign currencies and monetary policies. As everyone knows, sadly that’s not the case.

That all three are joined at the hip through the single currency to the rest of the eurozone makes the tragedy of the periphery very much everyone else’s, too. The periphery has come to threaten the core.

Against this wider, existential threat to the single currency, the “will they, won’t they?” see-saw over giving Greece more bail-out money, and the interminable debate over whether private creditors might be required to take haircuts in return, make up something of a sideshow.

You’d have thought that Athens has virtually no cards left to play, yet the threat its travails pose to the eurozone as a whole gives Greece something of a whip hand. In the game of brinkmanship currently being played out in Athens and Brussels, Greece is not entirely without negotiating power.

Give us the money, the Greeks can say, or we’ll pull the whole house down with us. As Europe’s policy elite is only too painfully aware, the cost of refusing is likely to be infinitely greater than that of coughing up, however politically unpalatable it might seem to the solvent north. Neither the IMF nor the eurozone can afford to let Greece go.

Yet disingenuously, the pretence is maintained that the crisis is no more than a bit of fiscal ill-discipline in the profligate fringe that corrective austerity can easily eradicate.

Unfortunately, it’s much more serious than that, for the fiscal crisis now manifesting itself in sky-high sovereign bond yields is just part of an ongoing and European-wide banking crisis.

Let’s for the moment forget the bit of the crisis that grabs all the headlines right now – the meltdown in the periphery’s public finances – and instead focus on what’s happening in the banking system. Here we are seeing a continued “run” on the banks of vulnerable countries not unlike that which befell the UK at the height of the credit crunch.

This is an entirely rational response by depositors. Any country condemned to years of austerity and economic contraction is likely to experience a massive bad debt problem in its domestic lending, rendering much of the banking system insolvent.

On top of that, there’s the risk of sovereign debt default and/or enforced departure from the euro and consequent steep currency depreciation. No one in their right mind would keep their money in a Greek or Irish bank right now.

Fear of capital controls and/or the re-establishment of national currencies to stem the outflow and restore competitiveness has naturally served to exaggerate the phenomenon. The mentality is fast becoming one of get out now while you still can. It scarcely needs saying that the moment capital controls are imposed, it’s game over. The country that does so is effectively out of the euro.

With high dependence on foreign funding, the Irish banking system is particularly vulnerable to this capital flight. As deposits flee the country, the banks are forced back on to the lender-of-last-resort facilities operated by their central banks.

These central banks will in turn use the collateral to borrow from other eurozone central banks, the chief lender being the Bundesbank.

The whole system has become hopelessly enmeshed. It’s almost impossible to disentangle it in a cost-free way. Greece, Ireland and Portugal are one thing, but if they are joined by Spain, then that’s a different story.

At that point, the proportion of GDP accounted for by the troubled periphery rises to 26pc, and you might want to think seriously about getting your money out of the German banking system, too.

In so far as it is possible to discern a rationale behind repeated sovereign debt bail-outs, it seems to be that of buying time.

This time can be used by the banking system to rebuild solvency through earnings retention and, where necessary, recapitalisation. Yet so far, it’s failed to correct the underlying problem in the European periphery, which is one of excessive external indebtedness, both public as well as private.

Unfortunately, the current account imbalances that feed this indebtedness remain as large as ever. Without the natural stabiliser of currency adjustment, there’s nothing to relieve them other than years of grinding deflation.

There are only two ways this can end. Either the surplus core has to accept that it must continue to bail out the periphery on a virtually permanent basis – a transfer union – or the single currency must lose its outer fringe.

Both solutions carry significant cost to the core, the first through gift aid, the second through the crystalisation of bad debt.

It’s a stark choice, but markets seem determined to bring matters to a head.

I am reminded of Ambrose Evans-Pritchard’s comment :

That is what the euro always meant, and why I have always viewed the Project as the malign – chiefly, but not only, because any such European government created to back up EMU would lack a democratic counterweight rooted in legitimacy, and would be inherently authoritarian.

