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IMF warns US, eurozone deficits a threat to stability

The International Monetary Fund warned that Washington and debt-ridden European countries are “playing with fire” unless they take drastic steps to reduce their budget deficits.

The warning came as the IMF cut its growth forecast for the US and said the risks facing the global economy have increased since April.

It said the euro area’s worsening crisis, signs of economic weakening in the US and overheating in the developing world all pose fresh threats to global stability.

“The global economy has turned the corner from the Great Recession. However, securing the transition from recovery to expansion will require a concerted effort at addressing diverse challenges,” the IMF said in its World Economic Outlook update.

World growth this year is expected to be 4.3pc, a downgrade from 4.4pc in April, prompted predominantly by a sharp reduction in America. US GDP is now forecast to grow at 2.5pc this year and 2.7pc in 2012, compared with its prediction in April of 2.8pc and 2.9pc respectively.

“For the US, it is critical to immediately address the debt ceiling and launch a deficit reduction plan that includes entitlement reform and revenue-raising tax reform,” it said.

Jose Vinals, director of the IMF’s monetary and capital markets department, added: “If you make a list of the countries in the world that have the biggest homework in restoring their public finances to a reasonable situation in terms of debt levels, you find four countries: Greece, Ireland, Japan and the United States.

“You cannot afford to have a world economy where these important decisions are postponed because you’re really playing with fire.”

The IMF had already downgraded its forecasts for UK growth to 1.5pc from 1.7pc in April, which was itself a downgrade from 2pc in November.

It added: “Downside risks due to heightened potential for spillovers from further deterioration in market confidence in the euro area periphery have risen since April. Market concerns about possible setbacks to the US recovery have also surfaced.

If these risks materialize, they will reverberate across the rest of the world–possibly seriously impairing funding conditions for banks and corporations in advanced economies and undercutting capital flows to emerging economies.”

From Jeremy Warner in the Telegraph

Like a slow-motion car crash, all eyes are fixed in horror on the political chaos into which Greece is descending.

So desperate has the nation’s plight become that even economic suicide seems preferable to the austerity European neighbours seem minded, brutally, to impose upon it.

For the birthplace of European civilisation and modern democracy to boot, there could hardly be a more ignominious descent.

If the tax rises, spending cuts and state sell-offs of the ruling government’s medium term financial strategy (MTFS) aren’t approved, then assuming international policymakers are as good as their word, all future IMF/eurozone loans will cease.

In such circumstances, sovereign debt default would follow within days, and government, unable to pay its bills, would grind to a halt.

Given Greece’s comparatively recent history of junta rule, it would surely only be a matter of time before the military stepped into the ensuing political vacuum.

Unthinkable for an apparently advanced economy? Well, perhaps, but the unthinkable has had a nasty habit of becoming true these past four years.

Whatever the eventual outcome, we are now well past the point where matters are capable of happy resolution. What’s happening is plainly a tragedy for Greece, but just how serious is it for the rest of the eurozone?

In terms of the big numbers, it might scarcely seem to matter. Greece accounts for under 3pc of eurozone output.

If Greece were to vanish into a black hole tomorrow, the European economy as a whole would hardly notice. The same goes for the other peripheral eurozone nations that have availed themselves of the bail-out funds – Ireland and Portugal. The three countries combined account for less than 7pc of eurozone GDP.

Their troubles would be nobody’s but their own if these nations had sovereign currencies and monetary policies. As everyone knows, sadly that’s not the case.

That all three are joined at the hip through the single currency to the rest of the eurozone makes the tragedy of the periphery very much everyone else’s, too. The periphery has come to threaten the core.

Against this wider, existential threat to the single currency, the “will they, won’t they?” see-saw over giving Greece more bail-out money, and the interminable debate over whether private creditors might be required to take haircuts in return, make up something of a sideshow.

You’d have thought that Athens has virtually no cards left to play, yet the threat its travails pose to the eurozone as a whole gives Greece something of a whip hand. In the game of brinkmanship currently being played out in Athens and Brussels, Greece is not entirely without negotiating power.

Give us the money, the Greeks can say, or we’ll pull the whole house down with us. As Europe’s policy elite is only too painfully aware, the cost of refusing is likely to be infinitely greater than that of coughing up, however politically unpalatable it might seem to the solvent north. Neither the IMF nor the eurozone can afford to let Greece go.

Yet disingenuously, the pretence is maintained that the crisis is no more than a bit of fiscal ill-discipline in the profligate fringe that corrective austerity can easily eradicate.

Unfortunately, it’s much more serious than that, for the fiscal crisis now manifesting itself in sky-high sovereign bond yields is just part of an ongoing and European-wide banking crisis.

Let’s for the moment forget the bit of the crisis that grabs all the headlines right now – the meltdown in the periphery’s public finances – and instead focus on what’s happening in the banking system. Here we are seeing a continued “run” on the banks of vulnerable countries not unlike that which befell the UK at the height of the credit crunch.

This is an entirely rational response by depositors. Any country condemned to years of austerity and economic contraction is likely to experience a massive bad debt problem in its domestic lending, rendering much of the banking system insolvent.

On top of that, there’s the risk of sovereign debt default and/or enforced departure from the euro and consequent steep currency depreciation. No one in their right mind would keep their money in a Greek or Irish bank right now.

Fear of capital controls and/or the re-establishment of national currencies to stem the outflow and restore competitiveness has naturally served to exaggerate the phenomenon. The mentality is fast becoming one of get out now while you still can. It scarcely needs saying that the moment capital controls are imposed, it’s game over. The country that does so is effectively out of the euro.

With high dependence on foreign funding, the Irish banking system is particularly vulnerable to this capital flight. As deposits flee the country, the banks are forced back on to the lender-of-last-resort facilities operated by their central banks.

These central banks will in turn use the collateral to borrow from other eurozone central banks, the chief lender being the Bundesbank.

The whole system has become hopelessly enmeshed. It’s almost impossible to disentangle it in a cost-free way. Greece, Ireland and Portugal are one thing, but if they are joined by Spain, then that’s a different story.

