8 standard deviations

September 6th, 2011 — 4:21pm

just to realise how toxic the whole environment is…

Europe is falling apart. That reality has not changed as a result of the SNB action. Over the next few weeks we will get more bad news from the EU. In the past the ‘go to’ response has been to buy the Yen and CHF as a safe haven knee jerk reaction. Now that trade is dead (both of them in my opinion). So where will the hot money go the next time the headlines scare capital?



There is only one choice left now.

That would be gold.

Comment » | EUR, Geo Politics, The Euro

Soros’ exhortation for fiscal union to save the Euro

August 22nd, 2011 — 11:43am

There’s an anecdote in a book called “What They Teach You At Harvard Business School” by Philip Broughton about a speech given to the students concerning the little things that make a good leader.

He emphasised the difference between the victims at a company, those who blamed others and felt sorry for themselves, and those who tried to make things right. Identifying the victims, or ‘spectacle makers’, was vital, or else they would contaminate everything you did. To illustrate the polluting effect of a whiner, he said: ‘If I had my favourite bowl of ice cream over here and a bowl of shit over here, if I took one speck of shit and put it in the ice cream, would you eat the ice cream?’

In an interview given by Soros to Der Spiegel he argues that unless Germany agrees to fiscal union with the other eurozone members the Euro will break up and there will be a banking collapse. However, what he is advocating is stirring all the PIIGS shit into the ice cream.

Comment » | General, Geo Politics, Macro, PIIGS, The Euro

Liquidity Options Running Out For European Banks – “Liquidity Crisis Scene Set”

August 12th, 2011 — 1:16pm

Again from ZeroHedge
Submitted by Tyler Durden on 08/12/2011 08:43 -0400

One of the key catalysts for Wednesday’s market rout which originated in Europe came following news that Chinese banks had cut down on their credit lines to Europe, which highlighted the key threat to the European banking system: access to liquidity. The Chinese reaction is merely a symptom of a much deeper underlying ailment: the increasing lack of counterparty confidence across various funding markets, both traditional and shadow, which has continued to accelerate over the past week, a development summarized effectively by the latest report in the International Financing Review which uses some powerful words (of the type that European bureaucrats hate) to explain where Europe stands right now: “credit taps run dry for European lenders, setting scene for liquidity crisis.” For those strapped for time the take home message is that: “with bond markets shut and investors unwilling to buy asset-backed securities, the repo market – for some banks the sole remaining source of private funding – has become the most recent tap to run dry, with some investment banks pulling credit lines worth tens of billions of euros in recent weeks.” This is very disturbing as with liquidity windows shut, Europe’s bank have no recourse on how to roll the €4.8 trillion in wholesale and interbank funding which expires in the next two years. End result: the only recourse is the ECB, which unlike the Fed, is not suited to be a lender of last resort and has been morphing into that role over the past year kicking and screaming. And when that fails, there are the Fed’s liquidity swap lines. Too bad that the liabilities in the European banking system are orders of magnitude bigger than in the US, and should this liquidity crisis transform into its next and more virulent phase, even the Fed will find it does not have enough capital to prevent a worldwide short squeeze on the world’s carry trade funding currency (once known as the reserve currency).

First, IFR summarizes briefly how the last ditch liquidity conduit, repo, has now run out. The fact that even shadow banking system aggregates, or those entirely off the books, are being withheld, is very disturbing:

Bankers who once ran the now-defunct repo facilities for mid-sized European banks say the credit lines were withdrawn after risk managers became concerned about their own exposure to the enfolding sovereign debt crisis, leaving some clients now solely reliant on central banks for cash.

“Given what’s going on in the markets, there are big question marks surrounding some of these clients,” said one banker who has closed such lines. “The appetite from investment banks is fading. There is a great deal of concern about financing wrong-way collateral.”

“Many of the wholesale banks are starting to rethink these credit lines,” added the global markets chief of one European investment bank heavily present in the repo markets. “Things can turn pretty nasty if you get these things wrong.”

This is further distressing since the traditional venue of capital raising in Europe, covered bond issuance has ground to a halt, with not “a single publicly announced European covered bond deal since June.”

The culprit for the market freeze is quite simple to anyone who recalls the state of the markets in late 2008 and early 2009, when the Fed and the central bank cartel will had the option of backstopping the global financial system.

“Everyone has been cutting off their exposure,” said the head of another European investment bank. “It started with Greece, then Spain and now Italy. People don’t want to do business with these banks. Many of them have good underlying businesses but they are stuffed.”