With Greek two year paper ‘yielding’ 27%, the question of a Greek default is no longer a matter of ‘if’, but ‘when and in what form’. Minds are being focussed on what happens to the Euro area, and the Euro itself. Now that we know that the French banks (as signalled by Moody’s downgrade of Crédit Agricole, BNP Paribas and Société Générale) are on the hook for large chunks of Greek debt, the idea of wider contagion must be scaring the shit out of the imbecile euro politicians who have foisted this doomed experiment on the European people.

The question is who wants to be holding Euros while they sort the whole mess out…

from zero hedge

As if insolvent European private banks were not enough to worry about (and with banking assets of 461 percent of GDP in the UK, 178 percent in Germany, and 820 percent in Switzerland, there is more than enough to worry about), a new study by Open Europe has found that at the heart of the insolvency argument is none other than the only hedge fund that is even worse capitalized than the US Federal Reserve: the European Central Bank. “With Greece forced to seek a second bail-out to avoid bankruptcy, Open Europe has today published a briefing cataloguing how the eurozone crisis could drive the European Central Bank itself into insolvency, with taxpayers likely to pick up a big chunk of the bill. The role of the ECB in the ongoing eurozone and banking crisis has been significantly understated. By propping up struggling eurozone governments and providing cheap credit to ailing banks, the ECB has put billions worth of risky assets on its books. We estimate that the ECB has exposure to struggling eurozone economies (the so-called PIIGS) of around €444bn – an amount roughly equivalent to the GDP of Finland and Austria combined. Of this, around €190bn is exposure to the Greek state and Greek banks. Should the ECB see the value of its assets fall by just 4.25%, which is no longer a remote risk, its entire capital base would be wiped out.” It seems that in crafting “prudent” capitalization ratios courtesy of Basel 1 through infinity, the global NWO regulators totally let the ECB slip through the cracks. The finding also confirms what we have been saying all along: there is no way that any form of voluntary or involuntary phase transition that will require the ECB to mark down assets that it has on its books at par (yet are worth 50 cents on the dollar) can ever occur: such an event would result in the immediate insolvency of the European lender of first and last resort, and, in turn, the unravelling of the Eurozone.

From Open Europe:

“The ECB’s attempts to paper over the cracks in the eurozone may have temporarily softened the impact of the crisis, but have exacerbated the situation in the long-term. The ECB has dug itself into a hole and now we are seeing that there is no easy way out.”

“Huge risks have been transferred from struggling governments and banks onto the ECB’s books, with taxpayers as the ultimate guarantor. There’s a real risk that these assets will face radical write-downs in future with eurozone governments and banks teetering on the edge of bankruptcy. This amounts to a hidden – and potentially huge – bill to taxpayers to save the euro.”

“The ECB’s wobbly finances and operations to finance states have landed a serious blow to its credibility. It must now seek to become the strong, independent bank that electorates were promised when the Single Currency was forged.”

Key points from the report:

– In parallel with the IMF’s and EU’s multi-billion euro interventions, the ECB has engaged in its own bail-out operation, providing cheap credit to insolvent banks and propping up struggling eurozone governments, despite this being against its own rules. The ECB is ultimately underwritten by taxpayers, which means that there is a hidden – and potentially huge – cost of the eurozone crisis to taxpayers buried in the ECB’s books.

– As a result, the ECB’s balance sheet is now looking increasingly vulnerable. We estimate that the ECB has exposure to struggling eurozone economies (the so-called PIIGS) of around €444bn – an amount roughly equivalent to the GDP of Finland and Austria combined. Although not all these assets and loans are ‘bad’, many of them could result in serious losses for the ECB should the eurozone crisis continue to deteriorate. Critically, struggling banks in insolvent countries have been allowed to shift risky assets away from their own balance sheets and onto the ECB’s (all the while receiving ECB loans in return). Many of these assets are extremely difficult to value.

– Overall, the ECB is now leveraged around 23 to 24 times, with only €82bn in capital and reserves. In contrast, the Swedish central bank is leveraged just under five times, while the average hedge fund is leveraged four to five times. This means that should the ECB see its assets fall by just 4.25% in value, from booking losses on its loans or purchases of government debt, its entire capital base would be wiped out.