At that point, the proportion of GDP accounted for by the troubled periphery rises to 26pc, and you might want to think seriously about getting your money out of the German banking system, too.

In so far as it is possible to discern a rationale behind repeated sovereign debt bail-outs, it seems to be that of buying time.

This time can be used by the banking system to rebuild solvency through earnings retention and, where necessary, recapitalisation. Yet so far, it’s failed to correct the underlying problem in the European periphery, which is one of excessive external indebtedness, both public as well as private.

Unfortunately, the current account imbalances that feed this indebtedness remain as large as ever. Without the natural stabiliser of currency adjustment, there’s nothing to relieve them other than years of grinding deflation.

There are only two ways this can end. Either the surplus core has to accept that it must continue to bail out the periphery on a virtually permanent basis – a transfer union – or the single currency must lose its outer fringe.

Both solutions carry significant cost to the core, the first through gift aid, the second through the crystalisation of bad debt.

It’s a stark choice, but markets seem determined to bring matters to a head.

I am reminded of Ambrose Evans-Pritchard’s comment :

That is what the euro always meant, and why I have always viewed the Project as the malign – chiefly, but not only, because any such European government created to back up EMU would lack a democratic counterweight rooted in legitimacy, and would be inherently authoritarian.

With Greek two year paper ‘yielding’ 27%, the question of a Greek default is no longer a matter of ‘if’, but ‘when and in what form’. Minds are being focussed on what happens to the Euro area, and the Euro itself. Now that we know that the French banks (as signalled by Moody’s downgrade of Crédit Agricole, BNP Paribas and Société Générale) are on the hook for large chunks of Greek debt, the idea of wider contagion must be scaring the shit out of the imbecile euro politicians who have foisted this doomed experiment on the European people.

The question is who wants to be holding Euros while they sort the whole mess out…

from zero hedge

Courtesy of the recently declassified Fed discount window documents, we now know that the biggest beneficiaries of the Fed’s generosity during the peak of the credit crisis were foreign banks, among which Belgium’s Dexia was the most troubled, and thus most lent to, bank. Having been thus exposed, many speculated that going forward the US central bank would primarily focus its “rescue” efforts on US banks, not US-based (or local branches) of foreign (read European) banks: after all that’s what the ECB is for, while the Fed’s role is to stimulate US employment and to keep US inflation modest. And furthermore, should the ECB need to bail out its banks, it could simply do what the Fed does, and monetize debt, thus boosting its assets, while concurrently expanding its excess reserves thus generating fungible capital which would go to European banks. Wrong. Below we present that not only has the Fed’s bailout of foreign banks not terminated with the drop in discount window borrowings or the unwind of the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, but that the only beneficiary of the reserves generated were US-based branches of foreign banks (which in turn turned around and funnelled the cash back to their domestic branches), a shocking finding which explains not only why US banks have been unwilling and, far more importantly, unable to lend out these reserves, but that anyone retaining hopes that with the end of QE2 the reserves that hypothetically had been accumulated at US banks would be flipped to purchase Treasurys, has been dead wrong, therefore making the case for QE3 a done deal. In summary, instead of doing everything in its power to stimulate reserve, and thus cash, accumulation at domestic (US) banks which would in turn encourage lending to US borrowers, the Fed has been conducting yet another stealthy foreign bank rescue operation, which rerouted $600 billion in capital from potential borrowers to insolvent foreign financial institutions in the past 7 months. QE2 was nothing more (or less) than another European bank rescue operation!

For those who can’t wait for the punchline, here it is. Below we chart the total cash holdings of Foreign-related banks in the US using weekly H.8 data.

Note the $630 billion increase in foreign bank cash balances since November 3, which just so happens is the date when the Fed commenced QE2 operations in the form of adding excess reserves to the liability side of its balance sheet. Here is the change in Fed reserves during QE2 (from the Fed’s H.4.1 statement, ending with the week of June 1).

Above, note that Fed reserves increased by $610 billion for the duration of QE2 through the week ending June 1 (and by another $70 billion in the week ending June 8, although since we only have bank cash data through June 1, we use the former number, although we are certain that the bulk of this incremental cash once again went to foreign financial institutions).

So how did cash held by US banks fare during QE2? Well, not good. The chart below demonstrates cash balances at small and large US domestic banks, as well as the cash at foreign banks, all of which is compared to total Fed reserves plotted on the same axis. It pretty much explains it all.

The chart above has tremendous implications for everything from US and European monetary policy, to exhange rate and trade policy, to the current account on both sides of the Atlantic, to US fiscal policy, to borrowing and lending activity in the US, and, lastly, to QE 3.

What is the first notable thing about the above chart is that while cash levels in US and US-based foreign-banks correlate almost perfectly with the Fed’s reserve balances, as they should, there is a notable divergence beginning around May of 2010, or the first Greek bailout, when Europe was in a state of turmoil, and when cash assets of foreign banks jumped by $200 billion, independent of the Fed and of cash holdings by US banks. About 6 months later, this jump in foreign bank cash balances had plunged to the lowest in years, due to repatriated fungible cash being used to plug undercapitalized local operations, with total cash just $265 billion as of November 17, just as QE2 was commencing. Incidentally, the last time foreign banks had this little cash was April 2009… Just as QE1 was beginning. As to what happens next, the first chart above says it all: cash held by foreign banks jumps from $308 billion on November 3, or the official start of QE2, to $940 billion as of June 1: an almost dollar for dollar increase with the increase in Fed reserve balances. In other words, while the Fed did nothing to rescue foreign banks in the aftermath of the first Greek crisis, aside from opening up FX swap lines, one can argue that the whole point of QE2 was not so much to spike equity markets, or the proverbial “third mandate” of Ben Bernanke, but solely to rescue European banks!