At his point however, the global central bank intervention has not already occurred but is actively priced in at any given moment. There is no step function of additional liquidity that the central bankers can provide, which is why the status quo is scrambling so hard to avoid a quantum leap in the risk perception of European banks.

Another indication of the unwillingness to participate in the market is the complete elimination of crap collateral from tri-party repo lines:

The latest repo markets survey by the International Capital Market Association indeed shows a marked pick-up in the use of riskier assets in European tri-party repo deals. Though small as a proportion of the region’s entire €5.91trn repo market, the use of assets with a rating of below BBB– accounted for 5.1% of all transactions in December, up from 1.2% a year earlier.

That has now largely stopped, say bankers once heavily involved in such deals. Previously, they were able to hedge their exposures to such collateral – or repackage the collateral on behalf of clients to sell off in chunks to fund managers. But growing investor concern, and a rush towards safer assets, has meant that neither investment banks nor investors want to go near the stuff.

“We’ve attempted to do some trades with illiquid assets on behalf of peripheral banks, but we haven’t managed to syndicate deals,” said one senior banker that helped repackage some past deals. “Anything slightly peripheral-orientated is completely out of the question right now.”

What is, however, bad for banks, is perfectly good for the ECB, which will gladly hand over 100 cents on the dollar for the most worthless collateral it is stuffed with. There is one problem with this: Lehman did precisely this in the days and weeks before it filed. It did not help.

So with the ECB now happy to be Europe’s not-bad but thourughly toxic bank, how long until everyone realizes that the ECB is massively undercapitalized and its existence (yes, that includes its ability to print money), purely a factor of continued German good will.

Total use of the ECB’s main refinancing and long-term refinancing facilities – both part of the open market operations – are now close to €500bn, up from about €400bn in the spring.

According to Goldman Sachs, although such levels are well short of the almost €900bn used in 2009, the uptick is worrying. “This is a substantial figure, reflective of the strains in the banking system,” analysts wrote.

But banks’ use of the ECB open markets operations remains dependent upon them having ample quality assets on their books. Under the terms of the operations, the central bank will only provide liquidity against certain assets – generally those rated BBB– and above, with some exceptions.

If ECB eligible collateral runs out, banks will have little option but to sell off assets in a final fire sale, say bankers. That will depend on whether there are willing buyers for such assets, much of which were accumulated pre-2007 as retail, commercial and wholesale loans.

And as Germany has indicated, it is getting fed up with the ECB pledging what is effectively an ever increasing portion of its GDP either directly, by accepting worthless collateral, or indirectly, by funding an ever greater portion of the AAA-rating constrained EFSF. When does Germany find that the trade off between its sovereign risk and the fate of the EUR no longer makes practical sense.

So what is the conclusion:

“The financial wreckage at many of these banks is along the lines of World War Two,” added the global markets chief. “There is so much detritus. But a lot of them don’t want to sell at these current prices, they know there will be a capital hit if things are properly priced.”

Bottom line: 3 years after Lehman blew up we are in precisely the same position, only this time the culprits are European banks. This is to be expected as absolutely nothing has changed in that time period, and the end result, by implication, will be absolutely the same.

Comment » | Deflation, EURUSD, General, Macro, The Euro, USD

CDS Rerack

August 12th, 2011 — 11:43am

from zerohedge :

Submitted by Tyler Durden on 08/12/2011 – 07:28

BUNGA BUNGA: -25
SIESTA: -20
PORT: -90
YOGURT: unch
WAFFLES: -36
RIOTS: -11
GUINNESS: -45
F. FRIED: -21
ANSTALT: -10
GERM: -11.5

Comment » | Deflation, General, Geo Politics, Macro, The Euro

EURUSD

August 3rd, 2011 — 3:18pm

Predictions are hard to make, especially about the future, but following the latest piece from AEP in the telegraph, where he states :

“The Chinese central bank’s reserve manager SAFE is clearly buying euros on a large scale to hold down the yuan and safeguard export advantage in Europe, but it appears to be purchasing short-term debt of a one-year maturity or less and other liquid assets.”

also..

“The three-month euribor/OIS spread, the fear gauge of credit markets, reached the highest level in two years today, jumping 7 basis points to 40 in wild trading.

“Europe’s money markets are undoubtedly starting to freeze up,” said Marc Ostwald from Monument Securities.