– Hefty losses for the ECB are no longer a remote risk, with Greece likely to default within the next few years – even if it gets a fresh bail-out package from the EU and IMF – which would also bring down the country’s banks. We estimate that the ECB has taken on around €190bn in Greek assets by propping up the Greek state and banks. Should Greece restructure half of its debt – which is needed to bring down the country’s debt to sustainable levels – the ECB is set to face losses of between €44.5bn and €65.8bn on the government bonds it has purchased and the collateral it is holding from Greek banks. This is equal to between 2.35% and 3.47% of assets, meaning it comes close to wiping out the ECB’s capital base.

– A loss of this magnitude would effectively leave the ECB insolvent and in need of recapitalisation. It would then have to either start printing money to cover the losses or ask eurozone governments to send it more cash (via a capital call to national central banks). The first option would lead to inflation, which is unacceptable in Germany, while the second option amounts to another fully fledged bail-out, with taxpayers facing upfront costs (rather than loan guarantees as in the government eurozone bail-outs).

– The ECB’s actions during the financial crisis have not only weighed heavily on its balance sheet, but also its credibility. First, as a paper published by the ECB last year noted, “The perceptions of a central bank’s financial strength have an impact on the credibility of the central bank and its policy”. Secondly, by financing states, the ECB has effectively engaged in fiscal policy – and therefore politics – something which electorates were told would never happen.

– Worried about the risk of these potential losses being realised, the ECB is vehemently opposed to debt restructuring for Greece and other weaker economies. However, continuing the ECB’s existing policy of propping up insolvent banks – and intermittently governments – would be even worse for the eurozone as a whole.

– The ECB’s cheap credit has served as a disincentive to struggling banks to recapitalise and limit their exposure to toxic assets in weak eurozone economies. This creates moral hazard for banks and governments alike, at times even fuelling the sovereign debt crisis, while transferring more of the ultimate risk to taxpayers across Europe. Therefore, in its attempt to soften the immediate impact of the financial crisis, the ECB may in fact have exacerbated the situation in the long-term, increasing the cost of keeping the eurozone together for taxpayers and governments.

– Moving forward, the ECB must return to its original mission of promoting price stability and a way has to be found to get ailing banks off the ECB’s life support. This should include a winding-down mechanism for insolvent banks.

Sitting here watching the €uro get hammered on the Greece rumour, I was idly trawling through some of my favourite sites and re-read this piece from Gonzalo Lira written a while back [December 2010]. Seems that now the pressure is off the USD, (obviously, now Gold and Silver have had a ‘correction’), attention has turned again to the other problem currency.

☞ Possible EMU Collapse: What To Pay Attention To In 2011

After the Greek and Irish bailouts, it looks like Portugal and possibly Belgium are up next in this perverse game of musical chairs played to the tune of sovereign debt—

—but these smaller countries are dwarfed by Spain: Spain, as I argued here, is where the European game is really at.

As I pointed out, Spain is twice the size of Greece, Ireland and Portugal combined—Spain is roughly half the size of Germany—Spain has a fiscal deficit of over 11% of GDP for 2010, and a total debt of over 80% of GDP, data here (I am counting the accumulated debt of comunidades autónomas, which is so far 10.2% of GDP and steadily rising; data here)—Spain has an unemployment of over 20%—

—in short, Spain is trouble.

Not “Spain is in trouble”—that’s obvious, but that’s not my point: Spain is trouble. Trouble for the German banks that own so much of the Spanish debt. Trouble for Germany, which is propping up its insolvent banks (What, you think German politicians are any less craven than American politicians?). Spain is trouble for the European Union, for what a German banking crisis might mean for the EU as a whole and as an institution.

More than anything, Spain is trouble for the European Financial Stability Facility, because Spain is too big to be saved—and there’s really no way to finesse that hard fact.

You know what a lynchpin is? Actually, I didn’t—I had to look it up. According to the dictionary, a lynchpin is “a pin passed through the end of an axle to keep the wheel in position”. Hence the figure of speech: Without a lynchpin, the wheel comes off, and the whole vehicle crashes.