What this observation also means, is that the bulk of risk asset purchasing by dealer desks (if any), has not been performed by US-based primary dealers, as has been widely speculated, but by foreign dealers, which have the designation of “Primary” with the Federal Reserve. Below is the list of 20 Primary Dealers currently recognized by the New York Fed. The foreign ones, with US-based operations, are bolded:

BNP Paribas Securities Corp.
Barclays Capital Inc.
Cantor Fitzgerald & Co.
Citigroup Global Markets Inc.
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC
Daiwa Capital Markets America Inc.
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
Goldman, Sachs & Co.
HSBC Securities (USA) Inc.
Jefferies & Company, Inc.
J.P. Morgan Securities LLC
MF Global Inc.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated
Mizuho Securities USA Inc.
Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC
Nomura Securities International, Inc.
RBC Capital Markets, LLC
RBS Securities Inc.
SG Americas Securities, LLC
UBS Securities LLC.

That’s right, out of 20 Primary Dealers, 12 are…. foreign. And incidentally, the reason why we added the (if any) above, is that since this cash is fungible between on and off-shore operations, what happened is that the $600 billion in cash was promptly repatriated and used by domestic branches of foreign banks to fill undercapitalization voids left by exposure to insolvent European PIIGS and for all other bankruptcy-related capital needs. And one wonders why suddenly German banks are so willing to take haircuts on Greek bonds: it is simply because courtesy of their US based branches which have been getting the bulk of the Fed’s dollars in 1 and 0 format, they suddenly find themselves willing and ready to face the mark to market on Greek debt from par to 50 cents on the dollar. And not only Greek, but all other PIIGS, which will inevitably happen once Greece goes bankrupt, either volutnarily or otherwise. In fact, the $600 billion in cash that was repatriated to Europe will mean that European banks likely are fully covered to face the capitalization shortfall that will occur once Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain and possibly Italy are forced to face the inevitable Event of Default that will see their bonds marked down anywhere between 20% and 60%. Of course, this will also expose the ECB as an insolvent central bank, but that largely explains why Germany has been so willing to allow Mario Draghi to take the helm at an institution that will soon be left insolvent, and also explains the recent shocking animosity between Angela Merkel and Jean Claude Trichet: the German are preparing for the end of the ECB, and thanks to Ben Bernanke they are certainly capitalized well enough to handle the end of Europe’s lender of first and last resort. But don’t take our word for this: here is Stone McCarthy’s explanation of what massive reserve sequestering by foreign banks means: “Foreign banks operating in the US often lend reserves to home offices or other banks operating outside the US. These loans do not change the volume of excess reserves in the system, but do support the funding of dollar denominated assets outside the US….Foreign banks operating in the US do not present a large source of C&I, Consumer, or Real Estate Loans. These banks represent about 16% of commercial bank assets, but only about 9% of bank credit. Thus, the concern that excess reserves will quickly fuel lending activities and money growth is probably diminished by the skewing of excess reserve balances towards foreign banks.”

Which brings us to point #2: prepare for the Bernanke hearings and possible impeachment. For if it becomes popular knowledge that the Chairman of the Fed, despite explicit instructions to enforce the trickle down of “printed” dollars to US banks, was only concerned about rescuing foreign banks with the $600 billion in excess cash created out of QE2, then all political hell is about to break loose, and not even Democrats will be able to defend Bernanke’s actions to a public furious with the complete inability to procure a loan. Any loan. Furthermore the data above proves beyond a reasonable doubt why there has been no excess lending by US banks to US borrowers: none of the cash ever even made it to US banks! This also resolves the mystery of the broken money multiplier and why the velocity of money has imploded.

Implication #3 explains why the US dollar has been as week as it has since the start of QE 2. Instead of repricing the EUR to a fair value, somewhere around parity with the USD, this stealthy fund flow from the US to Europe to the tune of $600 billion has likely resulted in an artificial boost in the european currency to the tune of 2000-3000 pips, keeping it far from its fair value of about 1.1 EURUSD. If this data does not send European (read German) exporters into a blind rage, after the realization that the Fed (most certainly with the complicity of the G7) was willing to sacrifice European economic output in order to plug European bank undercapitalization, then nothing will.

But implication #4 is by far the most important. Recall that Bill Gross has long been asking where the cash to purchase bonds come the end of QE 2 would come from. Well, the punditry, in its parroting groupthink stupidity (validated by precisely zero actual research), immediately set forth the thesis that there is no problem: after all banks would simply reverse the process of reserve expansion and use the $750 billion in Cash that will be accumulated by the end of QE 2 on June 30 to purchase US Treasurys.

Wrong.

The above data destroys this thesis completely: since the bulk of the reserve induced bank cash has long since departed US shores and is now being used to ratably fill European bank balance sheet voids, and since US banks have benefited precisely not at all from any of the reserves generated by QE 2, there is exactly zero dry powder for the US Primary Dealers to purchase Treasurys starting July 1.

This observation may well be the missing link that justifies the Gross argument, as it puts to rest any speculation that there is any buyer remaining for Treasurys. Alas: the digital cash generated by the Fed’s computers has long since been spent… a few thousand miles east of the US.

Which leads us to implication #5. QE 3 is a certainty. The one thing people focus on during every episode of monetary easing is the change in Fed assets, which courtesy of LSAP means a jump in Treasurys, MBS, Agency paper, or (for the tin foil brigade) ES: the truth is all these are a distraction. The one thing people always forget is the change in Fed liabilities, all of them: currency in circulation, which has barely budged in the past 3 years, and far more importantly- excess reserves, which as this article demonstrates, is the electronic “cash” that goes to needy banks the world over in order to fund this need or that. In fact, it is the need to expand the Fed’s liabilities that is and has always been a driver of monetary stimulus, not the need to boost Fed assets. The latter is, counterintuitively, merely a mathematical aftereffect of matching an asset-for-liability expansion. This means that as banks are about to face yet another risk flaring episode in the next several months, the Fed will need to release another $500-$1000 billion in excess reserves. As to what asset will be used to match this balance sheet expansion, why take your picK; the Fed could buy MBS, Muni bonds, Treasurys, or go Japanese, and purchase ETFs, REITs, or just go ahead and outright buy up every underwater mortgage in the US. This side of the ledger is largely irrelevant, and will serve only two functions: to send the S&P surging, and to send the precious metal complex surging2 as it becomes clear that the dollar is now entirely worthless.