“It’s not as dramatic as pre-Lehman but it is alarming and shows the pervasive degree of fear in the markets. People are again refusing to lend except on a secured basis.”

If those with demand for Euros can’t borrow any, short term rates will go up, even if the market is non functioning. This will put upward pressure on the currency…. Given that we’re sitting in the middle of the range formed since the low in May, and given the violence of the rejection of each new low seen during the last couple of days’ trading, a break to the upside of this range is now not inconceivable. The “negative” outlook for the eurozone probably means that the market is short, which to me warns of the possibility of a significant move higher.

1.51 is back in the frame.

Negated by a break back below 1.40.

Comment » | EUR, EURUSD, Geo Politics, Macro, Technicals, The Euro

That EU bailout plan in full… translated

July 24th, 2011 — 3:31pm

We are going to keep throwing good money after bad and work as hard as we can to transfer the debt that is on the banks to the ECB and European taxpayers as long as the voters will let us. This first tranche will be another €109 billion. That will last a few years, and Greece will only have to pay about 3.5% on that debt and the rollover debt, and people who expected to be repaid in that period will see payment extended to either 15 or 30 years.

hahahaha….

you mugs….

Call my chauffeur and get me back to my taxpayer funded penthouse…

Comment » | Deflation, EUR, Greece, Macro, PIIGS

Three Competing Theories

July 20th, 2011 — 2:44am

This is a great article which I am reposting from John Mauldin’s Outside the Box E-Letter.

You should sign up here

Three Competing Theories

By Lacy Hunt, Hoisington Asset Management

The three competing theories for economic contractions are: 1) the Keynesian, 2) the Friedmanite, and 3) the Fisherian. The Keynesian view is that normal economic contractions are caused by an insufficiency of aggregate demand (or total spending). This problem is to be solved by deficit spending. The Friedmanite view, one shared by our current Federal Reserve Chairman, is that protracted economic slumps are also caused by an insufficiency of aggregate demand, but are preventable or ameliorated by increasing the money stock. Both economic theories are consistent with the widely-held view that the economy experiences three to seven years of growth, followed by one to two years of decline. The slumps are worrisome, but not too daunting since two years lapse fairly quickly and then the economy is off to the races again. This normal business cycle framework has been the standard since World War II until now.

The Fisherian theory is that an excessive buildup of debt relative to GDP is the key factor in causing major contractions, as opposed to the typical business cycle slumps (Chart 1). Only a time consuming and difficult process of deleveraging corrects this economic circumstance. Symptoms of the excessive indebtedness are: weakness in aggregate demand; slow money growth; falling velocity; sustained underperformance of the labor markets; low levels of confidence; and possibly even a decline in the birth rate and household formation. In other words, the normal business cycle models of the Keynesian and Friedmanite theories are overwhelmed in such extreme, overindebted situations.


Economists are aware of Fisher’s views, but until the onset of the present economic circumstances they have been largely ignored, even though Friedman called Irving Fisher “America’s greatest economist.” Part of that oversight results from the fact that Fisher’s position was not spelled out in one complete work. The bulk of his ideas are reflected in an article and book written in 1933, but he made important revisions in a series of letters later written to FDR, which currently reside in the Presidential Library at Hyde Park. In 1933, Fisher held out some hope that fiscal policy might be helpful in dealing with excessive debt, but within several years he had completely rejected the Keynesian view. By 1940, Fisher had firmly stated to FDR in several letters that government spending of borrowed funds was counterproductive to stimulating economic growth. Significantly, by 2011, Fisher’s seven decade-old ideas have been supported by thorough, comprehensive and robust econometric and empirical analysis. It is now evident that the actions of monetary and fiscal authorities since 2008 have made economic conditions worse, just as Fisher suggested. In other words, we are painfully re-learning a lesson that a truly great economist gave us a road map to avoid.

High Dollar Policy Failures

If governmental financial transactions, advocated by following Keynesian and Friedmanite policies, were the keys to prosperity, the U.S. should be in an unparalleled boom. For instance, on the monetary side, since 2007 excess reserves of depository institutions have increased from $1.8 billion to more than $1.5 trillion, an amazing gain of more than 83,000%. The fiscal response is equally unparalleled. Combining 2009, 2010, and 2011 the U.S. budget deficit will total 28.3% of GDP, the highest three year total since World War II, and up from 6.3% of GDP in the three years ending 2008 (Chart 2). Importantly, the massive advance in the deficit was primarily due to a surge in outlays that was more than double the fall in revenues. In the current three years, spending was an astounding $2.2 trillion more than in the three years ending 2008. The fiscal and monetary actions combined have had no meaningful impact on improving the standard of living of the average American family (Chart 3).