In the case of Europe, the lynchpin can come off awfully fast—think of Ireland. A few impolitic words from Angela Merkel, and suddenly the Irish bond market panics. Suddenly, Ireland is teetering on the brink of insolvency, unable to meet its funding needs. And that was Ireland—all due respect to those wonderful people, but we’re talking a GDP of a paltry $227 billion. Ben Bernanke takes a morning dump bigger than that. What’s Ireland’s $227 billion when compared to Spain’s economy of $1.5 trillion?

Spain: During 2011, Spain will be the flash-point—so you want to keep one eye on Spanish sovereign bond spreads, and one eye on Brussels:

When Spanish debt spreads over German bunds creep into the 3.5% to 4% range, you know trouble is coming. And when the Spanish spread decisively crosses 4.25% over the German 10-year, then you know trouble’s arrived—and it won’t be leaving town ‘til it’s had its chance to run riot in the streets.

How the EU and the ECB handle an eventual Spanish sovereign debt crisis will determine the very future of the European Union.

Because there will be a Spanish sovereign debt crisis—it’s inevitable. The Spanish balance sheet is not improving fast enough, even with so-called “austerity” measures, because even though the Spanish government might be cutting spending, the comunidades autónomas—roughly analogous to states or regions—are expanding their budgets in order to take up the slack, and thereby increasing the Spanish deficit. Don’t believe me? Check the figures I just cited.

So when Spain goes into crisis—which should take place no later than August 2011, and perhaps as early as this coming March—the European Union’s collective and institutional reaction to this crisis event will determine whether a smaller, healthier European Monetary Union continues to exist, or whether the whole concept of EMU is ripped to shreds by events.

If the EU and the ECB are clever, and brave, and humble in the face of failure, then they’ll expel Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy from the European Monetary Union. The euro will remain the currency of the stronger economies—France, Holland, Germany—while the weaker economies will go back to their original currencies, and immediately devalue so as to kickstart their economies.

If, however, the European Union and European Central Bank leadership proves to be stupid, cowardly, and arrogant—as is very likely, considering their confused, self-defeating actions and reactions to the Greek and Irish crises—then there will be some sort of European-wide convulsion, when the bond markets panic, and leave Spain locked out of any funding.

This is the key event of 2011: Whether the European Monetary Union survives. Unless Brussels gets its collective shit together and realizes it has to cut the weaker economies loose from the euro, odds are high the euro goes the way of the dodo.

Ha ha. The recent rally appears to have fizzled, as the imminnent collapse of the Irish banking system threatens to bring down the entire euro project, and hopefully with it the “proto Fascist” EU,  as it was described by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard in a recent post in the London Telegraph. An Irish bailout would increase the pressure on Portugal, Spain and Italy in that order, with the final act potentially including France, as the entire European banking system collapses under the weight of this extreme indebtedness. As Evans-Pritchard writes “Like Alpinistas roped together, an ever-reduced core of solvent states are supposed to carry the weight on an ever-widening group of insolvent states dangling beneath them”.  An apt analogy. And while I’m quoting from another source I would add this, on the decision to discuss the imposition of haircuts and the subsequent backpeddling : “This is a breath-taking mixture of suicidal irresponsibility and farcical incoherence,” – Marco Annunziata from Unicredit.  This whole episode is symptomatic of the incompetence of the politicians and examples such as this are rarely laid so bare by the consequences being made apparent with such immediacy. The normal pattern is for their responsibility for the unintended consequences of their actions to be adeptly concealed with deceit. But I digress.

Further to our post of 1st November discussing the decision to impose haircuts on bond holders and by implication the higher interest rates across the eurozone that logically result from this, an act which by its very nature is inherently deflationary, we can now see that any euro rally that results from the shedding of the PIGS will occur from much lower levels. Hence the current weakness. Effectively, as long as the euro contains the dross of southern Europe it will never mimic the Deutschmark, as it was supposed to and as the Germans would have liked. Indeed their management of it as though it were, it could be argued, has contributed to its woes.

Anyway there is a degree of incomprehensibility to the gyrations caused by the politics. We’ll try in future to stick to technicals.