That said, of all of the above, the one we are most looking forward to is the impeachment of Ben Bernanke: because if there is one definitive proof of the Fed abdicating any and all of its mandates, and merely playing the role of globofunder explicitly at the expense of US consumers and borrowers, not to mention lackey for the banking syndicate, this is it.

from zero hedge

As if insolvent European private banks were not enough to worry about (and with banking assets of 461 percent of GDP in the UK, 178 percent in Germany, and 820 percent in Switzerland, there is more than enough to worry about), a new study by Open Europe has found that at the heart of the insolvency argument is none other than the only hedge fund that is even worse capitalized than the US Federal Reserve: the European Central Bank. “With Greece forced to seek a second bail-out to avoid bankruptcy, Open Europe has today published a briefing cataloguing how the eurozone crisis could drive the European Central Bank itself into insolvency, with taxpayers likely to pick up a big chunk of the bill. The role of the ECB in the ongoing eurozone and banking crisis has been significantly understated. By propping up struggling eurozone governments and providing cheap credit to ailing banks, the ECB has put billions worth of risky assets on its books. We estimate that the ECB has exposure to struggling eurozone economies (the so-called PIIGS) of around €444bn – an amount roughly equivalent to the GDP of Finland and Austria combined. Of this, around €190bn is exposure to the Greek state and Greek banks. Should the ECB see the value of its assets fall by just 4.25%, which is no longer a remote risk, its entire capital base would be wiped out.” It seems that in crafting “prudent” capitalization ratios courtesy of Basel 1 through infinity, the global NWO regulators totally let the ECB slip through the cracks. The finding also confirms what we have been saying all along: there is no way that any form of voluntary or involuntary phase transition that will require the ECB to mark down assets that it has on its books at par (yet are worth 50 cents on the dollar) can ever occur: such an event would result in the immediate insolvency of the European lender of first and last resort, and, in turn, the unravelling of the Eurozone.

From Open Europe:

“The ECB’s attempts to paper over the cracks in the eurozone may have temporarily softened the impact of the crisis, but have exacerbated the situation in the long-term. The ECB has dug itself into a hole and now we are seeing that there is no easy way out.”

“Huge risks have been transferred from struggling governments and banks onto the ECB’s books, with taxpayers as the ultimate guarantor. There’s a real risk that these assets will face radical write-downs in future with eurozone governments and banks teetering on the edge of bankruptcy. This amounts to a hidden – and potentially huge – bill to taxpayers to save the euro.”

“The ECB’s wobbly finances and operations to finance states have landed a serious blow to its credibility. It must now seek to become the strong, independent bank that electorates were promised when the Single Currency was forged.”

Key points from the report:

– In parallel with the IMF’s and EU’s multi-billion euro interventions, the ECB has engaged in its own bail-out operation, providing cheap credit to insolvent banks and propping up struggling eurozone governments, despite this being against its own rules. The ECB is ultimately underwritten by taxpayers, which means that there is a hidden – and potentially huge – cost of the eurozone crisis to taxpayers buried in the ECB’s books.

– As a result, the ECB’s balance sheet is now looking increasingly vulnerable. We estimate that the ECB has exposure to struggling eurozone economies (the so-called PIIGS) of around €444bn – an amount roughly equivalent to the GDP of Finland and Austria combined. Although not all these assets and loans are ‘bad’, many of them could result in serious losses for the ECB should the eurozone crisis continue to deteriorate. Critically, struggling banks in insolvent countries have been allowed to shift risky assets away from their own balance sheets and onto the ECB’s (all the while receiving ECB loans in return). Many of these assets are extremely difficult to value.

– Overall, the ECB is now leveraged around 23 to 24 times, with only €82bn in capital and reserves. In contrast, the Swedish central bank is leveraged just under five times, while the average hedge fund is leveraged four to five times. This means that should the ECB see its assets fall by just 4.25% in value, from booking losses on its loans or purchases of government debt, its entire capital base would be wiped out.

– Hefty losses for the ECB are no longer a remote risk, with Greece likely to default within the next few years – even if it gets a fresh bail-out package from the EU and IMF – which would also bring down the country’s banks. We estimate that the ECB has taken on around €190bn in Greek assets by propping up the Greek state and banks. Should Greece restructure half of its debt – which is needed to bring down the country’s debt to sustainable levels – the ECB is set to face losses of between €44.5bn and €65.8bn on the government bonds it has purchased and the collateral it is holding from Greek banks. This is equal to between 2.35% and 3.47% of assets, meaning it comes close to wiping out the ECB’s capital base.

– A loss of this magnitude would effectively leave the ECB insolvent and in need of recapitalisation. It would then have to either start printing money to cover the losses or ask eurozone governments to send it more cash (via a capital call to national central banks). The first option would lead to inflation, which is unacceptable in Germany, while the second option amounts to another fully fledged bail-out, with taxpayers facing upfront costs (rather than loan guarantees as in the government eurozone bail-outs).

– The ECB’s actions during the financial crisis have not only weighed heavily on its balance sheet, but also its credibility. First, as a paper published by the ECB last year noted, “The perceptions of a central bank’s financial strength have an impact on the credibility of the central bank and its policy”. Secondly, by financing states, the ECB has effectively engaged in fiscal policy – and therefore politics – something which electorates were told would never happen.

– Worried about the risk of these potential losses being realised, the ECB is vehemently opposed to debt restructuring for Greece and other weaker economies. However, continuing the ECB’s existing policy of propping up insolvent banks – and intermittently governments – would be even worse for the eurozone as a whole.

– The ECB’s cheap credit has served as a disincentive to struggling banks to recapitalise and limit their exposure to toxic assets in weak eurozone economies. This creates moral hazard for banks and governments alike, at times even fuelling the sovereign debt crisis, while transferring more of the ultimate risk to taxpayers across Europe. Therefore, in its attempt to soften the immediate impact of the financial crisis, the ECB may in fact have exacerbated the situation in the long-term, increasing the cost of keeping the eurozone together for taxpayers and governments.