Why Has Fiscal Policy Failed?

Four considerations, all drawn from contemporary economic analysis, explain the underlying cause of the fiscal policy failures and clearly show that continuing to repeat such programs will generate even more unsatisfactory results.

First, the government expenditure multiplier is zero, and quite possibly slightly negative. Depending on the initial conditions, deficit spending can increase economic activity, but only for a mere three to five quarters. Within twelve quarters these early gains are fully reversed. Thus, if the economy starts with $15 trillion in GDP and deficit spending is increased, then it will end with $15 trillion of GDP within three years. Reflecting the deficit spending, the government sector takes over a larger share of economic activity, reducing the private sector share while saddling the same-sized economy with a higher level of indebtedness. However, the resources to cover the interest expense associated with the rise in debt must be generated from a diminished private sector.

The problem is not the size or the timing of the actions, but the inherent flaws in the approach. Indeed, rigorous, independently produced statistical studies by Robert Barro of Harvard University in the United States and Roberto Perotti of Universita Bocconi in Italy were uncannily accurate in suggesting the path of failure that these programs would take. From 1955 to 2006, Dr. Barro estimates the expenditure multiplier at -0.1 (p. 206 Macroeconomics: A Modern Approach, Southwestern 2009). Perotti, a MIT Ph.D., found a low but positive multiplier in the U.S., U.K., Japan, Germany, Australia and Canada. Worsening the problem, most of those who took college economic courses assume that propositions learned decades ago are still valid. Unfortunately, new tests and the availability of more and longer streams of macroeconomic statistics have rendered many of the well-schooled propositions of the past five decades invalid.Second, temporary tax cuts enlarge budget deficits but they do not change behavior, providing no meaningful boost to economic activity. Transitory tax cuts have been enacted under Presidents Ford, Carter, Bush (41), Bush (43), and Obama. No meaningful difference in the outcome was observable, regardless of whether transitory tax cuts were in the form of rebate checks, earned income tax credits, or short-term changes in tax rates like the one year reduction in FICA taxes or the two year extension of the 2001/2003 tax cuts, both of which are currently in effect. Long run studies of consumer spending habits (the consumption function in academic circles), as well as detailed examinations of these separate episodes indicate that such efforts are a waste of borrowed funds. This is because while consumers will respond strongly to permanent or sustained increases in income, the response to transitory gains is insignificant. The cut in FICA taxes appears to have been a futile effort since there was no acceleration in economic growth, and the unfunded liabilities in the Social Security system are now even greater. Cutting payroll taxes for a year, as former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers advocates, would be no more successful, while further adding to the unfunded Social Security liability.

Third, when private sector tax rates are changed permanently behavior is altered, and according to the best evidence available, the response of the private sector is quite large. For permanent tax changes, the tax multiplier is between minus 2 and minus 3. If higher taxes are used to redress the deficit because of the seemingly rational need to have“shared sacrifice,” growth will be impaired even further. Thus, attempting to reduce the budget deficit by hiking marginal tax rates will be counterproductive since economic activity will deteriorate and revenues will be lost.

Fourth, existing programs suggest that more of the federal budget will go for basic income maintenance and interest expense; therefore the government expenditure multiplier may become more negative. Positive multiplier expenditures such as military hardware, space exploration and infrastructure programs will all become a smaller part of future budgets. Even the multiplier of such meritorious programs may be much less than anticipated since the expended funds for such programs have to come from somewhere, and it is never possible to identify precisely what private sector program will be sacrificed so that more funds would be available for federal spending. Clearly, some programs like the first-time home buyers program and cash for clunkers had highly negative side effects. Both programs only further exacerbated the problems in the auto and housing markets.
Permanent Fiscal Solutions Versus Quick Fixes

While the fiscal steps have been debilitating, new programs could improve business considerably over time. A federal tax code with rates of 15%, 20%, and 25% for both the household and corporate sectors, but without deductions, would serve several worthwhile purposes. Such measures would be revenue neutral, but at the same time they would lower the marginal tax rates permanently which, over time, would provide a considerable boost for economic growth. Moreover, the private sector would save $400-$500 billion of tax preparation expenses that could then be channeled to other uses. Admittedly, the path to such changes would entail a long and difficult political debate.