– Moving forward, the ECB must return to its original mission of promoting price stability and a way has to be found to get ailing banks off the ECB’s life support. This should include a winding-down mechanism for insolvent banks.

the dots are gradually joining up

from zero hedge

Here Is What Happens After Greece Defaults

Submitted by Tyler Durden on 05/21/2011 19:49 -0400

When it comes to the topic of Greece, by now everyone is sick of prevaricating European politicians who even they admit are lying openly to the media, and tired of conflicted investment banks trying to make the situation appear more palatable if only they dress it in some verbally appropriate if totally ridiculous phrase (which just so happens contracts to SLiME). The truth is Greece will fold like a lawn chair: whether it’s tomorrow (which would be smartest for everyone involved) or in 1 years, when the bailout money runs out, is irrelevant. The question then is what will happen after the threshold of nevernever land is finally breached, and Kickthecandowntheroad world once again reverts to the ugly confines of reality. Luckily, the Telegraph’s Andrew Lilico presents what is arguably the most realistic list of the consequences of crossing the senior bondholder Styx compiled to date.

What happens when Greece defaults. Here are a few things:

Every bank in Greece will instantly go insolvent.
The Greek government will nationalise every bank in Greece.
The Greek government will forbid withdrawals from Greek banks.
To prevent Greek depositors from rioting on the streets, Argentina-2002-style (when the Argentinian president had to flee by helicopter from the roof of the presidential palace to evade a mob of such depositors), the Greek government will declare a curfew, perhaps even general martial law.
Greece will redenominate all its debts into “New Drachmas” or whatever it calls the new currency (this is a classic ploy of countries defaulting)
The New Drachma will devalue by some 30-70 per cent (probably around 50 per cent, though perhaps more), effectively defaulting 0n 50 per cent or more of all Greek euro-denominated debts.
The Irish will, within a few days, walk away from the debts of its banking system.
The Portuguese government will wait to see whether there is chaos in Greece before deciding whether to default in turn.
A number of French and German banks will make sufficient losses that they no longer meet regulatory capital adequacy requirements.
The European Central Bank will become insolvent, given its very high exposure to Greek government debt, and to Greek banking sector and Irish banking sector debt.
The French and German governments will meet to decide whether (a) to recapitalise the ECB, or (b) to allow the ECB to print money to restore its solvency. (Because the ECB has relatively little foreign currency-denominated exposure, it could in principle print its way out, but this is forbidden by its founding charter. On the other hand, the EU Treaty explicitly, and in terms, forbids the form of bailouts used for Greece, Portugal and Ireland, but a little thing like their being blatantly illegal hasn’t prevented that from happening, so it’s not intrinsically obvious that its being illegal for the ECB to print its way out will prove much of a hurdle.)
They will recapitalise, and recapitalise their own banks, but declare an end to all bailouts.
There will be carnage in the market for Spanish banking sector bonds, as bondholders anticipate imposed debt-equity swaps.
This assumption will prove justified, as the Spaniards choose to over-ride the structure of current bond contracts in the Spanish banking sector, recapitalising a number of banks via debt-equity swaps.
Bondholders will take the Spanish Banking Sector to the European Court of Human Rights (and probably other courts, also), claiming violations of property rights. These cases won’t be heard for years. By the time they are finally heard, no-one will care.
Attention will turn to the British banks. Then we shall see…

Contagion.

From Simon Black

The world is now divided into essentially three categories:
(1) those nations that can effectively sidestep catastrophic meltdown;
(2) those nations that cannot avoid meltdown, but can afford to kick the can down the road
(3) those nations that must face their grim, unavoidable meltdown reality now

The United States, for better or worse, is in category 2. Politicians can keep pretending that the wheels on the bus go ’round and ’round because, at present, there are too many other countries in category 3… namely, much of Europe.

Greece is on the brink of official insolvency… yet in an exceedingly bizarre interview with German news magazine Der Spiegel published today, Jean-Claude Junker insists that (a) Greece is not broke, (b) if Greece doesn’t make its debt payments, this is not the same as ‘default,’ and (c) it’s OK for politicians to lie because people don’t understand capital markets.

(*Note, suspension of disbelief IS required to read this interview; Junker caps it off with a metaphoric riddle, “If the donkey were a cat it could climb a tree. But it is not a cat,” which has about as much insight as “Confucius say: Man who go to bed with itchy butt wake up with smelly finger….”)

As the Prime Minister of Luxembourg and president of the Euro Group, Junker is a very important figure in European finance… and in the interview, he makes it quite clear where his priorities lie: with the bankers.

As Junker states, “If Greece were to declare a national bankruptcy tomorrow, the country would have no access to the international financial market for years to come, and its most important creditors, the banks in Germany and Europe, would have an enormous problem…”

Well, certainly no one should expect Europe’s banks to suffer their own losses after making idiotic loans to corrupt governments. It’s much easier to stick the people with the bill by establishing a trillion dollar bailout fund with taxpayer money.

Problem is, people in Europe are starting to wake up and get it.

The anti-euro “True Finn” party in Finland recently surged in the polls to become the country’s third-largest political party and a major obstacle for any European bailout. This weekend, Spain’s ruling Socialist party was hammered with losses as voters voiced their utter disgust with the current government’s handling of the economy.

In Germany, this year’s state election results are showing that voters are sick and tired of shouldering the financial burden for the rest of Europe. Chancellor Angela Merkel’s ruling party is losing miserably, though in a pathetically desperate move, some local governments are changing suffrage limits and allowing 16-year olds to vote.

This is the strongest indicator yet of how bad the situation in Europe has become: German banks are so over-exposed to the PIIGS sovereign debt that, in the face of political revolt all across Europe, German politicians have resorted to recruiting the Justin Bieber crowd to maintain the status quo.

Simply put, if Greece fails, the banks will collapse, and European financial markets will tank. Politicians will stop at nothing to prevent this from happening… including sticking every man, woman, and child with the bailout bill, as well as pulling socialist-minded teenagers into the voting booths to ensure they stay in power.

Eventually, though, these efforts will prove fruitless. Greece has two months of cash left… and a default by any other name is still a default. The ‘have’ nations in Europe don’t want to foot the bailout bill any more than the ‘have not’ nations in Europe want to accept deep austerity measures.