In the 2011 IMF working paper, “An Analysis of U.S. Fiscal and Generational Imbalances,” authored by Nicoletta Batini, Giovanni Callegari, and Julia Guerreiro, the options to correct the problem are identified thoroughly. These authors enumerate the ways to close the gaps under different scenarios in what they call “Menu of Pain.” Rather than lacking the knowledge to improve the economic situation, there may not be the political will to deal with the problems because of their enormity and the huge numbers of Americans who would be required to share in the sacrifices. If this assessment is correct, the U.S. government will not act until a major emergency arises.

The Debt Bomb

The two major U.S. government debt to GDP statistics commonly referred to in budget discussions are shown in Chart 4. The first is the ratio of U.S. debt held by the public to GDP, which excludes federal debt held in various government entities such as Social Security and the Federal Reserve banks. The second is the ratio of gross U.S. debt to GDP. Historically, the debt held by the public ratio was the more useful, but now the gross debt ratio is more relevant. By 2015, according to the CBO, debt held by the public will jump to more than 75% of GDP, while gross debt will exceed 104% of GDP. The CBO figures may be too optimistic. The IMF estimates that gross debt will amount to 110% of GDP by 2015, and others have even higher numbers. The gross debt ratio, however, does not capture the magnitude of the approaching problem.

According to a recent report in USA Today, the unfunded liabilities in the Social Security and Medicare programs now total $59.1 trillion. This amounts to almost four times current GDP. Modern accrual accounting requires corporations to record expenses at the time the liability is incurred, even when payment will be made later. But this is not the case for the federal government. By modern private sector accounting standards, gross federal debt is already 500% of GDP.

Federal Debt – the End Game

Economic research on U.S. Treasury credit worthiness is of significant interest to Hoisington Management because it is possible that if nothing is politically accomplished in reducing our long-term debt liabilities, a large risk premium could be established in Treasury securities. It is not possible to predict whether this will occur in five years, twenty years, or longer. However, John H. Cochrane of the University of Chicago, and currently President of the American Finance Association, spells out the end game if the deficits and debt are not contained. Dr. Cochrane observes that real, or inflation adjusted Federal government debt, plus the liabilities of the Federal Reserve (which are just another form of federal debt) must be equal to the present value of future government surpluses (Table 1). In plain language, you owe a certain amount of money so your income in the future should equal that figure on a present value basis. Federal Reserve liabilities are also known as high powered money (the sum of deposits at the Federal Reserve banks plus currency in circulation). This proposition is critical because it means that when the Fed buys government securities it has merely substituted one type of federal debt for another. In quantitative easing (QE), the Fed purchases Treasury securities with an average maturity of about four years and replaces it with federal obligations with zero maturity. Federal Reserve deposits and currency are due on demand, and as economists say, they are zero maturity money. Thus, QE shortens the maturity of the federal debt but, as Dr. Cochrane points out, the operation has merely substituted one type for another. The sum of the two different types of liabilities must equal the present value of future governmental surpluses since both the Treasury and Fed are components of the federal government.

Calculating the present value of the stream of future surpluses requires federal outlays and expenditures and the discount rate at which the dollar value of that stream is expressed in today’s real dollars. The formula where all future liabilities must equal future surpluses must always hold. At the point that investors lose confidence in the dollar stream of future surpluses, the interest rate, or discount rate on that stream, will soar in order to keep the present value equation in balance. The surge in the discount rate is likely to result in a severe crisis like those that occurred in the past and that currently exist in Europe. In such a crisis the U.S. will be forced to make extremely difficult decisions in a very short period of time, possibly without much input from the political will of American citizens. Dr. Cochrane does not believe this point is at hand, and observes that Japan has avoided this day of reckoning for two decades. The U.S. may also be able to avoid this, but not if the deficits and debt problem are not corrected. Our interpretation of Dr. Cochrane’s analysis is that, although the U.S. has time, not to urgently redress these imbalances is irresponsible and begs for an eventual crisis.
Monetary Policy’s Numerous Misadventures

Fed policy has aggravated, rather than ameliorated our basic problems because it has encouraged an unwise and debilitating buildup of debt, while also pursuing short term policies that have increased inflation, weakened economic growth, and decreased the standard of living. No objective evidence exists that QE has improved economic conditions. Even before the Japanese earthquake and weather related problems arose this spring, real economic growth was worse than prior to QE2. Some measures of nominal activity improved, but these gains were more than eroded by the higher commodity inflation. Clearly, the median standard of living has deteriorated.

When the Fed diverts attention with QE, it is possible to lose sight of the important deficit spending, tax and regulatory barriers that are restraining the economy’s ability to grow. Raising expectations that Fed actions can make things better is a disservice since these hopes are bound to be dashed. There is ample evidence that such a treadmill serves to make consumers even more cynical and depressed. To quote Dr. Cochrane, “Mostly, it is dangerous for the Fed to claim immense power, and for us to trust that power when it is basically helpless. If Bernanke had admitted to Congress, ‘There’s nothing the Fed can do. You’d better clean this mess up fast,’ he might have a much more salutary effect.” Instead, Bernanke wrote newspaper editorials, gave speeches, and appeared on national television taking credit for improved economic conditions. In all instances these claims about the Fed’s power were greatly exaggerated.

Summary and Outlook

In the broadest sense, monetary and fiscal policies have failed because government financial transactions are not the key to prosperity. Instead, the economic well-being of a country is determined by the creativity, inventiveness and hard work of its households and individuals.

A meaningful risk exists that the economy could turn down prior to the general election in 2012, even though this would be highly unusual for presidential election years. The econometric studies that indicate the government expenditure multiplier is zero are evidenced by the prevailing, dismal business conditions. In essence, the massive federal budget deficits have not produced economic gain, but have left the country with a massively inflated level of debt and the prospect of higher interest expense for decades to come. This will be the case even if interest rates remain extremely low for the foreseeable future. The flow of state and local tax revenues will be unreliable in an environment of weak labor markets that will produce little opportunity for full time employment. Thus, state and local governments will continue to constrain the pace of economic expansion. Unemployment will remain unacceptably high and further increases should not be ruled out. The weak labor markets could in turn force home prices lower, another problematic development in current circumstances. Inflationary forces should turn tranquil, thereby contributing to an elongated period of low bond yields. The Fed may resort to another round of quantitative easing, or some other untested gimmick with a new name. Such undertakings will be no more successful than previous efforts that increased over-indebtedness or raised transitory inflation, which in turn weakened the economy by directly, or indirectly, intensifying financial pressures on households of modest and moderate means.

While the massive budget deficits and the buildup of federal debt, if not addressed, may someday result in a substantial increase in interest rates, that day is not at hand. The U.S. economy is too fragile to sustain higher interest rates except for interim, transitory periods that have been recurring in recent years. As it stands, deflation is our largest concern, therefore we remain fully committed to the long end of the Treasury bond market.

Comment » | Deflation, Fed Policy, General, Macro, US denouement

Germany must leave the Euro

July 14th, 2011 — 8:52pm

June 27, 2011 by guidoromero
As I speculated some two years ago, it seems to me that if anyone should leave the Euro it is Germany. The rationale is that weak members need the union more than the union needs them. Conversely, the union needs strong members more than strong members need it.

Even assuming Greece should leave the union, I don’t see how other weak members could stay on. If Greece goes, borrowing costs will sky rocket for all other weak members thereby hastening their demise. This in turn brings about two dilemmas. First, if all weak members start falling off the wagon then how many members other than Germany might be left? Second, even assuming Greece should go, this will bring about the marking to market of Greece’s debt held by the ECB… which I think should bring about the marking to market of all other sovereign debt held there… in other words this would be the “poof!” moment for the ECB thus the dissolution of the EU…

In my view, the path of least complication is if Germany quits the Euro and the EU

There is actually a faint hope that with the bayonets of the German taxpayers pointed at their arses, the dumbf*ck German politicians might make the right choice. All is now crystal clear; It’s a race to become toilet paper between the Euro and the US Dollar now.

Sorry, second thoughts… Can politicians admit mistakes ?

Oh shit…

Comment » | Deflation, Geo Politics, PIIGS, The Euro

Next Downleg

June 21st, 2011 — 7:26am

From Porter Stansberry in the S&A Digest

Porter Stansberry: The next stage of the crisis is starting now
Monday, June 20, 2011

We’re about to see a return to crisis-like conditions in the world’s credit markets. This will devastate financial stocks. It should also hit commodity prices and commodity-related stocks hard. In today’s Digest, I’ll show you why I believe this will happen.

As longtime readers know, I write Friday’s Digest personally. In general, I try my best to teach our subscribers something useful. I’ve always run my research company with a few simple principles in mind. Among them, I strive to provide you with the information I would expect if our roles were reversed. You should know… abiding by this principle often requires me to share information with you before I can be 100% certain it’s correct.