This is going to cause a lot of turmoil in Europe in the short-term… and as the US government has successfully kicked its can down the road through late summer thanks to the Treasury Department plundering public pension money, investors are free to get their worry on in Europe.

I would suspect gold and silver in euro terms to do quite well as the market looks around, once and for all and realizes that there are truly no good major currency alternatives. This could be the start of a chain reaction.

The “Game Over” Redux
Submitted by Tyler Durden on 05/19/2011 21:01 -0400

Back in November, we posted a piece by Knight Research titled “The Game Is Over” in which the firm’s strategist Mark Lapolla presented his thesis why he believes that “the structural and cyclical terms of global trade have finally reached their tipping point. This will catalyze a wholesale change in sentiment and a historic repositioning of risk assets. The emerging market global growth story is over.” And while the article came out just as the barrage of $750 billion in daily POMOs courtesy of QE2 was starting and hence masked the true state of reality, now that QE2 is finishing, it is only appropriate to bring Mark back up front, as the imminent and very violent convergence of the rosy myth that is the stock market, and of the underlying miserable reality, is about to wake up all those who have been dozing under the Printer Piper of Eccleslin’s soothing tune, and Lapolla’s thesis is about to see its first validation. In essence, while we have heard much from those who claim that the end game will come as a result of hyperinflation, Lapolla is convinced in the opposite: namely that the end will be not a bang but a hyperdeflationary whimper. In order to refresh readers with his thoughts, recently Lapolla conducted an interview with the master questioner Kate Welling in which the Knight strategist laid out his uber-bearish case in more gruesome detail than most can stomach. Below we present the key points from his interview, as well as the full thing subsequently.

In a nutshell, and this won’t come as a surprise to anyone, Lapolla believes that “the game is over because there is no collateral… When consumer debt is rooted 75%-plus in residential real estate and residential real estate is impaired, easy Federal Reserve monetary policy simply cannot make it to Main Street. The transmission mechanism is broken. There is no conduit. ”

Lapolla’s observations on the secular shift in the employment structure:

What’s going on here is very simple. John Maynard Keynes wrote a letter entitled, “Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren “in 1930, in which he coined the term “technological unemployment.” He said it’s a term nobody has heard of, but you are going to be hearing a lot about it. Of course, he was writing about the use of technology to supplant labor in the factory… Any way you slice it, nominal wages, real wages, hourly wages, the duration of unemployment — all of these measures imply that we have a growing structural fracture in the labor markets.

On the irrelevance of week to week and month to month micro fluctuations in the jobs numbers:

Right now, the full employment gap is running about 11 million jobs. That’s a shocking gap and, although this is very difficult to quantify, we have a sinking suspicion that — while a number of the jobs that are being created right now might in fact be “good jobs” – they’re being filled by over-qualified labor no longer able to wait for jobs at compensation levels similar to what they had before. Now, in the very long run, this might work itself out, but in the short run it doesn’t do anything to change the outlook for the consumer. What it does is suggest that people are going to have to shift down the way they live and the way they expect to live — perhaps even further than they already have. Thus, the propensity to save in this country has to continue to rise — which (although not in the short term) is very bullish long term — whether that’s captured in the aggregate data or not. So as you’ve gathered, we are very different from consensus, first and foremost, when it comes to the secular structure of labor and credit in the U.S.

On the previously discussed topic of Squatter’s Rent (discussed extensively here):

There are roughly six to seven million folks who are no longer paying on the mortgages on their homes, so if we do some really simple arithmetic, it suggests in the aggregate as much as $100 billion of annualized consumer income is being freed up to find its way into consumer spending elsewhere in the economy, instead of going towards the satisfaction of housing debt…, the real question is if, or when, does the foreclosure mechanism begin to kick back into gear and then accelerate? At this juncture, there really isn’t a tremendous amount of evidence that it’s going to accelerate. Let me give you a tangible example. We know someone who has lost his job and is in a home with a $1.45 million mortgage. The house is on the market at $1.3 million, which we guess is the degree to which the home has been written down on the books of the mortgage holder. The property taxes on the home are about $20,000 a year, so he has been expecting an eviction notice or a foreclosure proceeding for almost 18 months. Yet his property taxes have been mysteriously paid every year. What is going on is clear: If the bank or whomever holds that mortgage note were to foreclose, the house’s liquidation value is prob¬ably about $900,000. So they would have to take a further $400,000 writedown on that mortgage. Which makes paying $20,000 a year in property taxes, look like a relative bargain.

On Europe’s state of suspended animation:

Europe right now is still kicking the deflationary can down the street; trying to postpone and prolong the inevitable. Meanwhile, they’re trying to cover their tracks with verbiage claiming they’re pursing mandated fiscal and monetary austerity policies and monetary policy. But the ECB’s bump up in rates of 25 basis points isn’t material. And all of this is intensifying the deflationary pressures on the periphery countries. So Europe is in a state of suspended animation, where the deflationary pressures are spilling out but even the sort of modest financial restructuring the United States is trying is still being resisted. It’s clearly not a stable situation.

On the “China” question:

I think the China situation, how¬ever, is profoundly obvious and profoundly simple. The idea that the free world is placing its hope in a repressive, communist regime employing command and control economic management while violating trade protections and human rights everywhere is absolutely astounding, amazing. I would suggest that, in itself, should be a sufficient warning flag. But let’s be a lot more specific. I actually see the situation in China as very analogous to the U.S. in 1929 and Japan in the 1980s….I’ll just tick off eight similarities between China circa 2011 and the U.S. before the Depression. 1) Massive disparity of wealth, income, and education. 2) Rapid industrialization and displacement of labor. 3) Opaque and misleading economic and financial data. 4) Massive build-up of leverage across the “rising” class. 5) Bubbles in both residential real estate and fixed asset/infrastructure development. 6) Accelerating and uncontrolled growth in disintermediated credit. 7) Expected transference of economic growth to domestic demand. And, finally, an accelerating price/wage spiral. Nonetheless, to China’s credit, they have a booming economy which has drawn the attention, admiration and certainly the economic aspirations of the world. The irony is, despite its hubris, China appears to have lost control — and has done so by doing everything it could to avoid that. Essentially, in its own zeal to placate its masses with rapid growth, China has created a tide of inflation that threatens it with wide-spread social unrest. But if it crushes speculation and clamps down on credit, it risks a deflationary collapse that would also threaten social harmony. The upshot is that China no longer controls its own destiny. The free markets do. As an aside, I would suggest that in the not-too distant future, when this all unravels, there will be downside as well as upside for the U.S., particularly as it relates to what we were talking about before, the way the U.S. has benefited from the value of intellectual property versus scale.