That’s the case with today’s Digest. I want to show you the warning signs as I see them, right now. I want to guide you through my thinking process. And while I’ll give you my predictions about what these things mean, I hope you’ll realize that, as Yogi Berra famously said, predictions are tough – especially about the future.

The next stage in the ongoing global financial crisis will feature the collapse of both the Spanish and the Italian economies. This should occur within the next six months. Concurrently, I believe the “Chinese miracle” will be unmasked as mostly a fraud powered by a huge increase in bad lending from state-controlled banks.

Ironically, the coming wave of financial trouble will probably force people back into U.S. dollars. Gold will also do well. In the currency markets, I believe the euro will collapse in the second half of this year, as will the Australian dollar, which serves as a proxy for the Chinese economy.

I expect this next “down leg” in the world’s markets to be more severe than the crisis of 2008, because the balance sheets of the Western democracies are now less prepared to manage the losses.

Finally, I believe the euro will simply cease to exist.

The first thing I want to show you is the share price of UniCredit. You have probably never heard of UniCredit, but it is a major European bank, with significant operations in eastern and southern Europe. UniCredit is based in Italy. I’ve been keeping my eye on UniCredit for years, for reasons I’ll explain below. UniCredit is the ultimate “canary in the coal mine” of the world’s global currency system.

Most people don’t know that UniCredit is the direct descendent of Oesterreichische Credit-Anstalt, the largest bank in Eastern Europe before World War II. Translated the name means: Imperial Royal Privileged Austrian Credit-Institute for Commerce and Industry. It was a Rothschild bank. The family founded it 1855, and it became one of the most important banks in Europe.

Credit-Anstalt held assets and took deposits from all over Europe. In 1931, the bank failed as a direct result of the U.S.’s Smoot-Hawley tariff. The act crippled Germany’s economy and led French investors to redeem all the capital they’d lent to the bank. The failure of Credit-Anstalt caused Austria to abandon the gold standard, which set off a series of economic dominoes. Germany left gold… then Great Britain… and finally, in 1933, so did America.

The failure of Credit-Anstalt is what really kicked off the Great Depression. I have long been convinced the failure of its successor bank – now called UniCredit – would presage the next global monetary collapse.

I first began warning investors about UniCredit’s likely collapse and its historic role in the world’s monetary history back in March 2010. Since then, the bank’s shares have grown weaker and weaker. And since March, the shares have fallen off a cliff, hitting lows not seen since March 2009.

The sudden weakness in UniCredit’s shares (down 21% in the last several weeks) indicates to me that big trouble is brewing in Europe. I don’t believe efforts to stop the crisis in Greece will work. The austerity measures undertaken in Ireland, Spain, Italy, and Greece have severely weakened these economies, causing loan losses to banks like UniCredit.

And if there’s a run on UniCredit (and I believe there will be), the losses will be too large for Italy to manage without a huge international bailout. UniCredit has borrowed $300 billion from other European banks. And Italy’s government already owes creditors more than 120% of GDP. There aren’t any easy solutions to this problem.

Another warning comes from a friend who is a senior executive at a major Wall Street bank. He sees more high-yield bond deals than just about anyone else in the world. He told our Atlas 400 group last weekend that credit markets around the world were suddenly shutting down. Yields were moving up. Spreads (the cost to borrow above the sovereign rate) were getting wider for the first time since March 2009.

Why? Because the market knows that the U.S. Federal Reserve is going to stop buying $85 billion-plus per month of U.S. Treasury debt. But the Treasury is going to continue to issue more debt. In total, 61% of the entire federal debt will mature within four years. That means roughly $10 trillion in U.S. Treasury bonds will have to be sold, plus whatever the total deficit adds up to over the next four years – maybe another $6 trillion.

It’s difficult to imagine this amount of Treasury issuance won’t have a big impact on the world’s credit markets because these bonds always sell first and at the lowest yields. As these yields “back up” because of the large issuance, they should drain liquidity away from other issues, causing other bond prices to fall. This will reduce liquidity and make issuing debt more expensive across the credit spectrum.

China’s boom since 2009 was fueled by massive domestic debt issuance, which was unsustainable and is reversing. In addition, one Chinese company after another is being revealed as a fraud – and then crashing. These are not isolated events. I have studied Chinese companies for more than a decade. Out of all the stocks I’ve analyzed closely, I’ve only seen a handful I didn’t believe were fraudulent.