On China’s Lewis Point (discussed extensively here):

If there was one thing that pushed us over the edge to publish it last November, it was our belief, now confirmed, that China and an increasing number of other emerging markets are caught in a price/wage spirals that they’re not going to be able to control through monetary, fiscal or legislative policy. These are an inevitable result, not only of the credit boom, but of the manufacturing engine they’re living by. This is the great differentiator between the U.S. and China. The reason a systemic inflation cannot happen here for a long time and why it is happening in China is simply this: When labor is in the business of manufacturing goods (as opposed intellectual property or services), labor has a call on rising finished goods prices. When commodities prices begin to increase and manufacturers attempt to raise finished goods prices, wage rates must go up or labor’s value is necessarily diminished. This is the dynamic traditional U.S. manufacturing businesses faced decades ago, and now, in China, it has reached epic proportions. We’ve seen 20% to 30% wage increases by the government on the low end and by contract manufacturers such as Foxconn (FXCNF), which does the Apple (AAPL) iPhone, on the high end. It has raised wage rates, almost 30%. China bulls believe this wage inflation is good for workers and so ultimately is going to help China accelerate consumer demand as an engine of their growth. Nonetheless, it hasn’t and won’t, for a couple of reasons. 1) Savings rates actually are rising in the major city centers. 2) China’s consumer confidence numbers and research on the ground in China both show that labor has never been less secure than they are now, which seems paradoxical. One would think that China’s new¬found international power, along with higher incomes, would make Chinese workers feel all is right with the world. The problem is that the cost of living is growing even faster. Without getting too technical, China has probably crossed over what’s called, in academic theory, the Lewis Point, where the movement of labor from agriculture into manufacturing reaches a peak and begins to taper off as manufacturing labor begins to reconsider whether life in fact wasn’t better back on the farm.

On the link between inflation and money:

Increased money supply is not a causal factor for inflation. It’s like suggesting that a bartender is a causal factor for alcoholism. In reality, reserves, whether they exist in the system’s books or not, are always available. Credit creation cannot really be controlled. If you and I want to create a loan between ourselves, we can do it. If a bank wants to create a loan, it can do it. The only thing that can mitigate that ability is regulation of the banks. However, if we consider the off-balance-sheet and shadow banking mechanisms, there really is no way to control that credit creation. The only way the Federal Reserve can influence credit creation is by raising or lowering short-term rates. With that said, we’re at the outer bound, at zero, and what we’re finding is that demand for money is not increasing as the cost of money goes to zero — which is not unlike what we saw in Japan. What is happening, however, as ever when the cost of money stays this low, is that speculators are inclined to speculate because the cost of speculation on leverage is negligible.

The reason why, in Lapolla’s opinion, the Fed has failed in generating systemic inflation (and why the Fed will keep coming back, and doing the same wrong things over and over until everything finally breaks)

The reason [we don’t have systemic inflation] is that the labor markets are fractured. So, at the end of the day, what we’re having now is an asset inflation again, an echo. We’re not seeing the seeds or leading edge of wage/price inflation, the true driver of damaging systemic inflation. Asset inflation resolves itself in one way, and one way only, and that’s through asset deflation. So we have ongoing asset deflation in the residential real estate market. We have ongoing asset deflation in the commercial real estate market and we will ultimately have asset deflation across China and Asia.

On what would happen to the global economy if the dollar were to collapse versus the euro and commodities:

Global deflation and depression are what would happen.

On what self-cannibalizing HFT algorithms means for volume and for the markets in general.

Doesn’t it necessarily imply that there must be real inefficiencies in pricing on the table, for long-term investors, if everyone is totally focused on the short term? So, suggesting that “the game is over” has implications across the board. It has implications in terms of the way asset allocators think about investing, the way their money managers think about deploying capital, and ultimately about the way corporate managers think about deploying shareholder capital. We in effect are in this very awkward “teenage” stage where we’ve just had this fracturing shock, the credit crash, the exposing of all the financial hubris and misallocation of capital. We haven’t even moved to credibly addressing those issues in Europe and we’re still holding onto the notion that the emerging markets — which are just getting their first taste of capitalism on the back of reckless credit expansion and speculation — can somehow become the engine that overwhelms the massive deleveraging of the developed world. It’s a preposterous notion. I’m not being fatalistic. This is the way history moves. In 30 years, it will be clear to people, looking back, that this is the final chapter of the old story in which finance, financiers, leverage and short-term trading ruled the world.

On what the “sequel” is:

We’re moving towards something that, by definition, is going to have to address the real structural issues — in the U.S., fractured labor markets, still-excessive credit and unsupportable levels of debt tied to homes, a rising propensity to save, bleak expectations for wages and investment returns. From our vantage point, it’s only a question of timing. But it’s entirely possible that there won’t be an asymmetrically positive outcome for the globe. “Growth” is not a fait accompli. In fact, there can and probably should be periods, lengthy periods, of virtually no growth; of consolidation and pruning. So we would reject the notion that growth necessarily has to happen. Very marginal, just population-type, growth could in fact be the order of the day, and that implies a re-pricing of risk capital across the board.

Lastly, his investment advice:

Those who are bit more speculative, we’re encouraging to pick a spot where they will buy the U.S. long bond, if not zeros on the U.S. long bond, as rates start to move closer to 5%. It’s likely to have very high, equity-type returns, in short bursts.

Sitting here watching the €uro get hammered on the Greece rumour, I was idly trawling through some of my favourite sites and re-read this piece from Gonzalo Lira written a while back [December 2010]. Seems that now the pressure is off the USD, (obviously, now Gold and Silver have had a ‘correction’), attention has turned again to the other problem currency.