So far, none of the major Chinese banks have come under serious scrutiny. But I believe they will… and I believe major fraud will be discovered. Take the recent weakness in the shares of China Life Insurance (LFC), for example. This isn’t a minor company. It’s a $90 billion life insurance company. As fraud allegations spread into major Chinese financials, the entire underpinning of the Chinese boom will fall apart. It has all been fueled by debt and fixed-asset investments (land, buildings, equipment, and machinery). Consider just a few of these facts…

Fixed-asset investment remains greater than 50% of GDP in China, for the 12th year in a row. No other country has ever had more than nine years of this kind of sustained fixed-asset investment.

In the first five months of 2011, fixed-asset investment grew by 25.8% according to China’s National Bureau of Statistics. That’s $1.39 trillion worth of investment.

Jim Chanos, the famed short seller, says China is currently building 30 billion square feet of commercial real estate. That is enough to provide every person in China with a five-square-foot cubicle.

Jeremy Grantham, one of the world’s most astute investors, points out that China has been purchasing gigantic quantities of raw materials. The scale of these purchases makes them impossible to sustain. China makes up 9.4% of the world’s economy, but it is currently consuming 53% of the world’s cement, 47% of the world’s iron ore, and 46.9% of its coal.

A massive increase in China’s domestic debt fueled this investment. In 2010, for example, Chinese banks extended $55 billion in loans – up 95% from the year before. Now, banking regulators are increasing reserve requirements, greatly reducing the amount of available credit. In May, lending was down 25% versus last year.

With Europe’s crisis heating back up, with credit tightening in the U.S. (thanks to the end of quantitative easing), and with China’s boom unraveling… it’s time to be extremely cautious. I don’t know when it will start… but we’re entering another period of soaring volatility, increasing interest rate spreads, and falling stock and bond prices. How the authorities deal with these problems will set the stage for what happens next. If they try to paper over these continuing crises again – with new money-printing programs from the Federal Reserve – you can expect a massive inflation and what I call The End of America.

Our best hope for more stability and a return to prosperity is for people to realize that bailing out banks doesn’t solve these problems. It only makes them worse. But… I’m not optimistic. In the June issue of my newsletter, Stansberry’s Investment Advisory, I detail my best two new ideas to profit from the next stage of this crisis.

Comment » | Deflation, EUR, Geo Politics, PIIGS, The Euro, USD

IMF

June 18th, 2011 — 12:03pm

IMF warns US, eurozone deficits a threat to stability

The International Monetary Fund warned that Washington and debt-ridden European countries are “playing with fire” unless they take drastic steps to reduce their budget deficits.

The warning came as the IMF cut its growth forecast for the US and said the risks facing the global economy have increased since April.

It said the euro area’s worsening crisis, signs of economic weakening in the US and overheating in the developing world all pose fresh threats to global stability.

“The global economy has turned the corner from the Great Recession. However, securing the transition from recovery to expansion will require a concerted effort at addressing diverse challenges,” the IMF said in its World Economic Outlook update.

World growth this year is expected to be 4.3pc, a downgrade from 4.4pc in April, prompted predominantly by a sharp reduction in America. US GDP is now forecast to grow at 2.5pc this year and 2.7pc in 2012, compared with its prediction in April of 2.8pc and 2.9pc respectively.

“For the US, it is critical to immediately address the debt ceiling and launch a deficit reduction plan that includes entitlement reform and revenue-raising tax reform,” it said.

Jose Vinals, director of the IMF’s monetary and capital markets department, added: “If you make a list of the countries in the world that have the biggest homework in restoring their public finances to a reasonable situation in terms of debt levels, you find four countries: Greece, Ireland, Japan and the United States.

“You cannot afford to have a world economy where these important decisions are postponed because you’re really playing with fire.”

The IMF had already downgraded its forecasts for UK growth to 1.5pc from 1.7pc in April, which was itself a downgrade from 2pc in November.

It added: “Downside risks due to heightened potential for spillovers from further deterioration in market confidence in the euro area periphery have risen since April. Market concerns about possible setbacks to the US recovery have also surfaced.

If these risks materialize, they will reverberate across the rest of the world–possibly seriously impairing funding conditions for banks and corporations in advanced economies and undercutting capital flows to emerging economies.”

Comment » | Asia, General, Geo Politics, PIIGS, The Euro, US denouement, USD

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