☞ Possible EMU Collapse: What To Pay Attention To In 2011

After the Greek and Irish bailouts, it looks like Portugal and possibly Belgium are up next in this perverse game of musical chairs played to the tune of sovereign debt—

—but these smaller countries are dwarfed by Spain: Spain, as I argued here, is where the European game is really at.

As I pointed out, Spain is twice the size of Greece, Ireland and Portugal combined—Spain is roughly half the size of Germany—Spain has a fiscal deficit of over 11% of GDP for 2010, and a total debt of over 80% of GDP, data here (I am counting the accumulated debt of comunidades autónomas, which is so far 10.2% of GDP and steadily rising; data here)—Spain has an unemployment of over 20%—

—in short, Spain is trouble.

Not “Spain is in trouble”—that’s obvious, but that’s not my point: Spain is trouble. Trouble for the German banks that own so much of the Spanish debt. Trouble for Germany, which is propping up its insolvent banks (What, you think German politicians are any less craven than American politicians?). Spain is trouble for the European Union, for what a German banking crisis might mean for the EU as a whole and as an institution.

More than anything, Spain is trouble for the European Financial Stability Facility, because Spain is too big to be saved—and there’s really no way to finesse that hard fact.

You know what a lynchpin is? Actually, I didn’t—I had to look it up. According to the dictionary, a lynchpin is “a pin passed through the end of an axle to keep the wheel in position”. Hence the figure of speech: Without a lynchpin, the wheel comes off, and the whole vehicle crashes.

In the case of Europe, the lynchpin can come off awfully fast—think of Ireland. A few impolitic words from Angela Merkel, and suddenly the Irish bond market panics. Suddenly, Ireland is teetering on the brink of insolvency, unable to meet its funding needs. And that was Ireland—all due respect to those wonderful people, but we’re talking a GDP of a paltry $227 billion. Ben Bernanke takes a morning dump bigger than that. What’s Ireland’s $227 billion when compared to Spain’s economy of $1.5 trillion?

Spain: During 2011, Spain will be the flash-point—so you want to keep one eye on Spanish sovereign bond spreads, and one eye on Brussels:

When Spanish debt spreads over German bunds creep into the 3.5% to 4% range, you know trouble is coming. And when the Spanish spread decisively crosses 4.25% over the German 10-year, then you know trouble’s arrived—and it won’t be leaving town ‘til it’s had its chance to run riot in the streets.

How the EU and the ECB handle an eventual Spanish sovereign debt crisis will determine the very future of the European Union.

Because there will be a Spanish sovereign debt crisis—it’s inevitable. The Spanish balance sheet is not improving fast enough, even with so-called “austerity” measures, because even though the Spanish government might be cutting spending, the comunidades autónomas—roughly analogous to states or regions—are expanding their budgets in order to take up the slack, and thereby increasing the Spanish deficit. Don’t believe me? Check the figures I just cited.

So when Spain goes into crisis—which should take place no later than August 2011, and perhaps as early as this coming March—the European Union’s collective and institutional reaction to this crisis event will determine whether a smaller, healthier European Monetary Union continues to exist, or whether the whole concept of EMU is ripped to shreds by events.

If the EU and the ECB are clever, and brave, and humble in the face of failure, then they’ll expel Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy from the European Monetary Union. The euro will remain the currency of the stronger economies—France, Holland, Germany—while the weaker economies will go back to their original currencies, and immediately devalue so as to kickstart their economies.

If, however, the European Union and European Central Bank leadership proves to be stupid, cowardly, and arrogant—as is very likely, considering their confused, self-defeating actions and reactions to the Greek and Irish crises—then there will be some sort of European-wide convulsion, when the bond markets panic, and leave Spain locked out of any funding.

This is the key event of 2011: Whether the European Monetary Union survives. Unless Brussels gets its collective shit together and realizes it has to cut the weaker economies loose from the euro, odds are high the euro goes the way of the dodo.

From Der Spiegel

German bund futures rose to an almost one-month high after Der Spiegel reported that Greece is considering withdrawing from the euro region, prompting investors to seek a refuge in Europe’s benchmark securities.

The futures contract expiring in June climbed 0.6 percent to 123.76 as of 6:20 p.m. in London. Greece isn’t considering abandoning use of the euro as its currency, the Athens-based Finance Ministry said in an e-mailed statement today. Such reports have been repeatedly denied by Greece in the past as well as by governments of other European Union countries, the statement said.

Greece is lobbying for easier terms on the 110 billion euros ($164 billion) of bailout loans as speculation of a default mounts a year after European leaders set up the unprecedented emergency fund to prevent the nation’s debt woes from spreading.

“Some sort of Greek restructuring was priced in the market, but the thought of them leaving the euro-zone never really was,” said Anthony Cronin, a Treasury trader at Societe General in New York. “If there’s something that happens over there this weekend, you’ve got to be properly positioned for it.”

The euro fell against all of its 16 most-traded counterparts, extending its two-day loss as much as 3.1 percent, the most since May 2010. U.S. Treasury notes reversed earlier losses as investors also sought U.S. government debt as a haven.

Debt Burden

EU leaders agreed in March to create a permanent rescue mechanism for the euro area, the European Stability Mechanism, or ESM. The ESM, which becomes effective in mid-2013 after a temporary facility expires, will make loans to fiscally strained governments under strict conditions. When governments can’t cover their debts in full, the ESM’s loans may be paid first, before private bondholders.

Even under cuts imposed as a bailout condition, Greece’s debt is forecast to climb to 159 percent of gross domestic product in 2012. The nation’s economy is forecast by the government to shrink for a third year in 2011, before returning to growth in 2012.

Greece’s possible exit from the euro area isn’t being discussed in the EU, said Steffen Seibert, German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s chief spokesman. “This isn’t on the table and hasn’t been on the table for the German government and isn’t a topic at the European level,” he said by telephone today.

Since exit is the sensible option for the people of Greece, this denial by Herr Siebert could signal an outbreak of common sense…